페이지 이미지
PDF
ePub

ETHICAL DEMOCRACY

EVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY

D. G. RITCHIE

"EVOLUTION" is very generally looked upon as the

central idea of modern scientific and philosophical thought. "Democracy" is for many the final goal, or at least it is the inevitable path, of our political and social progress. It is reasonable to connect the two terms and to ask ourselves what light can be thrown by biological conceptions upon the theoretical and practical problems of society. But we must guard carefully against the rhetorical and uncritical use of phrases which have a scientific sound, or which have served as the watchwords of eager struggles. Those who believe themselves advanced thinkers are sometimes apt to treat everything that takes place through evolution as if it were identical with progress, and to take it for granted that the democratic movements of our age must, simply because they are the movements of our age, be all of them of a progressive kind. More cautious thinking suggests many difficulties; and it is sometimes even argued that biology throws no light whatever upon sociology, theoretical or practical. In the enthusiasm caused by the theories of Mr Herbert Spencer and the discoveries of Darwin it was often too lightly assumed that society could be explained by the direct application of the formula which had proved so successful in the biological sphere. "The social organism" seemed to be a key to unlock political and social mysteries. The structure and the functions of society were thought to be fully intelligible only if approached from the biological side. Social evolution has been supposed to need the law of natural

A

selection and that alone to make its tendencies scientifically interpretable. These exaggerations have naturally provoked reaction and we now find some thoughtful writers refusing to allow any value whatever to the conception of the "social organism" it is only a metaphor, and a very misleading metaphor. The science of sociology must be kept clear of biological influence.* Now this is an exaggeration on the other side. Human beings, whatever else they may be, are animals, and, as such, are subject to biological laws; and no careful study of social conditions, with a view to their understanding or their amelioration, can afford to neglect the biological facts of heredity and sex and the primitive, but ever present, struggle for food and for the means of rearing offspring. Though the attempts to carry out into detail the image of the social organism have often led to absurdity, and though practical deductions from it of a perfectly contradictory kind can easily be made, the metaphor has at least helped to free discussion of political problems from artificial assumptions, such as those of the social contract theory; and the word "evolution" may at least serve to remind the impatient reformer of institutions that he is dealing with what cannot be suddenly changed, nor in any arbitrary direction. The idea of social evolution goes along with less revolutionary methods than the older doctrines of social contract and natural rights.

In the wide philosophical sense of the term, the conception of evolution does not perhaps give much help towards understanding or forecasting or judging the movements of society, except in so far as it may suggest some general considerations for estimating progress. If evolution be the transition from incoherent homogeneity to definite heterogeneity, this would seem to show that the more highly developed society must be that in which there is at once greater social order and greater diversity in the type of individual development. The formula of evolution does not indeed give us any standard

*

I may refer to the writings of M. Tarde and M. Coste, who take very different views of sociology, but are agreed on this matter. Mr R. Mackintosh holds the same view in his book, "From Comte to Benjamin Kidd."

by which we can balance "order" and "liberty," unity and diversity, against one another: and it must be remembered that the process of evolution may include degeneration as well as what we call progress, greater adaptation on the whole being secured by the sacrifice of individual completeness or independence. Still, this general conception of evolution may prevent us from accepting an ideal of society which underestimates the value and the need of cohesion and discipline - an ideal of laissez faire such as Mr Herbert Spencer retains from the individualistic Radicalism of his youthful days in spite of all his biological formulæ. On the other hand, the significance of differentiation in development may guard us against the monotonous rigidity of some collectivistic ideals, which provide no sufficient scope for individual initiative and no sufficient security against the crystallisation that means decay and death to societies. From the general formula of evolution—a formula such as most philosophers from the time of the Ionian Greeks downwards might accept-we are at least warned that the only safe movement of social change is one which shall avoid anarchy on the one side and overregulation on the other. The golden mean is a vague ideal and standard of conduct; and yet it is a more useful principle than many that seem more definite by being more abstract.

When, however, the conception of evolution is applied to politics, people are generally, and rightly, thinking of specially biological conceptions: and of these the most prominent is that of Natural Selection. If progress depends upon a perpetual struggle for existence, there seems indeed a prima facie argument for liberty in the negative sense of laissez faire ; but everything else that may be included in democratic ideals appears to be condemned as hopeless or mischievous in its consequences. Nature produces not equality but inequality; nay, inequality is even requisite for natural selection to work upon. Fraternity, again, seems clearly impossible when ceaseless struggle and ruthless elimination of the unfit are the very means of progress. The argument from biology to politics would appear to support, not democracy, but aristocracy, and to enforce the enduring necessity of war and of unchecked industrial competition. If democracy can be

defended on the basis of scientific thinking about society, it seems to be only in so far as democracy means the opening of careers to those who have the talents for them, and the abolition of institutions and sentiments that hamper the struggle for life and interfere with "that beneficent private war" which leads to the survival of the fittest.

Some such inferences are, indeed, what are commonly drawn by literary opponents of radical and socialistic ideals. The "aristocratic preferences" of nature and the ceaseless competition by which alone fitness for existence is produced and maintained, supply excellent rhetorical common-places, when the advocate of things as they are wishes to confute advanced politicians in the name of advanced science. There is an important element of truth in such arguments; but the practical inferences are very crudely and carelessly drawn from their supposed biological premises. We must seek to realise much more precisely what is the exact meaning of natural selection, and how far, or with what modifications, it can be applied to the interpretation of social evolution. Then only are we entitled to find any guidance in our criticism of political aspirations or in our search for safe methods of reform.

There has recently been a disposition among certain biologists to minimise the significance of Darwin's great discovery of natural selection. It is said, for instance, that natural selection only means elimination of the less fit it is a merely negative process. The important factor in development would thus seem to be the positive element-whatever that may be which determines the variations upon which natural selection works. Now, it is perfectly true that the theory of natural selection pre-supposes variations. But the fact of a tendency to variation (in different degrees) in vegetable and animal organisms admits of no doubt. Examine the flowers that spring from the same root, the plants grown from seeds taken from the same seed-vessel, the puppies of the same litter, the children of the same parents,―variation will always be found, sometimes slight, sometimes startling in amount. This indefiniteness or instability of nature is the material for natural selection. How to explain it is certainly a

« 이전계속 »