the last residence or last place of business of the deceased (b).

(a) Denninger v. Miller, 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 409; Bank of Port Jefferson v. Darling, 91 Hun, 236; Shoenberger's Executor v. Lancaster Savings Institution, 28 Pa. St. 459; Dodson v. Taylor, 56 N. J. Law, 11; Massachusetts Bank v. Oliver, 10 Cush. 557; Merchants' Bank v. Birch, 17 John. 24. See also Boyd's Admr. v. City Savings Bank, 15 Gratt. 501; Smalley v. Wright, 40 N. J. Law, 471; Goodnow v. Warren, 122 Mass. 82; Bealls v. Peck, 12 Barb. 245; Cayuga Co. Bank v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 236; Maspero v. Pedesclaux, 22 La. Ann. 227.

(b) Goodnow v. Warren, 122 Mass. 82; Merchants' Bank v. Birch, 17 Johns. 25; Lindeman's Exr. v. Guildin, 34 Pa. St. 54. The mailing of notice of dishonor to an indorser known to be dead, directed to a post office known to be one at which he had not received his mail while living, is not a good notice of dishonor. Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Brown, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 599.

§ 170. Notice to partners.— Where the parties to be notified are partners, notice to any one partner is notice to the firm (a), even though there has been a dissolution (b).

(a) But where partners give a promissory note with one of them as maker and the other as indorser, the latter is not liable on his indorsement unless he be duly notified of the dishonor of the note. Foland v. Boyd, 23 Pa. St. 476.

(b) Hubbard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43, 50; Coster v. Thomason, 19 Ala. 717; Slocomb v. Lizardi, 21 La. Ann. 355; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Henschuh, 52 Mo. 207; Seldner v. Mount Jackson Nat. Bank, 66 Md. 488.

§ 171. Notice to persons jointly liable.-Notice to joint parties who are not partners must be given to each of them, unless one of them has authority to receive such notice for the others (a).

(a) Shepard v. Hawley, 1 Conn. 367; Boyd v. Orton, 16 Wis. For the distinction between parties who are partners and

495.

joint parties not partners, see Gates v. Beecher, 60 N. Y. 518, 526. See also Willis v. Green, 5 Hill, 232. But see Sherer v. Easton Bank, 33 Pa. St. 134; Jarnigan v. Stratton, 95 Tenn. 619.

§ 172. Notice to bankrupt.—Where a party has been adjudged a bankrupt or an insolvent, or has made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, notice may be given either to the party himself or to his trustee or assignee (a).

(a) In Callahan v. Kentucky Bank, 82 Ky. 231, it was decided that where the indorser had made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, notice to the assignee would bind the indorser and his estate. And a similar rule was adopted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in American Nat. Bank v. Junk Bros., 94 Tenn. 634. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in House v. Vinton, 43 Ohio St. R., 346, by a majority opinion, declined to adopt this rule, making a distinction between an assignee under a voluntary general assignment and an assignee in bankruptcy. In this latter case, however, there is a strong dissenting opinion by two of the judges of that court, in which the soundness of the rule as announced by the Kentucky court is earnestly insisted upon.

8173. Time within which notice must be given.- Notice may be given as soon as the instrument is dishonored (a); and unless delay is excused as hereinafter provided, must be given within the times fixed by this act.

(a) The holder need not wait until the close of business hours, but may send notice at once. Bank of Alexandria v. Swan, 9 Peters, 33; Lenox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373; ex parte Moline, 19 Ves. 216; Whitwell v. Brigham, 19 Pick. 117; Coleman v. Carpenter, 9 Pa. St. 178.

§ 174. Where parties reside in same place.-- Where the person giving and the person to receive notice reside in the same place, notice must be given within the following times:

1. If given at the place of business of the person to receive

notice, it must be given before the close of business hours on the day following (a);

2. If given at his residence, it must be given before the usual hours of rest on the day following (b);

3. If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post-office in time to reach him in usual course on the day following (c).

(a) Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis. 408; Cayuga County Bank v. Hunt, 2 Hill, 236; Marks v. Boone, 24 Fla. 177; Bell v. Hagerstown Bank, 7 Gill, 216; Daniel on Neg. Insts., section 1038. The notice must follow upon the first demand. Rosson v. Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90.

(b) Phelps v. Stocking, 21 Neb. 444; Darbishire v. Parker, 6 East. 8. While service at the place of business must be during business hours, service at the residence is not so regulated. It will be sufficient if made during any of the hours when members of household are attending to their ordinary affairs. Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis. 408. If the service is properly made at the place of business or residence, it is immaterial that the party to be notified did not in fact receive the notice. Adams v. Wright, 14 Wis. 408.

(c) See note to next section.

