Any person claiming it, or any part of it, by assignment or otherwise, might appear, and maintain his right, and, if he did not voluntarily appear, he might upon notice be required to do so, and the court had ample power to adjust all questions arising, to appoint a receiver, and to make all orders which might be necessary or equitable between the parties. Rev. St. c. 62, §§ 11, 12-24; Stevens v. Dillman, 86 Ill. 233. Having such jurisdiction, it could not be deprived of it by a subsequent proceeding in another court of concurrent jurisdiction. It is elementary that in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction the court which first obtains jurisdiction will retain it to the end of the controversy, to the exclusion of all others. An opposite rule would lead to endless confusion and uncertainty. The scope of the original bill, as well as of the bill of interpleader, was to determine the very questions which would necessarily arise upon the garnishment. Its object was to obtain from the circuit court of Pike county a decision upon the points arising in the suit previously commenced in Peoria county. Accordingly the court in Pike proceeded to hear the controversy, and rendered a decree, whereby it enjoined the further prosecution of the suit in Peoria. This injunction violates section 4, c. 69, Rev. St., which provides that an injunction to stay a suit or proceeding at law shall be in the county where the suit is pending.

"It is urged, however, that the bill of interpleader gave the court in Pike county all needed jurisdiction. It is laid down by Pomeroy in his work on Equity Jurisprudence (section 1322) that the equitable remedy by interpleader depends upon and requires the existence of four essential elements or conditions: (1) The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties against whom relief is demanded; (2) all their adverse titles or claims must be dependent on or derived from a common source; (3) the person asking relief must not have any claim or interest in the subjectmatter; (4) he must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants. Passing the other conditions, the fourth is important here. The same author says, in section 1326: "The party asking the inter pleader in his dealings with one of the claimants may have expressly bound himself by contract so as to render himself liable upon such independent undertaking without reference to his possible liability to the rival claimant upon the general nature of the transaction. Under these circumstances he cannot require the claimants to interplead.' In Story on Equity Jurisprudence (volume 2, § 823) it is said that this remedy, while it has cured many defects in proceedings at law, has left may cases of hardship unprovided for, and, in the following section, that there are cases where a bill in the nature of interpleader will lie by a party in interest to ascertain and establish his own rights when

The

there are conflicting rights between third persons. Possibly this bill might be in analogy to some of the cases cited under this section, and might be entertained if it were an original bill, and if the statute had not provided a distinct and adequate remedy, and if no question of prior jurisdiction were involved; but it is difficult to see why this bill was necessary, in view of the scope and purpose of the original bill, which sought to accomplish a full adjustment of these conflicting claims. Moreover, the statute had provided a remedy wholly adequate, and a court of concurrent authority had obtained jurisdiction of the fund, and had power to hear and determine the entire controversy. attachment proceedings in Peoria county had subjected the fund in the hands of the garnishees to the control and judgment of that court. The garnishees were bound to answer to that court, and could not be relieved from that duty by another court of concurrent jurisdiction upon a proceeding subsequently commenced. In their answer they would necessarily disclose the claim of Newman and others, who asserted the rights which were allowed them by this decree; and upon such disclosure those claimants would be brought in to litigate the matter with the attaching creditors, and thus, in a court of law, an adequate remedy is provided. No resort to chancery, even in the court having already obtained jurisdiction, would be necessary. Conceding that the statute would not oust equity of its power to adjudicate in such a case, yet it is clear that equity would not interfere when a court of law having competent power had obtained jurisdiction, and was about to administer the remedy provided by the statute. It follows that the circuit court of Pike county should not have assumed jurisdiction, and that its decree must be reversed, with direction to dismiss the original and the interpleading bill."

Matthews, Higbee & Grigsby, A. C. Crawford, and Jefferson Orr, for appellants. David McCulloch and Irwin & Slemmons, for appellees.

