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great interests of the commonwealth were promoted by an immediate change, I would consent to make it; but, believing as I do, that those interests would be best promoted by adhering to our plighted faith, I must, so far as I can, endeavor to persuade the great body of this convention to agree with me in the views I take on this question. If they do not agree, then I will go with a majority for any principle which will approach most nearly to that which seems to me to be so closely connected with our honor and our integrity.

There is another matter to which I entreat attention. I approach the convention on this subject with no other desire, God knows, than that they should do what is right.

He had neither personal connexion, party connexion, nor could he say even an intimate connexion with any gentleman on the supreme court bench of the commonwealth. He had no personal predilections to indulge. He desired only that the majority of the convention might do what, on mature reflection, they conceived to be upright, proper, and purely beneficial for the commonwealth at this time, and for the future.

He would say, that it was capable of being demonstrated, as clearly as any arithmetical proposition could be, that unless the present terms of the judges were continued as they now stood, or the new term introduced into the constitution should be extended, he thought that the judicial tenure, hereafter, instead of being a tenure for fifteen or ten years, would become a tenure for about six years and a half only. And, he said, he would show how that was to be brought about.

If, then, this convention abolished the commissions of our present judges, they would, by so doing, establish this great principle-not a just principle, but one momentous in its consequences-viz: 'That when the constitution is amended in reference to the judiciary, the convention has a right to abolish all the existing commissions. Should this convention agree to destroy the commissions of the existing judges, then would they set a precedent for all future time.

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Look at the tenth article of the amended constitution. What does it declare? Why, that the constitution may be hereafter changed; that it may be altered by a majority of the senate and the house, after a vote taken by each branch at two different sessions, and a vote of a majority of the people. There was only one restriction. What was it? fact was, the amendments had been passed so hastily recently, that he scarcely knew what had really been done. The restriction was, he thought, that amendments should not be made to the constitution oftener than once in five years.

How long, he inquired, would it take to agree upon making amendments to the constitution? One legislature may agree to pass on the subject in January, February, or March of the first year; and the second, in January of the next year, and in three months afterwards, the proposed changes, if they think proper, may be adopted. Let the principle be once established, that changes may be made in the constitution every five years—that the commissions of the judges may be altered at the end of that period, and thus by this operation was the term of the judges reduced from fifteen years to six and a quarter. It was quite clear to his mind, that no judge could calculate upon holding his commission for a longer period.

VOL. XIII.

Suppose that we made the tenure of the judges of the supreme court fifteen years, and of the other courts ten, and it being conceded that we could now abolish the present commissions, might it not be done in six e years and a quarter, after the people shall have adopted the new constitu tion? He did not believe that it was the desire of the friends of reform to effect a change of that sort. He thought that the term of fifteen years was neither too short nor too long, for the supreme court; nor was ten years too long a tenure for the judges of the court of common pleas. He hoped that gentlemen would go with him to preserve the tenure, at least, to this extent, and that commissions thus granted should not be infringed. He did not regard it as at all material to consider what had been done by other states. What the commonwealth of Pennsylvania had to consider was, whether she ought to do right or wrong. That, however, was a question easily settled. For his own part, he believed that Pennsylvania was disposed to do what was right. He did not think it necessary that she should look for a pattern elsewhere. She ought to stand upon her own foundation, and set an example to all the freemen of the Union, on such a subject as the one under discussion.

He could not help alluding to a fact which had come to his knowledge almost within the last twenty-four hours, that New York, who had altered her judiciary a few years ago, had become dissatisfied with it. And, most of the states, it appeared, who had altered their constitutions in that respect, had likewise grown dissatisfied. The state of New York, he was informed, was about to propose amendments in regard to her judiciary. On the 2d of January, 1838, a report was made to the legislature, of the changes which the commissioners appointed to investigate the subject recommended for adoption, in regard to some of the courts, on the 15th May, 1837. They close their report with this section:

"Section 11.-This article shall not be so construed as to render vacant the offices of chancellor, and justices of the supreme court for the time being; but they shall be respectively members of the court of chancery, and of the supreme court as herein organized.”

