bar to the treaty at that time which the victory might have occafioned: twice the republic had rejected our overtures, unfettered by any former promife or agreement, and were we not juftified in refufing to liften to theirs?

But it was impolitic to talk of the restoration of royalty: it was an infult on the government of France, and a certain mode of irritating the nation. If, notwithstanding their dreadful experience, there ftill remained in that unhappy country some men enthufiaftically attached to democracy-whofe indignation was excited at the very name of king, who longed for the overthrow of every regular ftate, hated religion and its minifters, and wifhed to reduce all orders to one undiftinguiflied mafs-an appeal would be fruitlefs; but after ten years of mifery, after having feen their commerce ruined, their navy deftroyed, and their colonies wrefted from them; after having been deprived of their property and bereaved of their children, forced to carry on a war not only detrimental but deftructive to them; after wading through feas of blood to grafp the empty fhade of liberty, which ever eluded their purfuit; after feeing in the throne of their kings a form which waved a fword in its hand, and made the people bow before it: was it probable that they ftill bore an unconquerable antipathy to that line of princes under whofe gentle fway they had lived fo refpectable abroad and happy at home. Mr. Canning faid, he had not a doubt but that the French people equally wifhed their restoration, and the ufurpation of Bonaparte had been confidered as a step towards it. Although they were not unanimous, it was our duty principally to confult our own intereft, which was

materially concerned in overturning their prefent government. Much had been faid of the wickedness of the Bourbon family-he would not undertake to defend many of their actions, but the worst of them furely could not be compared with thofe of the prefent rulers of France. Befides, were we to infer that the conduct of their defcendants would be equally unjustifiable. The honourable gentleman had looked back with triumph to the reign of king William; he did the fame; but it was not the skill of our generals, the valour of our troops, nor the fpirit of the people which chiefly deferved our applaufe, it was the unanimous Support afforded by the legiflature to the executive government; and he wifhed for nothing fo ardently as to fee the houfe follow the example of thofe times.

It had been objected, that too harsh language had been used towards Bonaparte-and highly improper it must be to injure fo refpectable a perfonage! Yet character must be taken into confideration, fince upon that depended the nature of the peace to be obtained. It was not afferted that Bonaparte had been acceffory to the infraction of every treaty which the French had infringed, but that he never kept any of the treaties which he had himfelf made; and that this was the cafe was notorious to the world. Suppofing Bonaparte to be fincere, ftill a peace would be infecure. When France had fo often changed her rulers, what reafon had we to fuppofe that he would long obey the prefent one? His government was more arbitrary and defpotic than any of the preceding; defpotifm never could be perma nent; it could be maintained only by a military force, and this was a precarious tenure to fix fupreme

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power upon; tyrants were particularly infecure amidst their armed guards; and as this conftitution was more deteftable than any one which had gone before, it must foon be overturned. He should be cenfured for these ftrictures by men who threw out the most illiberal abuse upon our allies; this was jacobin juftice. The fuccefs of the coalition depended on England remaining at the head of it; were the to talk of negotiating, its ardour would be cooled, and its exertions relaxed. There was every profpect of unanimity amongst the coalefced powers at prefent; and though from fome mifunderstandings the end of the last campaign had been lefs fortunate than had been expected, it was, upon the whole, unparalleled for brilliancy in the annals of history. Had any one foretold twelve months ago that the French would poffefs at this time fcarcely one fortrefs in Italy, he would have been confidered a madman. If we fucceeded further, we fhall have the confolation to reflect, that, by our fpirit and steadinefs, we had reftored Europe to order, tranquillity, and happiness; if we failed, we fhould not have the mortification to reflect, that we let flip a favourable opportunity to make peace. There never could occur a feafon for treating more unfit than the prefent; by acting otherwife than we now de figned, we fhould damp the courage of our countrymen, introduce difcord into the councils of our allies, and confolidate a power which would afterwards be employed in our destruction.

Mr. Erikine rofe:-He faid the houfe was affembled indeed on a "momentous occafion," upon a new æra of the war: the queftion was not whether the king should have yielded to an immediate armiftice, 1800.

or whether he should have opened a negotiation without confulting his allies, but whether the house could fulfil his majesty's expectation, as expreffed in his meifage, by fignifying its approbation of the fpecific anfwer which had been fent? whether the commons could affirm, in the face of a fuffering nation and a defolated world, that a lofty, imperious, infulting anfwer, to a propofition profeffing peace, was the anfwer which ought to have been fent to France, or any government? It was evident, therefore, that they were not called upon to advife, but to ratify or condemn the policy and fitnefs of the anfwer which minifters on their own authori ty had previously fent to the republic. This anfwer had moft unadvifedly put in iffue the caufes of the war, which the two nations could never, in the nature of things, be brought to agree upon, and which were wholly irrelevant to the question of peace. Whether England or France was the aggreffor could no longer be debated in that house with any effect, though pofterity would fit in impartial judgment upon the queftion.

It was a subject on which he had delivered an opinion that he had feen no reafon to retract; but he fhould have thought it the height of impertinence and folly to have expected to produce any conviction on that fubject, after the character and confiftency of the house had been irretrievably pledged, both by its declarations and conduct, for nine years together.