PHILLIPS, J. (after stating the facts). In the brief filed in this court it is urged that the circuit court of Pike county had jurisdiction in the case for the purpose of considering the effect of the deed of assignment made by Kirkwood, Miller & Co. The assignee had qualified under that deed of assignment, and it had been filed in the county court of Peoria county before the institution of this suit in Pike county, and the assignee had entered upon the discharge of his duties as assignee. The county court had jurisdiction to determine what property passed to the assignee by virtue of the assignment, and determine the rights of conflicting claim. ants, and for that purpose is, in effect, an insolvency court, clothed with legal and equi table powers to determine those questions

Hanchett v. Waterbury, 115 III. 220, 32 N. E. 194; Preston v. Spaulding, 120 Ill. 208, 10 N. E. 903; Wilson v. Aaron, 132 Ill. 238, 23 N. E. 1037; Field v. Ridgely, 116 Ill. 424, 6 N. E. 156. The county court of Peoria county having such powers under the law with reference to the determination of the property assigned and conflicting claims, a court of equity of one county should not interfere where a court of law of another county has acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and has power to determine the rights of the parties. It is urged by appellants that, as they were strangers to the record of the attachment case pending in the circuit court of Peoria county, they could not be bound by any judgment therein rendered. Their claim to the fund was of an equitable character, and the rule is well established in this state that courts of law will notice and protect the interests of equitable owners of choses in action in garnishee proceedings which are of an equitable character. Hodson v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 170; Carr v. Waugh, 28 Ill. 418. By section 11 of chapter 62, Rev. St., entitled "An act in regard to garnishment," "if it appears that any goods, chattels, choses in action, credits or effects in the hands of a garnishee are claimed by any other person by force of an assignment from the defendant or otherwise the court or justice of the peace shall permit such claimant to appear and maintain his right. If he does not voluntarily appear, notice for that purpose shall be issued and served on him in such manner as the court or justice shall direct." With this provision of the statute, and the circuit court of Peoria county having first obtained jurisdiction, it, in the proceeding before it, had jurisdiction and power to give appellants the relief that was sought under the original bill and the bill of interpleader, and determine their right to the fund. We concur with the appellate court in what is said in the opinion above cited, and its judgment will be affirmed. Affirmed.

(156 Ill. 499)

ORTON et al. v. CITY OF LINCOLN.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 13, 1895.) OFFICIAL BONDS-MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-LIQUOR

LICENSES.

The sureties on a city clerk's bond, conditioned that he will pay over all money that may come to his hands by virtue of his office, are not liable for his misappropriation of money paid to him for liquor licenses under an ordinance requiring such money to be paid into the city treasury, since such an ordinance requires the payment to be made to the city treasurer, and not to the clerk.

Appeal from appellate court, Third district.

1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.

Action of debt by the city of Lincoln against John H. Starkey, Franklin C. Orton, and William N. Bock. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

Beach & Hodnett and A. D. Cadwallader, for appellants. E. C. Moos, for appellee.

PHILLIPS, J. John H. Starkey was elect ed city clerk of the city of Lincoln, and made his bond on April 16, 1889, conditioned that he would faithfully discharge the duties of his office, and pay over all moneys that may come to his hands by virtue thereof, and render a just and true account when required by the city council, and would perform the duties required by virtue of his office, and according to the laws of the state and the ordinances of the city, etc. Appellants were sureties on said bond, which was given to cover a term of two years. On March 8, 1886, the city of Lincoln was incorporated under the general act for the incorporation of cities, approved 1872. Prior thereto it was incorporated, and the clerk was by ordinance authorized to collect certain licenses, fees, etc.. not including money paid for dramshop license. By an ordinance approved April 5, 1885, it was provided: "The city council may in its discretion grant license for any period not exceeding one year and not less than three months to such person or persons as may apply therefor, upon such persons paying into the city treasury in advance a sum at the rate of five hundred dollars per year," etc. All ordinances or parts of ordinauces in conflict therewith were repealed, and there is no provision authorizing the clerk to collect and receive money paid for dramshop license. The last-mentioned ordinance was

in force when the bond was executed. Starkey succeeded himself as clerk for two years from April, 1891, and after the expiration of the latter term suit was brought on his bonds for each term. On the suit on the first bond a judgment was recovered in debt for the amount of the penalty of the bond, to be satisfied by damages assessed at $1,122.46.

The question of law arising on this record is whether the appellants, as sureties on his bond, are liable for his failure to account for money collected and received by him for dramshop licenses. The ordinance with reference to license of dramshops at the time of the execution of the bcnd did not authorize the clerk to collect and receive money paid for such licenses. That ordinance was in substance similar to section 3, c. 43, Rev. St. which provides: "It shall not be lawful for the corporate authorities of any city, town or village in this state to grant a license for the keeping of a dramshop except upon the payment in advance into the treasury of the city * ** such sum * * not less than at the rate of five hundred dollars per annum." A surety is only to be held by the precise terms of his undertaking. His liability is

strictissimi juris, and cannot be extended by construction, or enlarged by the act of oth

ers.