Thus, then, it appeared that the commissioners said, when about to make various changes, that they ought not to interfere with those judges who held commissions under the existing constitution of New York. He wished gentlemen to understand that the majority committee in adopting this principle did so under the impression that it protects the judges of the supreme court, the associate judges, and the justices of the peace. In regard to the latter, he would admit that the principle does not apply so strongly as to the others, because they do not hold their offices under the judicial tenure, but by an act of assembly. He was willing to admit that if there was any one court where the principle of superiority should be more absolute than another, it was the bench of the supreme court. We all know it is the highest tribunal in cases of the last resort, and exercises a supervisory power in all matters involving life or liberty. That court has sufficient to do to defend itself against the inferior courts. Owing to the contests continually going on between these tribunals, and the appeals made by them to the supreme court, it was only right and proper that a superiority should be given to it. If any distinction was to be made in respect to the courts, it should be in favor of the supreme court. If the convention would say that the proposed new tenure should not apply to the present judges of the supreme court, he should regard

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the principle as less injurious, for he conceived it would be impolitic, at least, to abolish the whole of the existing commissions, and to bring upon the bench an entirely new body of men. He had done his duty to the committee, and he would now leave the matter to the decision of the convention.

Mr. DICKEY, of Beaver, moved to amend the section, by striking therefrom all after the words "section six," and inserting in lieu thereof the following, viz:

"The commissions of the judges of the supreme court, the commissions of the president judges of the several judicial districts of this commonwealth, and of the legal associate judges, and the commissions of the other associate judges of this state, shall expire on the twenty-seventh day of February, A. D. 1839."

Mr. D. said, he would not detain the convention long by laying before it the views which he entertained. This was undoubtedly a subject deserving of the calm consideration of every delegate. He thought that his propo sition embraced what the people desired. In his opinion the notions of a great many members here ran entirely counter to the feelings of the... people. When they called this convention, they did not imagine that it was going to consume six months in preparing amendments for their decision, at an expense, too, of at least $300,000, besides printing a library consisting of five hundred books. He maintained that the new constitution, if adopted, should operate on all the judges alike, as is the case under the existing constitution. If, as seemed to be admitted by the gentleman from Philadelphia. (Mr. Scott) the principle of good behavior is applicable to the present judges of the supreme court, and if there was a pledge given that they should remain in office during good behavior, or for life, as some professed to regard the tenure, then it ought to be kept inviolable.

The gentleman said that these judges have a claim to our sympathy and justice. This being conceded, he (Mr. D.) would go further and say that the same remark would as properly apply to president judges of the court of common pleas, the associate judges and the justices of the peace. He apprehended the gentleman was in error when he declared that the justices of the peace are not entitled to look for the same treatment as the judges of the supreme court, because they do not hold by the same tenure. Now, he would admit it; but he presumed that the people had not sent their delegates here to destroy equality between men, to make distinctions between one class of men and another. It was to be recollected that although the justices of the peace are not so high a grade of officers as the judges, yet they are paid in proportion to the services they render, and therefore they have the same right to claim our sympathy and justice as others have.

There were, he thought, but two principles in this matter. Either the principle contended for by the gentleman from the city of Philadelphia was correct, or that proposed to be incorporated in the new constitutiontreating all the judicial officers alike. If we continued the judges of the supreme court under the tenure of good behavior, all the others must be put on the same footing. Many judges there were who performed their duties as faithfully as those of the supreme court, and he could see no good reason why any difference should be made between one class and another.

Mr. SCOTT explained. He, perhaps, had not expressed himself as clearly as he might have done in relation to the justices of the peace. The number of the judges of the supreme court was fixed by the constitution; but, as respected the justices of the peace, the number was regulated by the legislature.

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Mr. DICKEY said, then they were all to be destroyed by one swoop." It was true that the number of justices of the peace are regulated by law; and it was estimated that they at present amount to three thousand, and the principle which the gentleman maintained belongs to the supreme court was not to apply to the justices of the peace.

