I submit to the good sense of this convention, whether it is proper or right that these judges who have been guilty of no offence-men who are unimpeached, and, for aught I know, unimpeachable, should be turned out neck and heels, after having served the public faithfully for many years, and turned out, too, without even the form of a trial.

Mr. FORWARD, of Allegheny, said:

I am strongly opposed to the report of the minority of the committee, and for reasons which to my mind are perfectly satisfactory.

In the first place, there is no provision made for the chief justice. Is it intended that within three months after the third Tuesday in January, the chief justice may be superseded by one of his associates? Is this the intention? This point is met by saying that the chief justice may be re-appointed. But look at the naked proposition! What is it? You have the judges of your supreme court, five rivals for the favor of the governor all at once. Would such a scene be creditable to this great commonwealth-would it be creditable to the supreme court-would it be creditable to the executive government, that five of your highest judges should be all at once at the feet of the governor suing for preference? What must be the feelings of the supreme magistrate in such a state of things? What is he to do without giving offence? Here five persons are brought before him, and he is compelled to take his election between them. Will you impose upon your chief magistrate so invidious an office? And the senate too! What will be its situation? Here you have your judges going before the governor with all their pressing impor tunity, suing for preference, all at the same time, and entreating the sen ate of the commonwealth for their favor.. Thus you have them before the executive and the senate in a position which is disreputable to the state.

But, sir, this is not all. What must be the feelings engendered among these men, who are thus, by the action of this convention, to be made of necessity, rivals for office? Do you imagine that this competition which you are about to fasten upon them, will produce nothing like a feeling of rivalry? Do you imagine that there will be no fear, no jealousy, no heart burnings among them?

Will

What will be the condition of the supreme court? It will be one of discord, of mutual distrust, and mutual resentment. Think you that the man who is successful, and gains office for fifteen years, will ever find his brethren reconciled to him while he remains upon the bench? there be no question among them which is the most worthy? Will the judge who is put aside, deem himselfless worthy than the other? Will his friends think that he is so? Sir, there will be distrust; and that harmony which is requisite to the dignity of the bench, and the administration of justice, will be banished.

There are no the reason for imposing this

The condition of the inferior courts is a different thing. competitors, made so by your provision. And where is this? Recollect that we are making this restriction and duty on the governor, and this necessity upon the judges. And why are we doing so? Why not say at once that this man shall hold his office for the term of fifteen years-another for the term of twelve-another for the term of nine-another for the term of six, and another for the term of three? Is their judicial reputation any secret here? Are their personal

claims any secret here? Are they not known to us well? Why then should we not fix ourselves the terms for which they are to be retained ? Why throw this task upon the governor? Why upon the senate? Why produce difficulty among the members of the senate? Why should there be this rivalry? Why this supposition of foul dealing? There is no apology for it; there can be none. Let us then take the task upon our• selves, and thus prevent that discord which must arise in the court, and which never will be healed? Let me tell gentleman that, by adopting the course to which we are here invited, we are doing a great prejudice to the senators before the supreme court-that we are injuring the fountains of justice, that we are throwing every thing into confusion, and producing heart burnings and enmities-marking the man, graduating the man, saying who is the most worthy, and who is not so. And to what end is all this? May not you exercise this power as well as the governor? May not you exercise it as well as the senate? Is it true that these judges are better known to the senate than to us? Dispose of them as you will; but do not cast this invidious office проп others. I can see no excuse for refraining from this work, if we adopt such an amendment at all. If you go thus far, go to the end. Mark your men first rate-mark them second rate-mark them third rate-mark them fourth rate--or else go to the date of their commission.

Is there any danger in permitting these men to hold their offices? Are we blind? Do we profess a total ignorance of their capacity-a total ignorance of their fitness for office? I ask gentlemen, are they acting upon the ground of principle? If so, why will you put one man out, and another man in? Where is the difference? How will you make it out? Why will you make any difference between them? If they are equal, why not make it a lottery? Why not let them cast lots, and see who shall be fortunate, and who shall not? Turn the wheel of fortune, and take the uppermost. But why is it that you are thus going to distinguish between them, and to say that one shall go out at one time, and another at another? Sir, this stands on no principle, but some dream of expediency, some imaginable policy which points to this course as the proper one. There is no principle in it-none at all. How is the fact in relation to these judges? Why will you disturb this court unless you give a reason for it? Is there a lawyer within the sound of my voice who is ignorant of the character of the judges of the supreme court? If they are worthy and competent men, age and death will do the work fast enough. It is to them you may look to graduate the scale.

