maker's possession. The wife, in the absence of her husband, sometimes wrote the notices to charge and weigh; but, when applied to by the officers, the foreman always applied to his mistress. She also had paid paper duty to the collector more than once. After the seizure, the defendant was asked "Whether he allowed his wife to transact business for him in his absence, such as giving notices and the like," and he said, "I do." She never gave directions as to the mode of carrying on the business, nor did anything except giving the notices to charge if her husband was absent. When the defendant was at home, he always gave the requisite notices, but was often absent from home. Eighteen notices to weigh and charge, signed "Ann, for William Riddle; "fourteen receipts for labels, signed by her, and one account of goods sent out since the last survey, signed "Ann, for William Riddle," were produced at the trial.

Upon this evidence, Follett, for the defendant, objected that the evidence given only showed a limited authority for the wife, in the defendant's absence, to give such notices to the excise as were requisite to keep the manufacture from being stopped, but that nothing appeared to show her acting generally in the making of paper, or sending it out, or to have any general authority from the defendant to do any such acts; and that the payment of the duty was no part of the business, but a consequence of it, and not within the scope of her authority. The Lord Chief Baron was of this opinion, and the defendant had a verdict.

In Hilary Term a rule nisi for a new trial was obtained, against which

Follett showed cause. - The mere relation of husband and wife will not suffice to charge him with her acts, without showing that she was his agent intrusted with the management of his business. The only authority proved was of a limited kind; and, had it been to act generally in the business, the defendant could not be presumed to have sanctioned a direct breach of the excise laws. This is not strictly a criminal charge, though in the nature of it; and Attorney-General v. Siddon,1 does not carry constructive criminality so far as is here contended for. The illegal act here charged might have been done by the wife to shield her misapplication of money intrusted to her to pay the duty, and does not necessarily benefit the defendant. The acts which she was proved to have done were in the legal exercise of her husband's trade. They were qualified, not general, and she had no general authority, such as rendered the defendant liable for the acts of his servant in the case which will be relied upon. In the former cases, when the master has been made answerable for the act of his servant, it has been proved that the

11 Cr. & J. 220.

servant acted in the course of the manufacture, from which the master's authority might be inferred.

The Attorney-General, Clarke, and Sir George Grey, contra. Attorney-General v. Siddon is in point. The master, in that case, knew nothing of the act of the servant; yet, as with his master's authority, he was engaged in an illegal trade, the master was held responsible for acts done in the prosecution of that illegal traffic. The wife is a mere agent. This is not a criminal proceeding; but cases purely criminal have gone further than here contended for. In Rex v. Gutch,1 the proprietor of a newspaper, though residing at a distance, and not proved to take any part in its management, or to know of the libelous publication, was held criminally responsible for the act of the managing partner, who conducted the paper for him. Such is also the principle of Rex v. Almon,2 and Rex v. Dixon.3 The evidence was fairly calculated to raise the inference that the wife had a general authority from the defendant to conduct his business in all respects in his absence, and the question should have been left to the jury. The circumstance of the wife being also liable does not affect the admissibility of the evidence. Cur. Adv. Vult.

LORD LYNDHURST, C. B. The ground of the motion for a new trial was the rejection of evidence which, it was contended, ought to have been received. The facts of the case were these: The defendant was a paper manufacturer, who employed a foreman to superintend the manu facture of the paper. During the absence of the defendant his wife acted for him in one department of the business. It appeared upon the evidence that in cases where notices were necessary for the excise officer, these notices, during the absence of the husband, were very frequently given by the wife. It does not appear that she interfered in the manufacture of the paper, but, during the absence of the husband, she was exclusively employed in that part of the business referred to; and so much so, that the foreman used to appeal to her to know what notices should be given. It appeared also, that, on one occasion, she was employed by the defendant to pay duty in arrears; and on another, that she pledged some paper from her husband's manufactory to raise money to pay the duties.

These were the general facts of the case, and under these circumstances it was proposed by the Attorney-General to give certain acts of the wife in evidence, in order to fix the husband with the improper removal of paper. It was stated that, some duties being in arrear, the

1 Moo. & M. 437. 25 Burr. 2686.

$ 3 M. & S. 11, 4 Camp. 12 S. C.

wife had called at the house or shop of a neighbor, with a quantity of paper which had been illegally removed from the manufactory, and that she was desirous of borrowing money upon the deposit of it. The money was lent, and the paper accordingly deposited, and it was stated by the Attorney-General that he should prove that on the same day the duties then due were paid by the wife. That evidence was rejected as not being evidence proper to charge the husband with the act of the wife; but we are of opinion that it was improperly rejected, and that it ought to have been left to go to the jury to decide whether or not the act of the wife, under the circumstances stated, was done by the authority of her husband, the defendant. Therefore there ought to be a new trial. Rule absolute.

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-NON-LIABILITY OF HUSBAND.