People v. Toomey, 122 Ill. 308, 13 N. E. 521. The undertaking of the clerk was that he should discharge the duties of the office, and account and pay over all moneys which came to his hands by virtue thereof. For the discharge of that duty the appellants became sureties. When they undertook that the principal should account and pay over all moneys that should come to his hands by virtue of his office the intendment was that such money as should be received by the clerk in pursuance of law, and under the ordinances of the city, in his official capacity by virtue of his office, was referred to, and not such money as he might elect to accept without right, and of which some other official was the legal

recipient and disbursing agent. Appellants were not sureties for moneys which, by virtue of the statute and under the ordinances of the city, should have been paid the city treasurer. The mere officiousness of the clerk in the assumption of duties not belonging to his office, or the negligence of other officers in the discharge of their duties, cannot extend the sureties' liability beyond the terms of their undertaking. People v. Pennock, 60 N. Y. 421; Supervisors v. Bates, 17 N. Y. 243. No comptroller was provided for by the ordinances of the city, and by virtue of section 104, c. 24, Rev. St., the clerk acted as comptroller; but the provisions of that section did not authorize the clerk to receive and disburse money which the ordinances and statute provided should be received by the treas

urer.

It is finally argued that the requirement that the money should be paid into the city treasury is not a requirement that it should be paid to the city treasurer. A require ment that the money should be paid to the city treasurer is a designation of the city treasurer as a recipient of the money, and when it is paid to him or his agents he is liable therefor, and the undertaking of his sureties is that he shall account for money coming to his hands by virtue of his office. A payment to the clerk or comptroller is not a compliance with the requirement that the money should be paid into the city treasury. This record shows a remarkable method of conducting the business of the city. The bond of the clerk is for $10,000, covering a period of two years, and he assumed, in violation of statutes and ordinances, to receive all moneys from whatsoever source, including moneys collected for taxes that he assumed to collect during the two years for which this bond was executed,-the sum of over $95,000. The clerk had no right to collect or receive the money paid for dramshop licenses under the ordinance and statute of this state. The sureties were not liable therefor, and the judgments of the circuit court of Logan county and of the appellate court of the Third district are reversed, and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.

(156 I11. 602)

ORTON et al. v. CITY OF LINCOLN.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 13, 1895.) Appeal from appellate court, Third district. Action of debt by the city of Lincoln against Franklin C. Orton and others. Plaintiff obtained judgment, which was affirmed by the appellate court. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

Beach & Hodnett, for appellants. E. C. Moos, for appellee.

PHILLIPS, J. The questions in this record grow out of the execution of a bond as city clerk of the city of Lincoln by John H. Starkey, on which appellants were sureties. This bond was to cover a period of two years from May 1, 1891. Appellee, claiming that the clerk had, on the expiration of his term, failed to pay over or account for all moneys which came to his hand, brought suit in the circuit court of Logan county, where a judgment in debt for

$10,000, to be satisfied by payment of the dam

age, assessed at $795.47, was recovered. That judgment was affirmed on appeal to the appellate court of the Third district, and on certificate of importance, etc., this appeal is prosecuted. While the ordinances existing at the time of the execution of the bond in this case are different from those existing when the bond of Orton v. City of Lincoln (Ill. Sup.) 41 N. E. 159, was filed, yet there are no ordinances authorizing the clerk to receive and receipt for dramshop licenses, and the questions of law on this record are the same as in the above-mentioned case. A further discussion is unnecessary. The judgments of the circuit court of Logan county and of the appellate court of the Third district are reversed, and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.

(156 Ill. 584)

BLISS et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 15, 1895.) LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS-ORDINANCE - SPECIAL AS

SESSMENT.

1. A city ordinance providing for a local improvement need not state that the proposed improvement is within the city limits. Stanton v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 39 N. E. 987, followed.

2. Where separate objections to a special assessment are filed by owners of different lots, the court may hear them on different days, and enter several judgments of confirmation on different days, in the same proceeding. Browning v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 565, followed.

Error to Cook county court; Frank Scales, Judge.

Petition by the city of Chicago for confirmation of a special assessment. There was judgment of confirmation. N. W. Bliss and other property owners bring error. Affirmed.

