associate judges? Instead of having the appointment of clerks of the court and justices of the peace, he will have the appointment in every county of at least two associate judges. And, taking the rotation as it now stands under our amendment, how many presidents of the districts of our commonwealth will the governor have to appoint-and whom he would not have to appoint if you had not taken this extraordinary method of reducing executive patronage? Is there any party here so blinded as not to see through this? Does any man suppose that the people will be so wheedled by this as to suppose that the power of the executive is diminished in this way? I ask any man to look at the schedule reported by the minority, and to see in the term of six years, aye, or of three years, how many president judges will be laid at the feet of the executive. There is not the most remote township in the mountains, in which the hope of executive patronage will not reach the heart of every man who is engaged in politics.

Having done all this, what is proposed to be done again under the color of reducing executive patronage? What are we going to do now? In addition to all the chances of vacancies which have heretofore existed, and must necessarily exist, under any system by death, superannuation, and now by expiration of terms, you are going to give to every governor who shall be elected, whether he holds the office for two terms, or for one, the certainty of one appointment to the bench of the supreme court. This is the course which this convention, in the exercise of its ardent patriotism, in its desire to cut down executive patronage, and to preserve the purity of our institutions are going to pursue, in order that political aspirants may never be without an opportunity of looking to that reward which is to be had for party services from an executive who may be willing to make an appointment to suit his party views. I do not mean to say, that the executive would make an appointment totally unworthy. Many of those men who have been most active, have been, and will be entirely fit for the station. But I say that you are here laying down a principle that one, at all events of these commissions, shall be in the power of the executive in every term. And, in addition to this, comes all the chance patronage which may fall in.

Now, I want to know how the accumulation of patronage is thus to be prevented? You are going to take a certain evil which is represented to be so great, that the mere possibility that it might happen fifteen years hence, is to be the reason for the present course,-I say you are going to take that very step at the present moment; because as to all evils that can be spoken of, it is just as bad to leave to a governor and senate to say which of the judges shall be appointed for three years, and which for fifteen, as to leave the whole open.

I shall not go upon what my colleague, (Mr. Scott) and the gentleman from Allegheny, (Mr. Forward) have said, as to the spirit of discord. which you are introducing into this tribunal; but I say that, for every public purpose, the evil is as great to leave to the governor the selection of the judges, as it would be to leave to him to turn them all out, or to re-appoint them at the end of fifteen if they should all live-the improbability of which is so great as to be almost counted among the things that are impossible. There are five judges on the bench of the supreme court, some of whom have been declared to be old. You may leave it to Pro

vidence, you may leave it to the hand of death to make the selection. Does not every man here believe that, in the course of fifteen years, many, if not the whole of them will be incapable, even if they should survive so long. Why then should we shut our eyes to this fact? and why are we to turn them out in terms of three, six, nine, twelve, and fifteen years? I ask the members of the convention who desire to carry out their own principles-I ask those who are desirous really to prevent the accumulation of executive patronage, whether they are carrying out their own principles-whether they are preventing the accumulation of executive patronage in the course they are pursuing? I tell them that instead of diminishing it. they will, if they adopt the amendment of the gentleman from Luzerne, (Mr. Woodward) be pursuing a course which will certainly increase it.

For these reasons, as well as for others which have been advanced, I trust that the individual members of the convention will consider the matter well, and that they will carry out the principle which they have themselves adopted.

Mr. DICKEY said. There is another principle involved in this question, and in view of which I desire to bring forward an amendment, though I cannot now do so, because there is an amendment pending to the amendment. The principle is this: We are now framing an amended constitution, agreeably, as we believe, to the wishes of the people, and upon new principles in some respects-amongst others, by the establishment of a limited judicial tenure.

