responsibility of his immediate indorser, there is no necessity for his giving notice to any previous party; and if such notice be properly given in time, by the other parties, it will enure to the benefit of the holder and he may recover thereon against any of them. Thus, if the holder notifies the sixth indorser, and he the fifth, and so on to the first, the latter will be liable to all the parties. And it is no objection to such notice that it is not in fact received so soon as the first or any prior indorser, as if it had been transmitted directly by the holder or notary, provided it has been seasonably sent by each indorser as he received it. Colt v. Noble, 5 Mass. 167; Mead v. Engs, 5 Cow. 303; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263. And the same degree of diligence must be exercised on the part of the indorser in forwarding notice as is required of the holder. Ordinary diligence must be used in both cases. He is not bound to forward notice on the very day upon which he receives it, but may wait until the next. See cases above cited. Service of notice upon an antecedent party is not shown by the mere testimony of the notary that not knowing the address of the indorser he inclosed the notice of dishonor to a subsequent indorser with postage for forwarding the same to the prior indorser. Fuller Buggy Co. v. Waldron, 112 App. Div. (N. Y.) 814. The holder of a check indorsed and deposited the same in his bank for collection on July 28th. On July 29th, he was notified by the bank that the check had been dishonored, and on July 30th, he notified the payee by telegraph:- Held, that the notice was in due time under this section. Jurgens v. Wichmann, 108 N. Y. Supp. 881.

$179. Where notice must be sent.- Where a party has added an address to his signature, notice of dishonor must be sent to that address (a); but if he has not given such address, then the notice must be sent as follows:

1. Either to the post-office nearest to his place of residence, or to the post-office where he is accustomed to receive his letters (b); or

2. If he live in one place, and have his place of business in another, notice may be sent to either place (c); or

3. If he is sojourning in another place, notice may be sent to the place where he is so sojourning (d).

But where the notice is actually received by the party within the time specified in this act, it will be sufficient, though not sent in accordance with the requirements of this section (e).

(a) Bartlett v. Robinson, 39 N. Y. 187. In this case the indorsement was in the following form: "Chas. Robinson, 214 E. 18th Street." The notice of dishonor sent through the post-office was addressed Chas. Robinson, Esq., City of New York," and was not received by the indorser. Held, that he was discharged.

(b) Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Peters, 578; National Bank v. Cade, 73 Mich. 449; Northwestern Coal Co. v. Bowman, 69 Iowa 150; Mercer v. Lancaster, 5 Pa. St. 160; Woods v. Neeld, 44 Pa. St. 86; Haly v. Brown, 5 Pa. St. 178; Rand v. Reynolds, 2 Gratt. 171. But if sufficient inquiries have been made, and information received on which the holder has a right to rely, a mistake as to the nearest or usual post-office does not release the indorser. Moore v. Hardcastle, 11 Md. 486. For a case where the indorser received his mail at two post-offices, see Shelburne Falls Nat. Bank v. Townsley, 107 Mass. 444. A notice addressed to the indorser at "New York" is insufficient where there is no evidence that he lived, ever had lived, or was sojourning in New York, and no inquiry was made to ascertain whether such was the fact. Fonseca v. Hartman, 84 N. Y. Supp. 131.

(c) Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Peters, 549; Williams v. Bank of U. S., 2 Peters, 96; Montgomery Co. Bank v. Marsh, 7 N. Y. 481. The rule that notice might be served at the place of business, as well as at the residence, was not changed by the former statute of Wisconsin, Laws 1861, Ch. 79. Simus v. Larkin, 19 Wis. 390.

(d) Chouteau v. Webster, 6 Metc. 1; Young v. Durgin, 15 Gray, 264; Bigley's Adm'r v. Cluff, 16 Gratt. 284, 291-292. The stability of residence acquired under laws relating to taxation and the settlement of paupers is not necessary when ascertaining the abode of an indorser for the purpose of giving him notice of dishonor by mail. He may have a residence for this purpose at two places at the same time, and, in such case, notice to him at either place will be sufficient. Lowell Trust Company v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379, 381.

(e) Although the residence or place of business is the usual and

proper place for giving notice, it will be good if actually given anywhere. Dickens v. Hall, 87 Pa. St. 379, 380. If the party to be charged receives the notice in due time he cannot object to the means employed. Terbell v. Jones, 15 Wis. 235; Whitford v. Burckmeyer, 1 Gill, 127. But if the holder employs other means than the mail he does so at his own risk. (Id.) Notice sent by telegraph, for example, would undoubtedly be sufficient if actually received, and an omission to post the notice in due season might be corrected in this way. See section 175.

§ 180. Waiver of notice.-Notice of dishonor may be waived, either before the time of giving notice has arrived or after the omission to give due notice (a), and the waiver may be express or implied (b).