If they were worthy men, why, he would ask, should we not let them remain in office for fifteen years, or turn them all out at once? He was opposed to the principle of graduation. Let all go out at once, if found unworthy. If the judges were honest, upright and honorable men, why should they not be allowed to hold their offices for fifteen years? If they were honorable and worthy and creditable to the court, why should they not be allowed to remain? Would you breake in upon the comforts of those aged men, long removed from the arena of young and ambitious lawyers, and now in the decline of life, verging upon the vale of years? You have come on them with this torture, with these invidious distinctions, to bear them down to the ground. They, who are almost pennyless very poor-who expected to hold their offices so long as they were

competent to perform their duties now without saying that they are unfit —without charging them with any faults-be told that they must go out. Yes, without any allegation against them of having either neglected or violated their duty, they are to be thus dealt with by the power which commissioned them to hold during good behaviour.

He was opposed also, to the introduction of the principle of graduation into the inferior courts, though of Iss importance there than in the supreme court. The terms of office were proposed to be regulated by dates of the commissions of the judgas, and the re-appointment of those officers is to be left to the new governor. Why, he asked, should that be done? What reason could be assigned for it? Would he be better acquainted with their characters than we are? He thought that it would be better for this convention to name those judges who shall go out of office, and re-appoint those who shall remain, instead of leaving this duty to be performed by the governor, as the judges would each become tivals for his favor with a view to obtain the longest term of appointment. By adopting this course of proceeding, much dissension, heart-burning, and discord, which would probably otherwise prevail, would be removed. He was of opinion that the responsibility which was proposed to be thrown upon the governor, was of such a character as never could be exercised without producing great difficulty and leading to results which might be much regretted.

Mr. BROWN, of Philadelphia county, said he agreed in the main, with the arguments advanced by the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. For ward) and was not only wiling, bat desirous that the convention should take whatever responsibility attached to this subject, on itself. He thought that we ought to classify the dates of the commissions, and to say which of the judges shall go out and which shall remain in office. It was unnecessary for him to add any thing to what had been said by the delegate from Allegheny, in reference to the impropriety of leaving to the governor the responsibili y and difficulty of arranging this highly important ma ter. His (Mr. B's.) intention was to move an amendment at the proper time, providing that the commissions of the present judges shall expire in the order of their date at periods of three years.

Thus, as he had said, each judge would go out of office three years after each other, and the youngest judge would serve out his term of fifteen years. He should much prefer that this body would take the responsibility connected with this arrangement, instead of throwing it upon the governor of the commonwealth. For one, he was perfectly willing to bear his share of it. The first term that would expire would be that of Judge Rogers, whose commission was dated 1826, and would end in 1842. Now, the age of that gentleman was not so great, but that he might be re appointed for hfteen years. The next was Judge Huston, appointed in 1836, and from whom there was nothing to hope or to fear. He has six or seven years to serve, by the expiration of which time, he would be about seventy years old. The third would be Chief Justice Gib. son, whose term expires in ten years, and which would bring him to the verge of seventy, a period when he ought to quit the bench, or the peo ple might dispense with his services. Judge Kennedy's commission would expire in thirteen years, when he would be about seventy years of age, and the period would have arrived when he, also, ought to retire

from the bench, as well as Julge Sergeant who had between fifteen and sixteen years to serve, according to the plan which he (Mr. Brown) had laid down.

This was a good age for the judges to retire; and he did not think that any injustice would be done to them by requiring that they should then retire; or that injury would be done to the commonwealth by continuing their services so long. He was not going to say any thing against or for them. All that he desired to do was to carry out the principle, he had indicated with a due regard to them and to the wishes and welfare of the people of Pennsylvania. He was satisfied that it was the wish of the citizens of this state that the services of the judges shoud expire at stated periods. Like the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) he did not wish to see the judges pandering to the purposes of the governor for one year, or even one day, with a view to obtaining the longest term of appointment. He trusted that the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton would not be carried into effect.

