from criminal liability can exist. There is much reason for holding that the wife's dwelling-house can be considered that of the husband only while he makes it such in fact, and that there is no such legal identity as can preclude her house being considered in legal proceedings against him, as the dwelling of "another" when it is no longer his abode. That case was not fairly presented upon this record and was barely alluded to in the argument; and it must be left for the proper consideration when it becomes necessary to decide it. We confine our attention now to the case of a husband in the practical exercise of the right to reside with his family in the wife's dwelling-house, which the wife at the same time practically concedes. In such a case the dwellinghouse can not be said not to be that of the husband. It follows that the judgment was erroneous and it must be reversed and a new trial ordered. In the Central Criminal Court, London, 1871. 1. Presumption of Coercion Applies to Misdemeanors and Felonies.-The presumption of coercion exists in misdemeanors as well as in felonies, and the question. for the jury is the same in both cases. 2. Robbery with Violence. - The doctrine applies to the crime of robbery with violence. 3. Marriage Need not be Proved. Where a man and woman are indicted together for a joint crime and it appears from the evidence for the prosecution that they had lived together for some months as man and wife, having with them an infant who passed as their child, it is not necessary for the woman to give evidence of her marriage in order to entitle her to the benefit of the doctrine of coercion, although the indictment does not describe her as a married woman. Martha Torpey was indicted, with one Michael Torpey, for a robbery with violence committed by them together upon James Unett Parkes, and stealing from his person two diamond necklaces and other articles of jewelry, the goods of William Henry Ryder. The second count of the indictment described the goods as being, at the time of the robbery, in the possession and under the control of the said J. U. Parkes. The third count charged both prisoners with feloniously receiving the property, knowing it to have been stolen. The male prisoner was not in custody, and the female prisoner may, therefore, be tried alone. In the gaol calendar she was described as a married woman, but this did not appear on the face of the indictment, which contained no description of either prisoner. Metcalfe and Straight for the prosecution. Montague Willams and Horace Brown for the defense. The facts of the case, as appearing from the evidence, were as follows: : The prosecutor was an assistant to Messrs. London & Ryder, jewellers, of New Bond Street. On the 12th of January last, in consequence of an order given to his employers, he went, with some jewelry to the value of over £5,000, to a house, No. 4 Upper Berkeley Street, W. He reached the house about half-past five o'clock in the evening, and the door was opened by Michael Torpey who had given the order for the jewelry at the shop. Michael Torpey apologized for the absence of the servant; asked prosecutor to leave his hat in a room on the ground floor, and there to follow him (Torpey) to the drawing-room. There they were joined by the prisoner, Martha Torpey, and prosecutor took out of a bag part of the jewelry, and placing it on the table, began to show it to the two prisoners, keeping the remainder of the jewelry in his bag under the table. The two prisoners were together on the other side of the table, and as they examined the jewels the value of each article was explained. The male prisoner admired a necklace worth £1,100, and said he should like to have either that one or one valued at £570, but that he thought he should like to consult his wife's sister before a decision was come to. He told the female prisoner to call her sister, and she left the room apparently for that purpose. The male prisoner continued standing at the table in the same position as before, and prosecutor remained with his back to the door. In about a couple of minutes the female prisoner returned, and said that her sister would be there directly. She then came quietly behind prosecutor, and placed a handkerchief saturated with something over his face and mouth, whilst the male prisoner rushed at him and clasped him round the arms in front. They struggled together for two or three minutes, the female prisoner constantly applying the handkerchief to prosecutor's face, who, after a short time, became unconscious, and was forced by the prisoners on to a sofa. On returning to complete consciousness prosecutor found himself lying on the sofa, bound with straps. Both prisoners had then left the house, taking with them all the jewelry which had been placed on the table, except a small gold chain. The house in Berkeley Street had been taken at a weekly rent by the male prisoner from a house agent, to whom he represented his name as Tyrrel, and gave a reference to a hotel-keeper at Bath. The reply to the reference, in consequence of which the male prisoner was allowed to engage the house, was as follows: "BATH, ROYAL HOTEL, “M. de Madallion (being imperfectly acquainted with the English language) has requested me to acknowledge and reply to your letter. We have known Mr. Tyrrel for some years in Paris, and I have no hesitation in assuring you that any engagement into which he may enter with you will be honorably fulfilled. "I am faithfully yours, "EMILY DE MADALLION.” This letter was proved to be in the handwriting of the female prisoner. On the afternoon of the robbery both prisoners arrived at the house in Berkeley Street in a cab; they had no baggage. Shortly afterwards the only female servant in the house was sent out by the female prisoner with a letter directed to some fictitious Miss Pearson at Tulse Hill, and the servant's unsuccessful search for this person kept her fully occupied until after the robbery had been completed. On her return the house was in the possession of the police. The direction on the envelope of this letter was also proved to be in the handwriting of the female prisoner. The two prisoners had been living together as husband and wife since the month of June previously at the house of a Miss Pitt at Leamington. They had with them an infant whom they treated as their child. On