nished as to why it is closed. Sulsbacker v. Bank of Charleston, 86 Tenn. 201. If, however, the party has abandoned his place of business at the maturity of the paper, but has a residence or other place of business in the city, which could be ascertained by reasonable inquiry, a presentment at the former place of business would not be sufficient. (Id.) The making and dating of a promissory note at a particular place is not equivalent to making it payable there, nor does it supersede the necessity for presentment and demand at the residence or place of business of the maker if it be known, or if by due diligence in making inquiry it could be ascertained. Oxnard v. Varnum, 111 Pa. St. 193. But where a bill of exchange is addressed to the drawee at a particular house, and the same is accepted generally by him, the address indicates the place where it is to be presented for payment, and a presentment there is sufficient as against the drawee and indorsers. Pierce v. Struthers, 27 Pa. St. 249, 254; Struthers v. Blake et al., 30 Pa. St. 139. Where a note is dated at a particular place, and no other place is designated as that of its negotiation and payment, the presumption is that the maker resides where the note is dated, and that he contemplates payment at that place. Sasscer v. Stone, 10 Md. 98; Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320; Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251; Clark v. Seabright, 135 Pa. St. 173. But this is presumption only, and if he resides elsewhere within the State when the note falls due, and this is known to the holder, demand must be made at the maker's residence or place of business. Sasscer v. Stone, 10 Md. 98. When the maker does not reside, and has no place of business, in the State where the note is payable, no demand upon him is necessary in order to charge the indorser. Ricketts v. Pendleton, 14 Md. 320. And if the maker absconds, this will generally excuse the demand; but if he changes his residence within the same jurisdiction, the holder must endeavor to find it and make demand there. Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251. But where the maker or acceptor waives presentment at his place of business or residence, presentment elsewhere may be sufficient. King v. Holmes, 11 Pa. St. 456; Parker v. Kellogg, 158 Mass. 90. (b) If the maker leaves the State subsequent to the making of the note, presentment at his former place of business or residence is sufficient. Nailor v. Bowie, 3 Md. 251.

$134. Instrument must be exhibited. The instrument must be exhibited to the person from whom payment is demanded, and when it is paid must be delivered up to the party paying it (a).

(a) Ocean Nat. Bank v. Fant, 50 N. Y. 474, 476; Smith v. Rockwell, 2 Hill, 482; Musson v. Lake, 4 How. 262; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Draper v. Clemens, 7 Mo. 52. This is requisite in order that the drawer or acceptor may be able to judge (1) of the genuineness of the instrument; (2) of the right of the holder to receive payment; and (3) that he may immediately reclaim possession upon paying the amount. Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46, 51. Demand of payment without actual exhibition of the note is sufficient to bind the indorser where the maker does not demand to see the note but refuses payment on other grounds. Legg v. Viman, 165 Mass. 555; Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46; Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361; Fall River Union Bank v. Willard, 5 Metcalf, 216. Where the note is secured by collaterals the maker is entitled to require that they be delivered with the note; and if he insists upon it, they must be tendered with the note or the demand of payment will not be sufficient. Ocean Nat. Bank v. Fant, 50 N. Y. 474.

§ 135. Presentment where instrument payable at bank.Where the instrument is payable at a bank, presentment for payment must be made during banking hours, unless the person to make payment has no funds there to meet it at any time during the day, in which case presentment at any hour before the bank is closed on that day is sufficient (a).

(a) See Salt Springs National Bank v. Burton, 58 N. Y. 430; Bank of Syracuse v. Hollister, 17 N. Y. 46; Bank of Utica v. Smith, 18 Johns. 230; Parker v. Gordon, 7 East. 387; Garnett v. Woodcock, 1 Starkie, 475; Reed v. Wilson, 41 N. J. Law, 29; Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46; Shepard v. Chamberlain, 8 Gray, 225. What will constitute banking hours within the meaning of the statute has reference to the general custom of the place where the transaction occurs. Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen (Wis.), 114 N. W. Rep. 451. Thus, where presentment was made to a Chicago bank between three and six o'clock in the afternoon, and