Mr. SCOTT, of Philadelphia, said that the simple question before the convention, was between the proposition of the gentleman from Northampton, and that of the minority of the cumminee. He thought there were too strong objections to the plan proposed by the delegate from Luzerne, which it would be difficult to get over. He would state what he believed to be these two strong reasons. This convention had solemnly said, by the vote adopting the amendment, which was afterwards confirmed by other votes, that it was their opinion that the tenure of the judges of the supreme court should be fifteen years, provided they should so long behave well. That is the declared sentiment of the convention, which they have required to have introduced into the fundamental law.

The proposition of the gentleman from Luzerne, is that the tenure of one of these judges shall be reduced to three years, one to six years, one to nine years, and one to twelve years, and that the one remaining judge only shall hold for fifteen years. Now, he would ask every man if that was not the operation and meaning of this amendment, The governor will appoint one for three years. His tenure will only be for three years, and so with the rest. And although the convention have said the tenure of the supreme judges shall be fifteen years, yet we are now called on to agree to discharge a judge twelve years before he shall reach the end of the constitutional tenure. When the tenure of fifteen years was adopted was it not said that this was a tenure essential to secure the independence of the judiciary. Will the convention now say that they had no good reasons for the adoption of this tenure of fifteen years, and that there fore, they will appoint the judges for three, six, nine and twelve years? This then he considered to be a strong reason why the proposition of the gentleman from Luzerne should not be adopted.

Another and the second reason was this; and it was a reason which would last through all time. Take the individuals who now occupy the bench, one of them is to go out at the end of three years. At the end of three years he will therefore be a candidate for re-appointment. Another is to go out in six years, and at the end of that time, he hopes also for a re-appointment. Another is in the same situation at the end of nine years, and another at the end of twelve years, and this principle

would be going on and operating forever. He would ask if this was the position in which any citizen of Pennsylvania would desire to see that supreme court placed to which the lives and liberties of the whole peo. ple have been trusted? Would not the inevitable tendency of this state of things be to destroy that independence and stability which are so essential in that tribunal. This was another and a powerful objection to the plan proposed by the amendment of the gentleman from Luzerne.

Now, I know very well, that this objection to a certain extent applies to the case of your judges whose commissions run for fifteen years without rotation. But if they should all live, that is a difficulty which will occur only once in fifteen years. There would be ten years during which the citizens may look for an impartial administration of justice, and a period of four or five years during which some apprehension may be entertained.

For these two reasons which, to my mind, are far beyond all personal considerations, having reference to the gentlenen now in commission, I think that almost anything would be better than the proposition of the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward.) The proposition of the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) is infinitely to be preferred.

Mr. MEREDITH, said. I have a few words to say on this question. I am not disposed, nor would it be of any use to quarrel with the decis ion of the convention, that the tenure of the judges of the supreme court shall be for the term of fifteen years. You have come to that decision. A part of the system which this convention seemed desirous to carry out, was to diminish executive patronage.

In order to diminish that patronage, and for no other cause that I can see, you have thrown upon the people the election of persons to fill cer tain small offices-of small emolument and of petty trust;—and this you have done in order that you might clip the claws of that monster-the executive. Now, unless you wish to show that your aim has been only to throw dust in the eyes of the people, you must carry out the principles you profess in the present instance in such a way as at all events to decrease executive patronage; for the people of the commonwealth will not be slow to perceive that although you have carried out your principle in small matters, you have utterly failed to do so in matters of grave import.

Sir, you will perceive, and they will perceive, that while upon one hand you have done this, you have on the other, under cover of reducing the judiciary within the power of the people (to whom in fact you have given a power over them) introduced on the part of the gov ernor and his organs in the senate, a principle of intreague in the appointment to office- - principle which will give rise to the worst kind of logrolling.

After reducing executive patronage in the manner I have described, you have given to the governor and the senate every ten years as to the judges of the court of common pleas, and every five years as to the associate judges, the power of a new appointment. What will be the consequence? Look at your proposed rotation of the president judges of the court of common pleas. Look at your district courts. Look at your associate judges going out every five years. Will not every governor who can succeed in holding office two terms, now have the appointment of the

VOL. XIII.

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