the 9th of January the male prisoner went to London. On the 11th the female prisoner received two telegrams at Leamington. On the morning of the 12th (the day of the robbery) she left for London, stating that she might not return that evening, in which case she would send a telegram. On the evening of the 12th Miss Pitt received a telegram from her, and about two o'clock on the morning of the 13th both prisoners returned together, and the male prisoner left in a day or two, and went abroad, leaving the female prisoner at Leamington, where she was shortly afterwards apprehended. On the 15th of January a relative of the female prisoner received from her a parcel (containing part of the stolen property), with a letter asking the former to take charge of the parcel for a time. This letter 'was also in the handwriting of the female prisoner. Metcalfe, in opening the case to the jury, said the question which would be raised by the defense would be whether the prisoner had acted under the coercion of her hushand. The doctrine of coercion had been to some extent misunderstood in some of the earlier cases quoted in books of law; but in these days of civilization a different construction was put upon it. The question the jury would have to consider was, whether the woman acted under the coercion and influence of her husband in such a way as to free her from all liability, or whether she herself committed certain acts of violence of her own will and accord, which rendered her clearly liable for the consequences. Whilst there was a strong presumption in favor of a married woman that she had acted under the influence of her husband, that was very easily to be rebutted by showing that she took active steps towards the perpetration of the crime. For instance, letters might be written by her independently of the will of her husband (as was, he submitted, the case here), and that would take her away from his influence and control. In this case the prisoner committed the first act of violence by placing the handkerchief over the face of the assistant, whilst her husband completed the act and stole the jewelry. There was nothing to show that he compelled her to submit to an act of violence, or that she was under his coercion at the time. Williams submitted that there was no case to go to the jury. The prisoner was undoubtedly a married woman, and no question would arise as to that indeed, the case for the prosecution was so opened to the jury by Mr. Metcalfe; and he should ask whether, considering the law as defined by the different authorities, she was not entitled to an acquittal. The prisoner, to all appearance, was acting under coercion; she was, in fact, under the influence and control of her husband, and therefore was not responsible for her conduct. He referred to the case of Reg. v. Cruse1 and the various cases there cited, including particularly that of Reg. v. Archer 2 as an authority for the proposition that, even if the woman had been proved to have taken a more active part than her husband, she would not be liable to be convicted of this charge, but would be absolved on the ground of control. The RECORDER overruled the objection, and this case was ordered to proceed. Metcalfe argued, that if the woman committed an act voluntarily, such as writing the letter of reference, she was responsible, and was punishable just the same as if she were a feme sole. Miss Pitt, being recalled, said that the male prisoner was away from Leamington for several days, and might have been in company with the female prisoner at the time the letter of reference was written. Williams said that letter was dated from Bath. There was no evidence to prove that the female prisoner was ever there. 18 C. & P. 541, and 2 Mood. C. C. 53. 21 Mood. C. C. 143. Straight said that it was perfectly clear that, in cases where violence was used, the wife was as responsible as the husband. The RECORDER. It is perfectly clear that the presence of the husband raises only a prima facie presumption, which is capable of being rebutted by the evidence in particular cases. Williams then addressed the jury upon the question whether, on the facts proved, the prisoner was acting under the husband's control or not. The RECORDER, in summing up the case, told the jury that they must not suppose that they were called upon to come to a different conclusion in this case, in consequence of the absence of the husband, from that which they would otherwise have come to. He had to lay down the law to them precisely in the same way as if the husband were then standing by the side of the accused. The presumption of law was, that if an act of dishonesty were committed by a wife in the presence of her husband, she was acting under his control and coercion; but that presumption might be rebutted by acts otherwise committed by her. The question for their consideration was, whether the part taken by the prisoner showed that she was exercising her own free will, and was not coerced by her husband at the time. He then referred to the evidence, and observed that, with respect to sending the letter of reference to the house agent, and the one by the servant to Tulse Hill, it certainly had not been proved that the husband was present on either of those occasions. If, in the opinion of the jury, the woman was acting under coercion and control, the balance of authority was in her favor, and she would be entitled to an acquittal. The cases, however, were not unanimous on the subject. He must object to the doctrine, that a wife was always bound to obey the dictates of her husband. A woman certainly was not to do a wicked act simply because her husband directed her to do it. The simple question was, aye or no, did the jury believe that the woman, either in procuring the handkerchief and forcing it upon the prosecutor's mouth, or in writing the letters and sending the servant to Tulse Hill, or in any other act done by her, was exercising an independent will, or was she acting throughout under the husband's coercion. The jury returned the following verdict: - "We are of opinion that the whole matter was pre-arranged by the husband, and that the prisoner acted under his coercion and control at the time." Not guilty. Metcalfe said there were other indictments against the prisoners; one was for the misdemeanor of an assault upon the prosecutor, or oc |