it appeared that the business day of the bank continued after the close of clearing-house transactions, so as to enable banks holding paper for collection to present those items which had been refused payment through the clearings, it was held that the presentment satisfied the requirements of the statute. (Id.) If a note held by a bank at which it is payable is not paid when due, no presentment and demand of payment are necessary. Dykman v. Northridge, 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 26. It is sufficient that the note was in the bank on the day it fell due, and that there were no funds of the maker there, or other provision for payment. Hallowell v. Curry, 41 Pa. St. 322. It has been held that the office of a private banker is not a bank within the terms of a note made payable at any bank in Boston." Way v. Butterworth, 108 Mass. 509. As to bank customs see Grand Bank v. Blanchard, 23 Pick. 305, 306; Mechanics' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Metc. 13, 24; Boston Bank v. Hodges, 9 Pick. 420; People's Bank v. Keech, 26 Md. 521. But now that the statute prescribes the rules as to presentment these matters can no longer be governed by custom; certainly not if the custom conflicts with the statute. Under the statute, paper payable at a bank may be presented there though the bank is closed and in the hands of a receiver, and a demand upon the receiver personally is not necessary. Schlesinger v. Schultz, 110 App. Div. (N. Y.) 356. See also Berg v. Abbott, 83 Pa. St. 177. But compare Hutchison v. Crutcher, 98 Tenn. 421, where it was held that when a national bank has been placed in the hands of a receiver, paper payable at the bank should be presented at the office of the receiver. See section 133, subdivision 1.

The authorities are not agreed upon the point as to the precise time when suit may be brought on a dishonored note payable at a bank, some holding that it cannot be brought until the day after its dishonor, others that it may be brought at any time after the expiration of business hours on the day it is payable, and others still that it may be commenced as soon as payment is refused on that day. Citizens' Bank v. Lay, 80 Va. 436, 440; Church v. Clark, 21 Pick. 309; Blackman v. Nearing, 43 Conn. 60; Humphreys v. Sutcliffe, 192 Pa. St. 336.

§ 136. Presentment where principal debtor is dead.Where the person primarily liable on the instrument is dead,

(a) and no place of payment is specified, presentment for payment must be made to his personal representative, if such there be, and if with the exercise of reasonable diligence, he can be found (b).

(a) But there must be competent and legal proof of his death, and that the party upon whom the demand was made was such representative; the statement of these facts in the protest is not prima facie proof thereof. Weems v. Farmers' Bank, 15 Md. 231.

(b) The fact that the holder is excused from making presentment under this section does not relieve him from the duty of giving notice of dishonor to the indorser. Reed v. Spear, 107 App. Div. (N. Y.) 144. See this case, also, for what evidence will justify a finding that the holder could not, with reasonable diligence, make presentment to the administrator of the deceased maker.

§ 137. Presentment to persons liable as partners. Where the persons primarily liable on the instrument are liable as partners, and no place of payment is specified, presentment for payment may be made to any one of them, even though there has been a dissolution of the firm (a).

(a) Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518; Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 635; Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill, 194; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Henschuk, 52 Mo. 207.

§ 138. Presentment to joint debtors.- Where there are several persons not partners, primarily liable on the instrument, and no place of payment is specified, presentment must be made to them all (a).

(a) Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518, 523; Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Metc. 504; Arnold v. Dresser, 8 Allen, 435; Willis v. Green, 5 Hill, 232; Benedict v. Schmieg, 13 Wash. 476. In some cases this might be impracticable, but such cases are covered by section 142. The holder of a joint and several note may sue one maker alone upon one cause of action arising out of the note and all makers generally upon another such cause of action. Davis v. Schmidt, 126 Wis. 461.

§ 139. When presentment not required to charge the drawer. Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge the drawer where he has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will pay the instrument (a).

(a) But presentment is not dispensed with merely because the drawer has no funds in the hands of the drawee. Life Insurance Company v. Pendleton, 112 U. S. 708; Dickens v. Beal, 10 Pet. 572; Welch v. B. C. Taylor Mfg. Co., 82 Ill. 581; Kimball v. Bryan, 56 Iowa, 632; Kingsley v. Robinson, 21 Pick. 327. It is sufficient if the drawer had a reasonable expectation that the bill would be paid; or if there was an agreement between him and the drawee that the latter should accept, or a course of dealing between them by which the drawee was accustomed to accept without reference to the state of the mutual account. See cases cited above. Presentment of a check is excused where the making of the check was a fraud upon the part of the drawer, he having no funds in the bank, and no ground for a reasonable expectation that it would be paid. Beaureguard v. Knowlton, 156 Mass. 395, 396.

§ 140. When presentment not required to charge the indorser.- Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge an indorser where the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation, and he has no reason to expect that the instrument will be paid if presented.

§ 141. When delay in making presentment is excused.— Delay in making presentment for payment is excused when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the holder and not imputable to his default, misconduct or negligence (a). When the cause of delay ceases to operate, presentment must be made with reasonable diligence.

(a) Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213; Pier v. Heinrichsoffen, 67 Mo. 163. In these cases the delay was caused by