case cited the Court said: "Keeping in mind that the discharge from liability above referred to because of unreasonable delay after the issuance of a check in presenting it for payment, is of the drawer only, and that this action is against the payee who indorsed the instrument in question without qualification and put it in circulation, we turn to section 1678-1, which provides, as to a Lill of exchange payable on demand, which from the foregoing obviously includes a check or draft on a bank of the character of the one in question, 'presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof.' From the foregoing it seems plain that, as regards the payee of such an instrument as we have here, who puts the same in circulation with his unqualified indorsement thereon, and all subsequent parties thereto so indorsing the same, presentment for payment is sufficient, as regards their liability, if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation. A bill of exchange payable on demand, regardless of its character, put in circulation, so long as its circulating character is preserved may be outstanding without impairing the liability of indorsers thereof. Formerly, the length of time within which a bill of exchange might circulate without impairing such liability was more or less uncertain, rendering it very difficult to determine any one case by the decision in another. That difficulty was removed, so far as practicable, by the provision that only the time need be considered intervening between the last negotiation and the presentment. That is recognized as a radical change in the law as it formerly existed." See also Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Summers, 143 N. C. 103; Citizens Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank (Iowa), 113 N. W. Rep. 481; Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie (Iowa), 110 N. W. Rep. 29, 50. In the case last cited it was said: "The checks were negotiated by the appellee to the Des Moines Savings Bank, and under the statute already quoted (Code Supp. 1902, §§ 3060-a-71), reasonable time for presentation and demand is to be reckoned from the last negotiation of the paper. Checks are an almost universal substitute for money. They pass from hand to hand, bank to bank, and city to city, and within reasonable limits, it may be said that no matter how long they remain outstanding, so long as one negotiation promptly follows another and the checks are in fact in circulation the statute requires us to hold that the indorser is not legally preju

diced by the consequent delay in their presentation for payment." Where the payee negotiates the check to his own agent the failure of the agent to present the check is the payee's own neglect. Gordon v. Levine, 194 Mass. 418. As respects discharge of the drawer by delay in making presentment, see section 322 and note.

$132. What constitutes a sufficient presentment.- Presentment for payment, to be sufficient, must be made:

1. By the holder, or by some person authorized to receive payment on his behalf (a);

2. At a reasonable hour on a business day (b);

3. At a proper place as herein defined (c);

4. To the person primarily liable on the instrument, or if he is absent or inaccessible, to any person found at the place where the presentment is made (d).

(a) The mere possession of a negotiable instrument which is payable to the order of the payee, and is indorsed by him in blank, or of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer, is in itself sufficient evidence of the right to present it and to demand payment thereof. Weber v. Orton, 91 Mo. 680; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harr. (N. J.) 487; Shedd v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401. And payment to such person will always be valid, unless he is known to the payer to have acquired possession wrongfully. Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, section 574. There is no need of a power of attorney or written instrument to constitute one an agent for this purpose. Shedd v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401. But the mere possession of an instrument payable to order and not indorsed by the 'payee is not alone sufficient evidence of the authority of an assumed agent to receive payment. Doubleday v. Kress, 50 N. Y. 410. Where a bank holding a note for collection sends it for the same purpose to the bank where it is payable, the latter is authorized to demand payment and give notice of dishonor. Blakeslee v. Hewett, 16 Wis. 341.

(b) Except in cases where the instrument is payable at a bank, the holder has the whole day in which to present the same, the only limitation being that he must present it at a reasonable

hour, and this may depend upon the circumstances of the case. Salt Springs National Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 430; Farnsworth v. Allen, 4 Gray, 453; Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp. 527; Wilkins v. Jadis, 2 B. & Ad. 188. As late as nine o'clock in the evening has been held to be a reasonable hour. Farnsworth v. Allen, 4 Gray, 453. But it is only when presentment is at the residence that the time is extended into the hours of rest. If it is at the place of business it must be during those business hours when such places are customarily open, or, at least, while some one is there competent to give an answer. Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46, 53. As to when instruments payable at bank must be presented, see section 135.

(c) See next section.

(d) Cromwell v. Hynson, 2 Camp. 596; Phillips v. Astberg, 2 Taunt. 206.

§ 133. Place of presentment.-Presentment for payment is made at the proper place.

1. Where a place of payment is specified in the instrument and it is there presented;

2. Where no place of payment is specified, but the address of the person to make payment is given in the instrument and it is there presented;

3. Where no place of payment is specified and no address is given and the instrument is presented at the usual place of business or residence of the person to make payment (a).