R. v. DRING.

[7 Cox, 383.]

In the English Court of Criminal Appeal, November, 1857.

A husband and wife were jointly indicted for receiving stolen goods. The jury found both guilty of stealing, that the wife received them without the control or knowledge of, and apart from her husband, but that he afterwards adopted her receipt. Held, that the conviction of the husband could not be sustained.

At the last Nottinghamshire quarter sessions held at Newark, William Dring and Mary Ann, his wife, were jointly indicted for feloniously stealing on the 22d of February last, at South Collingham, ten pecks of potatoes of the value of 7s., and two sack bags of the value of 3s. of the goods of Richard Wallhead. A second count in the indictment charged the prisoners jointly with receiving said potatoes and such bags, they well knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen. They both pleaded not guilty. The jury found both the prisoners guilty on the second count, and that Mary Ann Dring received the potatoes and bags without the control or knowledge of, and apart from, her husband, William Dring, and that William Dring afterwards adopted his wife's receipt. The prisoners' counsel contended that this verdict amounted in law to an acquittal of both prisoners. The court thought otherwise, and discharged the prisoners on recognizance to appear at the next sessions to receive judgment, and reserved a case for the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal whether, under the circumstances, the verdict as against either or both of the prisoners was wrong.

Bell, for the prisoners. The finding negatives a joint receipt; and section 14 of 14 and 15 Victoria,1 does not apply to successive receipts of the same entire property. Even if it did, there is no finding in this case, that the husband did separately receive the whole or any part of the stolen property. What is meant by "adopting" is doubtful; but it can not make the husband a joint receiver with his wife, who is found to have received without his knowledge. The conviction of the wife can not be questioned.

No counsel appearing for the crown.

COCKBURN, C. J. Even if the recent statute applies to a case, where, upon a joint charge of receiving, the evidence proves two distinct successive acts of receiving the whole property stolen, we think that the facts stated in this case, would not warrant a conviction. If we were to intend by the term "adopted," that he took an active part in her receipt, that might make him a receiver, but it may mean that he merely acquiesced in what his wife had done, without taking an active part so as to make him originally a receiver. And it is not necessary to give to the word the more rigid construction. So far, therefore, as he is concerned, we are of opinion that his conviction must be quashed. Conviction quashed.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT-HARBORING

HUSBAND.

R. v. GOOD.

[1C. & K. 185.]

Before Mr. Baron ALDERSON and Mr. Justice COLTMAN (London), 1842.

A wife can not be found guilty of comforting, harboring and assisting her husband who has committed a murder. And so as to one who believes herself to be his wife but is not so legally, semble.

The prisoner, Mary Good, was arraigned on an indictment which charged one Daniel Good with the willful murder of Jane Jones, otherwise Jane Good, and charged the prisoner with comforting, harboring, and assisting the said Daniel Good, knowing that he had committed the said murder.2

Sir T. Pollack, Attorney-General, in opening the case, said: I understand that the defense is, that the prisoner was married to Daniel Good,

1 ch. 100.

2 Daniel Good had been tried and found guilty of the murder on the day before.

and the law says, that in all cases, except treason, it is no offense in a wife to comfort and assist her husband. The counsel for the prisoner has communicated to me the circumstances relating to the marriage, and I think it is very probable that some marriage did take place in the kingdom of Ireland, at a place where the registers were very imperfectly kept. There is no doubt that Daniel Good and the prisoner for many years considered each other as man and wife; and, under these circumstances though it might be difficult for the prisoner to prove a marriage in fact, I do not intend to offer any evidence on the part of the prosecution.

ALDERSON, B., to the jury. No evidence being offered in this case, it is your duty to acquit the prisoner. Persons charged with such an offense, ought to know that it is a very serious offense to afford any assistance to a criminal, so as to obstruct the cause of public justice. But a wife is in a peculiar situation; she can not be found guilty of comforting and assisting her husband. And if the prisoner in this case went through the ceremony of marriage, and it should have turned out that there were some irregularity in the marriage, nevertheless, if it appeared that she acted under the supposition that she was the wife of Daniel Good, and according to the duty which she considered to be cast upon her, the court would have felt it right to have inflicted a very slight punishment upon her. I think, therefore, that the AttorneyGeneral has only acted consistently with the duties of his high office in taking the course which he has taken, and which the court entirely approves.

Verdict-not guilty.

HUSBAND AND WIFE - ASSAULT-CORPORAL CORRECTION OF

WIFE.

STATE v. RHODES.

[Phill. L. 453.]

In the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1868.

1. The law will not punish the husband for the moderate correction of his wife.

2. A husband was indicted for assault on his wife. The jury found that he had struck her three licks with a switch about the size of his finger" and the judge ruled that this was a verdict of not guilty, and dismissed the case. Held, correct.

Assault and battery tried before LITTLE, J., at fall term, 1867, of the Superior Court of Wilkes.