Mr. Scort asked the gentleman to read section eleven of the second minority report. Mr. S. then read the following:

"Section 11. All aldermen and justices of the peace now in commission shall continue to hold their offices according to the terms of their present commissions. Whenever the number of these officers in any ward, borough, or township, shall be reduced by death, resignation, or otherwise, below the number which may be prescribed by law, the vacancies shall be filled in the manner and upon the tenure prescribed by the seventh section of the sixth article of the amended constitution." Mr. DICKEY proceeded :

He was perfectly aware of these facts. But, it appeared, that as respected the three thousand justices of the peace, of whom he had spoken, no attention was to be paid to them, because they are located among the farmers of the country, who are equally interested with the rest of the community in the administration of justice, and they are, by one fell swoop, to be swept overboard. He believed that it was contemplated by the people that these justices of the peace should not hold during life, but be elected by the people. He thought, however, that the people did wish to extend the principle to the supreme court judges, the president judges and the associate judges. The people expected that the judges would be appointed anew, and the justices of the peace elected. These offices were not made for this man or that man, but for the benefit of the whole people of the commonwealth.

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He contended that good, able and efficient judges ought not to be dismissed from the bench. He could not, for one moment, suppose that the people ever contemplated we would attempt to change the appointing power. We, nevertheless, had settled that matter, viz: that the governor shall nominate and the senate confirm. But, he would ask, did not the minority report distrust the very power, the authors of it had viously expressed their confidence in? The report went on to say that the judges shall be continued in office for various specified terms, thereby showing an unwillingness to trust the legislature. For his own part he should like to know what power it was that we could not trust with the appointment of nineteen judges. It certainly would never do to tell the people this. Gentlemen had said that the regulation of the terms of the associate judges and judges of the court of common pleas should be left to the legislature. Why would not they themselves take the trouble to fix the periods when these offices shall go out? Why were they so anxious to avoid taking upon themselves any responsibility? Why not, too, specify the time at which the commissions of the president judges shall expire ?

The minority committee had reported a section providing that the governor shall, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, reappoint, next year, one of the then existing judges of the supreme court for the term of three years, one for six, one for nine, one for twelve, and one for fifteer years. Now, he wished to know whether it was sympathy which had led the gentlemen of the minority committee to report a section of this character? It was a strange kind of sympathy indeed. Mr. D. concluded by reiterating his opposition to the introduction of the graduation principle, and insisitng that the constitution should be so framed as to operate on all the judges alike. He asked for the yeas and nays. Mr. HIESTER, of Lancaster, said:

My friend from Beaver, (Mr. Dickey) expressed great solicitude on last evening, when the convention was about to refuse again going in to com nittee of the whole on the report of the committee on the schedule, lest he should be deprived of an opportunity of again proposing his amendment in convention. To cut off the heads of all the judges in the commonwealth" at one fell swoop"-to use his own expression. I for one was disposed to aid, so far as it was in my power, to give him that opportunity which he has now had. And I am pleased with it, on his account, and trust he will not desert his favorite bantling in the hour of its greatest need, as he did a week or ten days ago on another occasion when one of his bantlings received a kick from every member of this body, and he himself denied it paternity, by failing to come to its rescue. But he must not expect to get my vote for so wild and extraordinary a proposition. That five judges of the supreme court, nineteen of the presidents, and legal associates, of the courts of common pleas, and about one hundred other associate judges shall go out of office immedi etely after the adoption of the proposed amendments to the constitution, at the same time. Thus revolutionizing your whole judiciary, and giving your next governor and senate all those vacancies to fill at once. And what will be its further effect. In five years thereafter the governor then in office and the senate will again have all the associates to appoint. In ten years all the president judges of the courts of common pleas, and all the associates. And in fifteen years all the judges on the bench of the supreme court, and all the associates excepting those that may have been commissioned between each period to fill vacancies, occasioned by death or resignation. And in this way, instead of having less excitement and agitation at the election for governor-one of the objects for the attainment of which the people desired the executive to be deprived of a part of his patronage-you would at those periods at least, when the numerous important appointments are to be made, have more excitement than ever.

Sir, the people would be surprised and shocked at such a sudden and unexpected revolution as the delegate's proposition contemplates. He has frequently told us that he was a moderate reformer, and that the people whom he represented wanted but few changes or amendments. And is this a specimen of his moderate reform. Sir, if there has at any time been a more radical proposition introduced in this convention, I have no recollection of it. It would be changing and unsettling your whole judiciary, and well might the people be shocked and alarmed if the delegate's amendment could receive the sanction of this body.

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