Now, it seems to me that when this new constitution goes into operation, it should operate equally upon all the judicial officers now in existence. I cannot see why the judges of the supreme court, who were appointed during good behavior, have any more claim upon the consideration of this convention, than the justices of the peace who were appointed also during good behavior. And I cannot see why the same principle should not be extended to the president judges of the court of common pleas, as to the judges of the supreme court. It appears to me that there is no good principle in it. The proper principle is, either that all the judicial officers disposed of by the constitution should go out or be re-commissioned; that if there is any claim on account of the tenure during good behavior, it is as good in relation to the judge of one court, as of another. If, therefore, the principle of the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) is adopted in one case, it should be in another. It should operate in relation to the president judges for ten years, and the associate judges for five years. As to the justices of the peace, I do not know how it might operate, because they are to be elected; but they also were appointed during good behavior; and gentlemen do not seem to think it hard to limit them to the term of five years. should like to have offered an amendment, which will test whether we are ready to carry out the principles of reform which we have ourselves established.

Mr. PORTER said, that in order to give the gentleman from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey) a chance to offer his proposition, he (Mr. P.) would withdraw his own amendment for the present.

So the amendment to the amendment was withdrawn.

A motion was then made by Mr. DICKEY,

To amend the said amendment by striking therefrom all after number "six," and inserting in lieu thereof, the words as follow, viz: "The commissions of the judges of the supreme court, the commissions of the president judges of the several judicial districts of this commonwealth, and of the legal associate judges, and the commissions of the other associate judges of this state, shall expire on the twenty-seventh day of February, A. D. 1839."

Mr. DICKEY explained, that he had fixed upon this particular date, because it was the day named in the schedule as that on which the amendments to the constitution should take effect.

Now, as he had before said, the constitution ought to operate equally on all. All the judges had been heretofore appointed during good behavior, and if the reasons for the change of this tenure were good, as relates to the supreme court, they are also good in reference to president judges and associate judges; and if they were sufficient as to these, they were so also as to justices of the peace.

Mr. CURLL, of Armstrong said, the amendment of the gentleman from Beaver met his approbation, except that he thought the time too short for the judges of the supreme court. If the gentleman would so modify his amendment as to make the term of the judges of the supreme court expire in five years, he would agree to all the rest. At all events, he preferred the amendment in this form, to that in which it had previously been offered.

Mr. DICKEY asked for the yeas and nays on his motion, and they were ordered.

Mr. FORWARD, of Allegheny, asked for a division of the question, so as take the question as to the judges of the supreme court first. There were some political judges, who were always meddling through the newspapers, or at the polls, in all times of party excitement, for whom he felt no kind of sympathy. As to the supreme court, he could not vote for so speedy a change.

The CHAIR decided that the motion was not divisable.

Mr. FORWARD acquiesced, and withdrew his call for a division.

Mr. BELL, of Chester, considered that the question now before the convention was one of as much importance as had been presented for consideration, since the assembling of the body, and he was sorry to see any difficulty in deciding on a principle which was founded in justice and cominon honesty. You have a number of judges who have accepted their offices under a constitutional condition, on which they have a right to rely, on which they have relied, and which has been sanctioned in the most solemn manner. What was this condition? It was that they should hold their offices so long as they should continue to behave well. might as well interfere with the other condition, and strike off a portion of their salaries. Such judges as may come in hereafter, will accept their offices on the new conditions, and will have no reason to complain. You take gentlemen of talents from the bar, and induce them to relinquish a lucrative practice-perhaps four thousand or five thousand dollars a year-for the purpose of accepting sixteen hundred dollars; and the only reason for their consenting to this sacrifice, is the constitutional pledge

We

and no one will deny that there is such a pledge-that, while they behave well, they shall enjoy the station to which they are appointed. Many of these, having spent the best years of their life, and become gray, are now at an age when it is impracticable for them to return to the bar with any hope of obtaining a support. Thus, in the event of their removal from office, they would be cast on the cold charity of the world. He would emphatically ask of the members of this convention if, as men, as christians, as honest men, in the face of the constitution, they were disposed to do this great wrong. If they desired to get rid of an unpopular judge in a particular district, would they be guilty of the great wrong of removing all? And is not this amendment offered for the purpose of getting rid of some despotic and tyrannical judge? And in order to get rid of one man, are we, who are assembled to recommend amendments to the constitution, to disregard the interests of the state, and to violate the public faith solemnly pledged, by sweeping from the bench the whole judiciary of Pennsylvania? He would ask gentlemen to point to a case where a similar wrong has been committed. States have amended their judicial system, but he asked gentlemen to point out any state where, by introducing a principle peculiar to this, operating on the judges, they have been subjected to a punishment so severe and so undeserved. Does not the constitution point out the way in which judicial officers are to be punished? Is it not by removal from office?