4. In any other case if presented to the person to make payment wherever he can be found, or if presented at his last known place of business or residence (b).

(a) Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518, 522; Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634. A presentment at the maker's usual place of business during business hours, there being no one there to answer, is a sufficient demand to charge the indorser; for the maker is bound to have a suitable person there to answer inquiries, and pay his notes, if there demanded. Baumgardner v. Reeves, 35 Pa. St. 250; Wallace v. Crilly, 46 Wis. 577. And presentment at such place is sufficient, though it be closed, there being no explanation fur

nished as to why it is closed. Sulsbacker v. Bank of Charleston, 86 Tenn. 201. If, however, the party has abandoned his place of business at the maturity of the paper, but has a residence or other place of business in the city, which could be ascertained by reasonable inquiry, a presentment at the former place of business would not be sufficient. (Id.) The making and dating of a promissory note at a particular place is not equivalent to making it payable there, nor does it supersede the necessity for presentment and demand at the residence or place of business of the maker if it be known, or if by due diligence in making inquiry it could be ascertained. Oxnard v. Varnum, 111 Pa. St. 193. But where a bill of exchange is addressed to the drawee at a particular house, and the same is accepted generally by him, the address indicates the place where it is to be presented for payment, and a presentment there is sufficient as against the drawee and indorsers. Pierce v. Struthers, 27 Pa. St. 249, 254; Struthers v. Blake et al., 30 Pa. St. 139. Where a note is dated at a particular place, and no other place is designated as that of its negotiation and payment, the presumption is that the maker resides where the note is dated, and that he contemplates payment at that place. Sasscer v. Stone, 10 Md. 98; Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251; Clark v. Seabright, 135 Pa. St. 173. But this is presumption only, and if he resides elsewhere within the State when the note falls due, and this is known to the holder, demand must be made at the maker's residence or place of business. Sasscer v. Stone, 10 Md. 98. When the maker does not reside, and has no place of business, in the State where the note is payable, no demand upon him is necessary in order to charge the indorser. Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320. And if the maker absconds, this will generally excuse the demand; but if he changes his residence within the same jurisdiction, the holder must endeavor to find it and make demand there. Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251. But where the maker or acceptor waives presentment at his place of business or residence, presentment elsewhere may be sufficient. King v. Holmes, 11 Pa. St. 456; Parker v. Kellogg, 158 Mass. 90.

(b) If the maker leaves the State subsequent to the making of the note, presentment at his former place of business or residence is sufficient. Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251.

§ 134. Instrument must be exhibited. The instrument must be exhibited to the person from whom payment is demanded, and when it is paid must be delivered up to the party paying it (a).

(a) Ocean Nat. Bank v. Fant, 50 N. Y. 474, 476; Smith v. Rockwell, 2 Hill, 482; Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Draper v. Clemens, 7 Mo. 52. This is requisite in order that the drawer or acceptor may be able to judge (1) of the genuineness of the instrument; (2) of the right of the holder to receive payment; and (3) that he may immediately reclaim possession upon paying the amount. Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46, 51. Demand of payment without actual exhibition of the note is sufficient to bind the indorser where the maker does not demand to see the note but refuses payment on other grounds. Legg v. Viman, 165 Mass. 555; Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361; Fall River Union Bank v. Willard, 5 Metcalf, 216. Where the note is secured by collaterals the maker is entitled to require that they be delivered with the note; and if he insists upon it, they must be tendered with the note or the demand of payment will not be sufficient. Ocean Nat. Bank v. Fant, 50 N. Y. 474.

§ 135. Presentment where instrument payable at bank.— Where the instrument is payable at a bank, presentment for payment must be made during banking hours, unless the person to make payment has no funds there to meet it at any time during the day, in which case presentment at any hour before the bank is closed on that day is sufficient (a).

(a) See Salt Springs National Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 430; Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister, 17 N. Y. 46; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230; Parker v. Gordon, 7 East. 387; Garnett v. Woodcock, 1 Starkie, 475; Reed v. Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 29; Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46; Shepard v. Chamberlain, 8 Gray, 225. What will constitute banking hours within the meaning of the statute has reference to the general custom of the place where the transaction occurs. Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen (Wis.), 114 N. W. Rep. 451. Thus, where presentment was made to a Chicago bank between three and six o'clock in the afternoon, and