H. T. & L. Helm and Hamline, Scott & Lord, for plaintiffs in error. J. F. Holland, for defendant in error.

BAKER, J. This is a writ of error to reverse a judgment confirming a special assessment, rendered by the county court of Cook county on the 16th day of May, 1892, in a proceeding to assess the cost of constructing

1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.

a main sewer in accordance with the provisions of an ordinance of the city of Chicago, adopted by the city council on the 14th day of March, 1892. The assessment roll was filed in the court April 28, 1892, and all the preliminary steps required by law in order to give the court jurisdiction of the property and its owners seem to have been taken. Plaintiffs in error filed no objections to the assessment roll, and on said 16th day of May, 1892, a default and judgment of confirmation were entered as against them and their property, as well as against the property of all other persons not objecting and being in default. But some of the property owners filed objections; and on seven different days subsequent to said May 16, 1892, seven other judgments of confirmation were entered as to property of different objectors.

It is urged upon this writ of error that the ordinance of the city of Chicago, upon which the assessment was based, is invalid, by reason of its failing to affirmatively and specifically state that the proposed local improvement is within the territorial limits of the city of Chicago. This contention must be decided adversely to plaintiffs in error, on the authority of Stanton v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 39 N. E. 987, and numerous subsequent cases.

It is also claimed that it was error to enter several different judgments of confirmation, on different days, in one and the same special assessment proceeding. This claim is not well grounded. The case, upon this question, is governed by the decisions of this court in Delamater v. City of Chicago; 1 Browning v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 565; Wells v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 567; and other cases. error in the record. firmed. Affirmed.

(156 Ill. 616)

We find no manifest The judgment is af

Under Rev. St. 1893, c. 37, § 215a, which provides that the county judges of the several counties, "with like privileges as the judges of the circuit courts," may "interchange with each other, hold court for each other and perform each other's duties," when necessary or convenient, a county judge of one county may hold court in another county at the same time that the county judge of the latter county is holding another branch of the court there. Pike v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 567, followed.

Appeal from Cook county court; Frank Scales, Judge.

Application for judgment for delinquent taxes. F. C. Wells filed objections, which were overruled, and he appeals. Affirmed.

1 Rehearing pending.

2 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.

v.41N.E.no.3-11

A. B. Wells, for appellant. Harry Rubens, Corp. Counsel, and William J. Donlin, for the People.

BAKER, J. This was an application by the collector to the county court of Cook county for judgment against delinquent lands for unpaid special assessments. Wells, the appellant, filed objections, which were overruled, and judgment was entered ordering his lands to be sold. The objections that are relied on by appellant in the prosecution of this appeal are these: "Because no judgment has ever been entered confirming the assessment roll against the property described in the advertisement of this application for judgment;" and because "the judgment of the county court confirming the assessment roll against said property is void, because not rendered by the judge of said county court, but rendered by George Brown, a judge of the county court of Du Page county." The application for judgment against the lands was based on a judgment confirming the assessment roll against said lands, rendered on the 3d day of November, 1893, in the county court of Cook county, the Hon. George Brown, judge of the county court of Du Page county, presiding. The record shows that on the 3d day of November, 1893, the Hon. Frank Scales, the duly-elected and sole judge of the county court of Cook county, was present in and held court in said county, and tried causes, and entered a number of orders and judgments. It also shows that, on the same day, the Hon. George Brown, judge of the county court of Du Page county, also presided in the county court of Cook county, and likewise tried causes, and entered a number of orders, and rendered a number of judgments, among which was the judgment confirming the assessment roll involved in this case. The contention of appellant is that Judge Brown had no power or jurisdiction to preside in said court on that day, and render the judgment confirming the assessment roll, at the same time that the county judge of Cook county was holding another branch of the county court of Cook county; and that therefore said judgment of confirmation was and is void, and cannot be the basis of a judgment for the sale of appellant's lands. The case of Pike v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 567, decides this contention against appellant. This case is governed by the Pike Case. The judgment of the county court is affirmed. Affirmed.

(156 Ill. 574)

RASMUSSEN v. PEOPLE ex rel. KERN.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 15, 1895.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS - PRACTICE.

Where separate objections to a special assessment are filed by owners of different lots,

1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.

the court may hear them on different days, and enter several separate judgments of confirmation in the same proceeding. Browning v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 565, followed.

Appeal from Cook county court; Frank Scales, Judge.