(a) Robinson v. Barnett, 19 Fla. 670. The statute has not changed the law respecting waiver. First Nat. Bank v. Gridley, 112 App. Div. (N. Y.) 398. If an indorser with full knowledge of the laches of the holder in neglecting to protest a bill or note, unequivocally assents to continue his liability, or to be responsible, as though due protest had been made, he is held to have waived the right to object, and will stand in the same position as if he had been regularly charged by presentment, demand and notice. This assent must be clearly established, and will not be inferred from doubtful or equivocal acts or language. It has been frequently held that a promise by the indorser to pay the note or bill, after he has been discharged by the failure to protest it, will bind the indorser, provided he had full knowledge of the laches when the promise was made. A promise made under those circumstances affords the clearest evidence that the indorser does not intend to take advantage of the laches of the holder; and the law, without any new consideration moving between the parties, gives effect to the promise. The assent of the indorser to be bound, notwithstanding he has not been duly charged, may be established by any transaction between him and the holder, which clearly indicates this purpose and intention. Ross v. Hurd, 71 N. Y. 14, 18; Turnbull v. Maddux, 68 Md. 579; Lewis v. Brehme, 33 Md. 412; Bank v. Dibbrell, 91 Tenn. 301; Low v. Howard, 10 Cush. 159; Smith v. Lownsdale, 6 Oregon 78; Whittaker v. Morrison, 1 Fla. 25. But it must appear in such case that the in

dorser had knowledge of the fact that the holder was in default. Thornton v. Wynn, 12 Wheat. 183; Hunter v. Hook, 64 Barb. 469; Gawtry v. Doane, 48 Barb. 148; Schierl v. Baumel, 75 Wis. 75; Glaser v. Rounds, 16 R. I. 235; Aebi v. Bank of Evansville, 124 Wis. 73, 81. And in Massachusetts it is held that knowledge on the part of an indorser that demand upon the maker has not been made is material, and must be proved, notwithstanding the fact that he knew that the note had not been paid and that notice of non-payment had not been given, and was aware that he was discharged from all liability. Parks v. Smith, 155 Mass. 26, 33; Garland v. Salem Bank, 9 Mass. 408; Low v. Howard, 10 Cush. 159; S. C., 11 Cush. 268; Kelley v. Brown, 5 Gray, 108. But where the indorser is fully apprised of the facts, he is bound by the waiver, though made in ignorance of its legal effect. Toole v. Crafts, 193 Mass. 110. Under the statute, as before, where presentment for payment is waived notice of dishonor is dispensed with. Baumeister v. Kuntz (Fla.), 42 So. Rep. 886; Dye v. Scott, 35 Ohio St. 194.

(b) Jenkins v. White, 147 Pa. St. 303. A waiver will not be presumed without the most satisfactory proof. Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 374. But it is not essential that the waiver be in writing. When the fact is established by competent evidence, a parol waiver is as valid and binding as a written one. The only difference is in the character of the proof. Annville National Bank v. Kettering, 106 Pa. St. 531, 534. A part payment of a note by an indorser, not explained or qualified by any accompanying circumstances, will be held to be sufficient evidence of waiver of notice. Whittaker v. Morrison, 1 Fla. 25: As to whether an indorser who has taken sufficient security to protect himself against possible loss waives his legal right to require proof of demand and notice, the authorities are not agreed. Smith v. Lownsdale, 6 Ore. 78; Haskell v. Boardman, 8 Allen, 38; Moore v. Alexander, 63 App. Div. 100; Mechanics' Bank v. Griswold, 7 Wend. 165; Brown v. Maffey, 15 East. 222. As to when question of waiver is for the jury, see Valley Nat. Bank v. The Uhler, 191 Pa. St. 356; Jones v. Roberts, 191 Pa. St. 152. facts constituting the waiver must be alleged in the pleading. Congress Brewing Co. v. Habenicht, 83 App. Div. (N. Y.) 141.

181. Whom affected by waiver.-Where the waiver is embodied in the instrument itself, it is binding upon all par

ties (a); but where it is written above the signature of an indorser, it binds him only (b).

(a) Phillips v. Dippo, 93 Iowa 35; Smith v. Pickham, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 326; Bryant v. Merchants' Bank, 8 Bush. 43; Lowry v. Steele, 27 Ind. 168; Farmers' Bank of Kentucky v. Ewing, 78 Ky. 264; Bryant v. Taylor, 19 Minn. 396.

(b) Woodman v. Thurston, 8 Cush. 157; Farmers' Bank v. Ewing, 78 Ky. 264.

§ 182. Waiver of protest.- A waiver of protest, whether in the case of a foreign bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument, is deemed to be a waiver not only of a formal protest, but also of presentment and notice of dishonor (a).

(a) First Nat. Bank v. Falkenham, 94 Cal. 141. While in a strict and technical sense the term protest when used in reference to commercial paper means only the formal declaration drawn up and signed by a notary; yet in a popular sense, and as used among men of business, it includes all the steps necessary to charge an indorser; and in waiving protest an indorser is supposed to use in it this sense. Coddington v. Davis, 1 N. Y. 186, 189-190; Annville Nat. Bank v. Kettering, 106 Pa. St. 531; First Nat. Bank v. Schreiner, 110 Pa. St. 188; Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 50 Conn. 567; Brewster v. Arnold, 1 Wis. 264; Wilkie v. Chandon, 1 Wash. 355. But the waiver will not be extended beyond the fair import of the terms; and hence, a waiver of "notice of protest" will not be deemed a waiver of demand. Sprague v. Fletcher, 8 Oregon 367. In construing a pleading a more technical rule will be applied, and an allegation that the instrument was duly protested will not be held to comprehend an averment that notice of dishonor was given to the indorser. Cook v. Warren, 88 N. Y. 37.

§ 183. When notice is dispensed with.- Notice of dishonor (a) is dispensed with when, after the exercise of reasonable diligence, it cannot be given to or does not reach. the parties sought to be charged (b).

(a) The fact that the holder is excused from making presentment for payment under section 136 because the principal obligor