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(a) Drexler v. McGlynn, 99 Cal. 143. But a notice made out by a notary public and signed by mistake with the name of the maker of the note instead of with his own name, without the authority of the maker, is insufficient. Cabot Bank v. Warner, 92 Mass. 522.

(b) Banks as agents for collection have authority to receive and transmit notices on behalf of the owners of the paper. West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128, 130; Colt v. Noble, 5 Mass. 167; Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bor. & Pul. 599; Robson v. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388. An agent in giving notice represents and acts on behalf of his principal, and this, though he may be a notary and act in his official character. Lawrence v. Miller, 16 N. Y. 235, 238.

§ 163. Effect of notice given on behalf of holder.-Where notice is given by or on behalf of the holder, it enures for the benefit of all subsequent holders and all prior parties who have a right of recourse against the party to whom it is given (a).

(a) But the holder is not bound to give notice to any one but his immediate indorser. West River Bank v. Taylor, 34 N. Y. 128, 131; Linn v. Horton, 17 Wis. 150, 153.

§ 164. Effect where notice is given by party entitled thereto. Where notice is given by or on behalf of a party entitled to give notice, it enures for the benefit of the holder and all parties subsequent to the party to whom notice is given.

$165. When agent may give notice.- Where the instrument has been dishonored in the hands of an agent, he may either himself give notice to the parties liable thereon, or he may give notice to his principal. If he give notice to his principal, he must do so within the same time as if he were the holder, and the principal, upon the receipt of such notice, has himself the same time for giving notice as if the agent had been an independent holder (a).

(a) Rosson v. Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90. But if the agent has failed to give notice to his principal in due time, the latter is cut off, though he may thereafter use due diligence in communicating notice to antecedent parties. (Id.)

§ 166. When notice sufficient.-A written notice need not be signed (a), and an insufficient written notice may be supplemented and validated by verbal communication. A misdescription of the instrument does not vitiate the notice unless the party to whom the notice is given is in fact misled thereby (b).

(a) See Bank v. Dibrell, 91 Tenn. 301; Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 301; Kilgore v. Bulkley, 14 Conn. 362; Tobey v. Lenning, 14 Pa. St. 483.

16 Wis. 679. Where the fact that there is

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(b) Aiken V. Marine Bank, instrument is misdescribed, the other instrument to which the notice could be may be shown by extrinsic evidence. Cayuga Bank v. Worden, 6 N. Y. 19. But a notice of protest signed by a notary public, and personally delivered by him to the indorser is not sufficient to charge the latter, where it appears that the notice was addressed to another person than the indorser, and stated that the holder looked to such person for the payment of the note. Marshall v. Sonneman, 216 Pa. St. 65.

§ 167. Form of notice. The notice may be in writing or merely oral, and may be given in any terms which sufficiently identify the instrument, and indicate that it has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment (a). It may in all cases be given by delivering it personally (b) or through the mails (c).

(a) Second National Bank v. Smith, 118 Wis. 18; Sasscer v. Farmers' Bank, 4 Md. 409; Brewster v. Arnold, 1 Wis. 264. A notice which omits an essential feature of the note, or misdescribes it, is an imperfect one, but not necessarily invalid. It is invalid only where it fails to give that particular information which it would have given but for its particular imperfection; and even

in case the notice in itself be defective, if, from evidence aliunde of the attendant circumstances, it is apparent that the indorser was not deceived or misled as to the identity of the dishonored instrument, he will be charged. Hodges v. Schuler, 22 N. Y. 114; Artisans' Bank v. Backus, 36 N. Y. 106; Gill v. Palmer, 29 Conn. 57; Howland v. Adrian, 29 N. J. Law, 48; Derham v. Donohue, 155 Fed. Rep. 385. To make the notice defective the variance must be such as that, under the circumstances of the case, it conveys no sufficient knowledge to the indorser of the identity of the particular instrument which has been dishonored. Cayuga County Bank v. Worden, 1 N. Y. 413, 417; Mills v. Bank of U. S., 11 Wheat. 431; Bank of Alexandria v. Swaim, 9 Peters, 33. The notice is not necessarily defective because it is silent as to the date and time of payment, Youngs v. Lee, 12 N. Y. 551, or fails to state that demand of payment was made, Mills v. Bank of U. S., 11 Wheat. 431, or does not state at whose request it is given, nor who is the owner of the note. Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401. The term "protested" when contained in a notice, with the statement that the holder looks to the indorser for indemnity, fairly and necessarily implies that the note or bill has been dishonored. Brewster v. Arnold, 1 Wis. 264. A note is well described when its maker, payee, date, amount and time of payment are stated. A printed notice is sufficient, Cuyler v. Stevens, 4 Wend. 566; Bank of Cooperstown v. Woods, 28 N. Y. 545, and the signature of the notary need not be in writing, but may be printed. Bank of Cooperstown v. Woods, 28 N. Y. 561; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harr. (N. J.), 487. But a notice which is barely enough to put the indorser upon inquiry is not sufficient. Cook v. Litchfield, 9 N. Y. 279, 281. It must reasonably apprise the party of the particular paper upon which he is sought to be charged. Home Insurance Co. v. Greene, 19 N. Y. 518; Dodson v. Taylor, 56 N. J. Law, 11. In the New York case cited the name of the maker was left blank, and it was held that the notice was not sufficient. Notice that a note is unpaid would not necessarily imply that it is dishonored, because the note might remain unpaid, while in fact it may never have been presented to the maker for payment. Hunter v. Van Bomhorst, 1 Md. 504, 510. But such notice might be good if the note is payable at a bank. Id. If the notice indicates that the paper was presented before due, it is not sufficient. Etting v. Schuylkill Bank, 2 Pa. St. 355. The statement that the holder looks for payment to the party to whom notice is sent is