Application for judgment for delinquent taxes. R. R. Rasmussen filed objections, which were overruled, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Matz & Fisher (McMurdy & Job, Mason Bros., Wm. Garnett, Jr., Chas. T. Mason, R. E. Pendavis, and D. H. Horne, of counsel), for appellant. J. F. Holland (George W. Smith, of counsel), for appellee.

BAKER, J. The appeal in this case is taken from a judgment of the county court of Cook county rendered July 30, 1894, upon the application for the collection by judgment of sale for a delinquent special assessment of the city of Chicago for a street improvement. The only ground urged for error is that the county court entered several judgments against the property of different objectors in a proceeding based upon a single assessment roll. The contention of appellant must be decided adversely to him, on the authority of Delameter v. City of Chicago; 1 Browning v. City of Chicago (Ill. Sup.) 40 N. E. 565; and Wells v. City of Chicago, Id. 567. The judgment of the county court is affirmed. Affirmed.

(156 Ill. 601)

CITY OF CHICAGO v. SILVERMAN.2 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 15, 1895.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS- ORDINANCE-LOCAL IMPROVEMENT.

A city ordinance providing for a local improvement need not state that the proposed improvement is within the city limits. Stanton v. City of Chicago (Ill.) 39 N. E. 987, followed. Appeal from Cook county court; Frank Scales, Judge.

Petition of the city of Chicago for confirmation of a special assessment. Lazarus Silverman filed objections, which were sustained. The city appeals. Reversed.

W. J. Donlin, for appellant.

PHILLIPS, J. Petition prays for the cost of an improvement to be paid for special assessment. Objections filed by appellee present the question whether the ordinance is invalid, because it fails to show affirmatively that the improvement was within the city. Objections were sustained. This question was determined in Stanton v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. 23, 39 N. E. 987, and this ruling of the county court in sustaining the exceptions was error. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.

1 Rehearing pending.

2 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bai.

(156 III. 437)

QUINCY, O. & K. C. RY. CO. v. PEOPLE ex rel. CORRIGAN, Tax Collector.1 (Supreme Court of Illinois. June 13, 1895.) RAILROAD COMPANIES-TAXATION-RAILROAD

TRACK.

1. Trustees in charge of a railroad whose main track is all outside the state, but whose trains are brought into the state over the tracks of another company, are "operating a railroad in this state," within the meaning of Starr & C. Ann. St. c. 120, par. 40, requiring those "owning, operating or constructing a railroad in this state" to return schedules of its taxable property.

2. Land belonging to the railroad, on which are situated its passenger and freight depots, roundhouse, side tracks and terminal facilities, is properly assessable as "railroad track." under Starr & C. Ann. St. c. 120, par. 42, which declares that "such right of way including the superstructures of main, side or second tracks and turnouts and the station and improvements of the railroad company on such right of way shall be held to be real estate for the purpose of taxation and denominated 'railroad track' and shall be so listed and valued."

Appeal from Adams county court; Benjamin F. Berrian, Judge.

Application of the people of the state of Illinois on the relation of James B. Corrigan, collector, for judgment for delinquent taxes. The Quincy, Omaha & Kansas City Railway Company filed objections, which were overruled, and it appeals. Reversed.

The appeal in this case questions the acts of the county court of Adams county in rendering judgment for taxes against certain lots in the city of Quincy, owned by appellant, and which were sought to be taxed on an assessment made by the local assessor of the town. The Quincy, Omaha & Kansas City Railway Company owns a line of railroad from Trenton, Mo., to a point on the Mississippi river known as "West Quincy." The road is at present operated by John Patton and Edwin Parsons, trustees in charge for bondholders, and who are in possession of all the property of the road. The lots in question, which it is sought to tax, are occupied by appellant as a passenger depot, freight depot, shops, roundhouse, water tanks, side tracks, and other purposes of like character, in connection with the business of the road, and are not used for any other purpose. In order to reach this property on which their depots are located, appellants use the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy tracks in the city of Quincy. Trains arriving on the road of appellant in West Quincy proceed across the bridge controlled by the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy road, and thence, on the tracks of the latter road about three-fourths of a mile, south to appellant's passenger depot. The freight depot and switch yards of appellant are still further south. The bridge, and that portion of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy tracks connecting appellant's depots and switch yards with the main

1 Reported by Louis Boisot, Jr., Esq., of the Chicago bar.