In ftating therefore its different acts in the progrefs of the war, he did not call upon them to reverfe their former judgments by cenfuring the prefent anfwer, but to point out that the fame fatality of refifting peace upon general and unF

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defined objections to the ftate of France had characterised the war from the beginning, had been indeed the caule of it, and, if perfifted in by the measures in queftion, would lead to endless hoftility.

The French revolution was undoubtedly in its commencement an awful event, which could not but extend its influence to other nations; fo mighty a fabric of defpotifin and fuperftition, after having endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concuffion which the whole earth would feel; but the evil of fuch a revolution (if any there was to other nations) was only to be averted by internal policy, not by external war. The American war, when it firft broke out, was inveighed againft by its opponents in the fame extravagant manner an orator who had long Aourifhed within thefe walls had left the only fit anfwer to complaints of revolutions in other countries. "The queftion," fays Burke, "is not whether this condition of human affairs deferves praise or cenfure, but what are you to do with it?" Nor had minifters by eight years invective in this houfe been ab.e to mitigate the evils of the French revolution; on the contrary, after creating the worst of them, they prevented them from fubfiding, and provoked the exceffes which now furnithed the pretexts of perpetual and unavailing

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form, but the intereft of France was an argument that they were not a fraud upon England. It had been said, that, at that moment, the aggreffions of France were just caufes of the war: why then did not England complain of them, and difmifs the ambassador on his refufal of fatisfaction? Not a fyllable was ever uttered, capable of being adjufied by negotiation; on the contrary, when Louis XVI. before his death, most earnestly befought our mediation with the continental powers, we pofitively refufed it; yet, on his death, difmiffed the ambaffador accredited by the republic, for no other avowed reafon than that France had tried and executed her king.

What just cause of war was this to England? If France, at that time, was engaged in projects inconfiftent with peace, why were they not ftated then? If any fpecific objections exifted at this moment, why were they not ftated now? But then and now war was provoked, and peace rejected upon unjuftifiable objections-upon fpeculative dangers to religion and government, which, fuppofing them to have existed with all their imaginary confequences, were likely to be increafed than diminifhed by the fury and bitterness of the conteft.

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M. Chauvelin, with the olive branch in his hand from the first republic in France, was fent out of the country on twenty-four hours* notice; not because France was accufed of any national aggreffion towards us, but because he had be

her ambaffador furnished her with a pretext for war; though, at that time, minifters were repeatedly im plored from his fide of the house not to invite hoftilities upon prin

tion; fo mighty an event as the French revolution could not but agitate the human mind on the fubjeft of government wherever it was known; and that agitation prod ced a strong attention to the abufes of our own. But no one could affert, that any fpirit, whether it was good or evil, existed at this moment; and the fuppofed existence of it formerly had enabled government to arm the whole nation, and place it in the most abfolute ftate of internal fecurity; the fword was in the hand of the higher and middle orders of the people; and the domeftic dangers, which had always been held out as an argument against peace, were in our prefent condition permanently removed.

gotiation, was not to be vindicated; undoubtedly the evinced no difpofition to peace, and that averfion gave great ftrength to minifters, from the neceffity of exertion on the part of this country; and for the very fame reafon no argument could be more fatal to our minifters, as our averfion to peace at this time would confolidate the powers of the prefent rulers of France.

That government must either establish its authority by wife policy, and fortunate events, or it muft perish in the storm of another revolution: this was felf-evident; and it was no lefs fo, that the go vernment which overturned it must be a democratical revolution of the people within, or the return of the houfe of Bourbon. If the authority of Bonaparte became established, it was admitted, that after fome undefined period of probation, we were in the end to confent to peace: but was it as certain that France would then be as willing to make it? Experience taught us the contrary, for, after every interval, when peace had been refufed on our part, France appeared in a more formidable afpect, with a more alienated fpirit. If, on the other hand, the power of Bonaparte was overturned by a democratic revolution, additional difficulties would start up: in such an event, all our panics would return; the terror of French principles would predominate; and war would be prolonged ad infinitum to prevent the influx of dangerous opinions in cafe of peace. No alternative then remained but the restoration of the houfe of Bourbon; and, in spite of ali hiftory and experience, he would fuppofe it aufpicious: confining it to practicability, it could only be effected by entering France at the

When lord Malmesbury went to Paris not a fyllable was infinuated of the danger of a peace with France, or of incapacity in her rulers to maintain its relations: the negotiation was broken off upon our infifting on the restoration of Belgium as the fine qua non; it was therefore fpecific difference, not general incapacity; and the termination of the treaty read an awful leffon to the houfe. France had not then a foldier or a foot of land in Italy; and a hundred and fifty millions of British property exifted, which had fince been spent upon the war. A few months afterwards, on the second miffion of lord Malmesbury, the fine qua non of the reftoration of Belgium was retracted, and France broke off the negotiation on other pretences; and this was another warning against the evil of procraftinating; the pofition of France was afterwards changed, her spirit was altered, her ambition inflamed, and her views extended. The conduct of the republic, in the termination of the fecond attempt at ne

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