not necessary; for this is implied from the fact of giving notice. Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Peters, 543; Mills v. Bank of U. S., 11 Wheat. 431, 436; Nelson v. First Nat. Bank, 29 U. S. App. 554; 69 Fed. Rep. 798, 801; 16 C. C. A. 425; Cowles v. Horton, 3 Conn. 523. A certificate of deposit dated January 25, 1904, due January 25, 1905, was duly presented for payment. Payment was demanded and refused on January 25, 1905. Thereupon a notice of presentment, demand, and dishonor was sent to, and received by, the indorser, which was dated January 25, 1904, when it should have been dated January 25, 1905, which stated that the demand and dishonor were on the day of the date of the notice, that the certificate was dated January 25, 1905, when it was dated January 25, 1904, and it omitted to recite this clause which was in the certificate, "No interest after six months."-Held, that the notice sufficiently identified the certificate and notified the indorser of due presentment, demand, and dishonor. Derham v. Donohue, 155 Fed. Rep. 385. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of the sufficiency of the notice is a question of law for the court. Cayuga County Bank v. Worden, 6 N. Y. 19.

(b) The statute was not intended to change the rule as it previously existed. Where personal service is relied upon, the evidence must show either actual personal service or an ordinarily intelligent, diligent effort to make personal service upon the indorser either at his place of business during business hours, or at his residence if he have no place of business; but if he be absent, it is not necessary to call a second time, and the notice may, in that event, be left with any one found in charge, or if there be no one in charge, or no one there, then the giving of notice is deemed to be waived. American Exchange National Bank v. American Hotel Victoria Co., 103 App. Div. (N. Y.) 372, 374.

(c) The rule of the commercial law was well settled that if the parties resided in the same place the notice must be personal; that is, must be given to the individual or left at his domicile or place of business. Sheldon v. Benham, 4 Hill, 129; Brown v. Bank of Abingdon, 85 Va. 95; Boyd's Admr. v. City Savings Bank, 15 Gratt. 501, 505; Bell v. Hagerstown Bank, 7 Gill, 216; Westfall v. Farwell, 13 Wis. 504, 509. But the courts have been inclined to restrict the general rule, and established many exceptions to it. Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Peters, 578. In the notes to 1 American Lead. Cas. (402) it is said: "It is obvious that the rule

requiring personal notice, where the parties reside in the same place, has lost its reasonable force and exists only by authority. Instead of undermining it by exceptions that conflict with it in principle and render the subject embarrassing in practice, it would be much better to declare that the rule itself has become obsolete and is abolished." But it cannot properly be said that the rule had become obsolete, having been recognized and acted on in many recent as well as older cases, and having in no case been denied or disregarded. It was, therefore, too firmly established to be abolished by the courts. See Boyd's Admr. v. City Savings Bank, 15 Gratt. 501, 505. In New York, service by mail in such cases was authorized by Laws 1857, Chap. 416. For the construction of the former statute of Wisconsin see Smith v. Hill, 6 Wis. 154; Westfall v. Farwell, 13 Wis. 504.

§ 168. To whom notice may be given.- Notice of dishonor may be given either to the party himself or to his agent in that behalf (a).

(a) Fassin v. Hubbard, 55 N. Y. 465, 471; Lake Shore National Bank v. Butler Colliery Co., 51 Hun, 63, 68. In Firth v. Thrush, 8 Barn. & Cress. 387, the opinion was expressed that authority to indorse negotiable paper carried with it authority to receive notice of its dishonor. And in Persons v. Kruger, 45 App. Div. 187, it was held that a notice of protest may be served upon an agent of the payee and indorser, where the agent has authority to make and indorse paper, and has authority to act and has acted as the general agent of the payee in the conduct of his business, and has had full charge of the acts and dealings with the bank at which the paper was discounted and the management of the paper. A notice of non-payment sent to the indorser inclosed under seal and delivered by the messenger to one in the employment of the indorser, with directions not to open it, is insufficient. Paine v. Edsell, 19 Pa. St. 178.

§ 169. Notice where party is dead. When any party is dead, and his death is known to the party giving notice, the notice must be given to a personal representative, if there be one, and if with reasonable diligence he can be found (a). If there be no personal representative, notice may be sent to

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