§ 175. Where parties reside in different places.- Where the person giving and the person to receive notice reside in different places, the notice must be given within the following times:

1. If sent by mail, it must be deposited in the post-office in time to go by mail the day following the day of dishonor, or if there be no mail at a convenient hour on that day, by the next mail thereafter (a).

2. If given otherwise than through the post-office, then within the time that notice would have been received in due course of mail, if it had been deposited in the post-office within the time specified in the last subdivision (b).

(a) Sanderson v. Sanderson, 20 Fla. 292; Rosson v. Carroll, 90 Tenn. 90; Stephenson v. Dickson, 24. Pa. St. 148; Whitwell v.

Johnson, 17 Mass. 449. In Smith v. Poillon, 87 N. Y. 590, 597, Earl, J., said: "From a careful examination of all these authorities and many others, it is clear that the law is not precisely settled. It appears that at first it was supposed to be necessary that notice of dishonor should be given by the next post after dishonor, on the same day, if there was one. That rule was found inconveniently stringent, and then it was held that when the parties lived in different places, between which there was a mail, the notice could be posted the next day after the dishonor or notice of dishonor. Some of the authorities hold that the party required to give the notice may have the whole of the next day. Some of them hold that when there are several mails on the next day, it is sufficient to send the notice by any post of that day. Other authorities lay down the rule, in general terms, that the notice must be posted by the first practical and convenient mail of the next day; and that rule seems to be supported by the most authority in this State. What is a practical and convenient mail depends upon circumstances. It may be controlled by the usages of business and the customs of the people at the place of mailing, and the condition, situation and business engagements of the person required to give the notice. The rule should have a reasonable application in every case, and whether sufficient diligence has been used to mail the notice, the facts being undisputed, is a question of law." But see Burgess v. Vreeland, 4 Zab. (N. J.) 71; Winans v. Davis, 3 Harr. (N. J.) 276. Where it is proper to send the notice by the mail, and it has not arrived at as early a date as in the regular course of the mail it might have come if started at the proper time, the onus is upon the plaintiff to prove that it was put in the mail at the proper time. Friend v. Wilkinson, 9 Gratt. 31.

(b) Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Peters, 578; Jarvis v. St. Croix Mfg. Co., 23 Me. 287.

§ 176. When sender deemed to have given due notice.— Where notice of dishonor is duly addressed and deposited in the post-office, the sender is deemed to have given due notice, notwithstanding any miscarriage in the mails (a).

(a) Windham Bank v. Norton, 22 Conn. 213; Pier v. Heinrichsoffen, 67 Mo. 163; Bell v. Hagerstown Bank, 7 Gill, 216; Sasscer

v. Farmers' Bank, 4 Md. 409; Cook v. Foraker, 193 Pa. St. 461. În Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401, 410, it was said: "The mail being established by standing laws of the Government for the purpose principally of facilitating the transmission of mercantile correspondence, it being by far the most usual conveyance of letters and generally the most sure as to time, and safe in every other respect, all men who deal in mercantile paper are presumed to assent, and even expect, that such information as they may want will be communicated in this way. And thus the post-office becomes their agent; and if it happened to fail from any unexpected cause, he who made the right use of it by placing his letter there properly directed has done all his duty, and the consequences must fall upon him who has to receive."

§ 177. Deposit in post-office; what constitutes.- Notice is deemed to have been deposited in the post-office when deposited in any branch post-office or in any letter-box under the control of the post-office department (a).

(a) See Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 79 Me. 376; Pearce v. Langfit, 101 Pa. St. 507; Johnson v. Brown, 154 Mass. 105; Skilbeck v. Garbett, 7 Q. B. 846. In some cases it has been held that delivery to a letter carrier was sufficient. Pearce v. Langfit, 101 Pa. St. 507; Shoemaker v. Mechanics' Bank, 59 Pa. St. 79. But it was not deemed wise to adopt this rule in the statute.

§ 178. Notice to subsequent* party; time of. Where a party receives notice of dishonor, he has, after the receipt of such notice, the same time for giving notice to antecedent parties that the holder has after the dishonor (a).

(a) Howland v. Adrian, 29 N. J. Law, 41; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263; Jameson v. Swinton, 2 Taunt. 224; Shelburne Falls National Bank v. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177; Seaton v. Scovill, 18 Kans. 435; Haly v. Brown, 5 Pa. St. 178; Etting v. Schuylkill Bank, 2 Pa. St. 355; Struthers v. Blake, 30 Pa. St. 139; Bray v. Hadwen, 5 Maule & Sel. 68; Linn v. Horton, 17 Wis. 150. If the holder of an indorsed bill or note chooses to rely upon the

* Error in egrossing. The word should be "antecedent."