If he was guilty of malfeasance in office, the constitution prescribes for his punishment by removing him from office. Was he (Mr. B.) to be told that removal from office was not a punishment? Why, in his opinion, it must operate as a punishment. Let gentlemen look and see what is the salary of the president judges. Indeed, they were so low as not to permit of their saving any thing for a wintry day. These gentlemen were very poor, and they had but one object in view, and that was the fair and impartial administration of the law. And, having performed their duties fully, fairly, and faithfully to the satisfaction of the people, yet they were to be turned out of office-deprived of their livelihood, and compelled to begin the world anew among younger and more bustling men, whose habits and society they had long been strangers to, and which were unsuited to men having occupied the stations they had done. He regarded this removal of honest and faithful judges as a great hardshipas inflicting upon them the punishment which was awarded to those who were guilty of any misdemeanor in office. He would conclude what he had to say, by expressing his sincere hope that the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Porter) would be rejected.

Mr. HOPKINSON, of Philadelphia, recollected that an amendment of this character was introduced into the convention, when it was sitting at Harrisburg. That, however, was a matter which had now gone by, and, therefore, it would be improper in him to trespass upon the time and attention of this body. The convention had heard the argument on both sides, and he should cheerfully submit to its decision. The remarks which he had to offer would be very brief. He would then beg leave to recall to the recollection of gentlemen, whether or not, when the subject of the judicial tenure was before the convention at Harrisburg, the argument was directed against the principle, and not against the supreme court judges. The argument then set up was, that life offices were

adious to the people, and the object in view was, to root out this principle from the judiciary. It was said, too, that if it was not done, there would be great murmuring and discontent among the people. The argument, he repeated, then was confined to the necessity of rooting out this evil. He thought that many gentlemen said they did not care what the length of the term of office was-twenty or fifty years-provided that the principle which was odious to the people was got rid of. It had since been stricken from the constitution, and nothing like life offices were to be found in it. Having gained their object-having succeeded in destroying a principle so offensive, did he ask too much of their justice-their generosity, when he requested them to carry out their new regulation with as much mildness and consideration as they could in reference to the present incumbents upon the bench. He hoped that as they had accomplished the great object of their wishes, they would return to the feelings and the dictates of humanity and say, "we will establish our principles-we will carry them out in a way that will be the least oppressive and inconvenient to those who may be affected by them.” asked what principle there was in the report of the minority? not the proposition therein contained of a personal character? there any principle in it? He was well aware that it had been said there was nothing personal intended as to the judges. We all knew, however, that some remarks had been made against the judges as well as the justices of the peace. But, with respect to those highly respectable men who sat on the bench of the supreme court, not a member on this floor had ventured to whisper a syllable against them. He himself knew something of those judges. They were men above all reproach.

He

Was

Was

With regard to the amendment, he entertained no doubt that he understood the object of it. It was to get rid of these men. Was there any principle in this? What, he inquired, was contended for? Why, that no judge shall hold his office longer than fifteen years. That was the principle. Now, any thing beyond this was personal, and would have no other tendency than to get rid of those judges now in office. In front of him sat a gentleman who, in the outset of his remarks, said he would avoid all personal criminations, but as he proceeded, he forgot himself, and indulged in some. Why, he (Mr. Hopkinson) asked, would gentlemen here, after having established the principle they required, go beyond it, and thus destroy worthy, high-minded, and honourable men. Who are they? Look at the supreme court bench, and there would be seen men of talent and learning-men who have grown old and gray in administering the law of the land-men who have held and expected to hold during good behaviour, but now, it seemed, they were to be turned loose on the world, without the means of support and of comfort in their declining days. He would tell the farmers-(and there were many now sitting on that floor,) that when they should leave their seats here and arrive at home, they would be busily employed in endeavoring to secure an abundant harvest for his future support. The farmer relies only on the rains from Heaven and the heat of the sun to reward him with an ample harvest. But what, he (Mr. H.) would inquire, became of these judges if turned out of their offices,--these men whose places were to be supplied by those who could not be removed till the expiration of their terms? Would they go back to their homes cheerfully and joy