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zenship of the United States. As here used, citizenship means nationality. The Central American constitutions apply different meanings to nationality and citizenship. The latter term is used more in the sense of having the privilege of exercising political rights. With regard to nationality, the Central American countries adopt, to a greater or less extent, both the idea of nationality by birth and the idea of nationality by parentage. That is, all who are born within the country are considered nationals, as well as those born abroad of parents who are nationals, subject to certain provisions as to residence and the right to choose nationality.

Our Fifteenth Amendment grew out of the emancipation of the slaves and is therefore not applicable to the Central American situation. The Sixteenth Amendment, relating to the income tax, grew out of the limited powers of the federal government. Since the Central American legislatures are vested with the general power of taxation, there would be nothing to prevent their passing income tax laws and this has been done in some of them. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Amendments relate respectively to the popular election of senators and the prohibition of intoxicating liquors. The Central American countries have no senate, and they do not have constitutional prohibition.

It is our understanding that the women of Central American countries do not exercise the right of suffrage. However, their constitutions do not expressly restrict the right of voting to the male citizenship. They are, of course, written in the Spanish language; and in defining who are citizens having the right to vote, the masculine plural is used. However, the masculine plural is properly used in Spanish even when both the male and female are intended to be included. It seems that as a matter of practice and custom said provisions of the various constitutions are construed to apply only to the men. However, we note from recent press dispatches that the Costa Rican Congress has extended suffrage to women.

Provisions have been inserted in some of the Central American constitutions having for their purpose to construe certain rules of international law. For example, the Constitution of Honduras provides that:

"Art. 14. Foreigners shall not present claims against the State or demand the payment by it of any indemnity, except in the cases and in the manner in which Honduraneans may do so."

"Art. 15. Foreigners shall not resort to diplomatic intervention except in case of manifest denial of justice, abnormal delays, or self-evident violation of the principles of international law. The fact that a final decision is not favorable to the claimant shall not be construed as a denial of justice. If in violation of this provision claims are presented, and not amicably adjusted, injury to the Government being sustained thereby, the claimant shall lose the right to inhabit the country."

Of course, such provisions cannot be operative outside the territory of the republic concerned. The right of diplomatic intervention, or interposition, is the right of the government of the injured party and that right may be asserted without regard to what may be contained in the constitution or laws of the country at fault. Ordinarily injuries resulting from revolutions or insurrections do not under international law give a right of redress against the government; but if in a particular case the government concerned has not discharged its international duty, it could not successfully defend a diplomatic claim on the ground that it was not liable under the terms of its own constitution.

Thus it appears that while there is a general resemblance between our federal constitution and those of Central America, there exist many provisions which have no counterpart in our Constitution. The resemblance is due largely to the fact that they adopted a representative form of government. It was only natural that they should make use of the political institutions of the most important, and almost the only, representative republican government then in existence. The points of difference are due to the European influence on their institutions and customs, especially their adoption of the civil law as the basis for their judicial system. And, of course, some provisions are the result of their own peculiar domestic situations and international relations.

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

JUDICIAL SECTION

The Judicial Section of the American Bar Association convened at St. Louis, Mo., on Tuesday, August 24, 1920, at 2.30 P. M., Hon. Charles A. Woods, of South Carolina in the Chair.

The President:

The Judicial Section of the American Bar Association will please come to order.

The Section is now to be welcomed by the presiding judge of the St. Louis Court of Appeals.

Hon. George D. Reynolds of Missouri:

Mr. Chairman and brethren of the Bench. It is a distinguished honor that has been conferred on me to welcome to our city such a body of representative men as the judiciary of this country. You have, many of you, probably for the first time, landed in this our city, but 156 years ago Laclede landed at the river bank on what is now the levee somewhere near what we now know as Market Street. Since that time the city has had quite a history, although not old when compared with those of the East. We were under the Spanish and French régime, and finally came under the American government. We have never had any other domination over us, than Spanish and French, unless it might be called the domination that the Indians occasionally had, when they came in and attempted to storm the stockade. Missouri claims to have come into the union in 1820, but as a matter of fact, it was 1821, because certain reservations in the act of admission hung up the matter for about a year. Since that time we have been making some history for ourselves. You know of the terrible internal conflict that raged in Missouri. Missouri was made up of pioneers. Lewis and Clark started out from this state and made their way across the Rockies and established the first white settlements on the North Pacific Coast. In the beginning of the Civil War this state was divided almost equally.

The first aggressive movement ever made by the federal forces was made in this city under Gen. Nathaniel Lyon, when he took the state militia then camped at Camp Jackson, on the Western outskirts of the city, and converted many of them into loyal citizens. It is a rather curious thing, when we look back, as to the prevalence of the spirit of law even at that time. We had here at that time two very eminent lawyers who insisted that if General Lyon marched on Camp Jackson, he must do it for the purpose of replevying some cannon that had been brought up there from the United States arsenal at Baton Rouge. They thought a writ of replevin was the only effective and lawful weapon to use. We have gradually developed into a great state and city. We have had many eminent members of the judiciary sitting upon the Bench of the United States courts before which you are sitting. You will see their portraits around in this court room. At this bar the celebrated Dred Scott case was instituted and first tried. One of the first cases that attempted to establish the right of women to vote went from this court to the Supreme Court of the United States. We have had many celebrated cases tried here and many eminent lawyers have appeared in this very court room.

I know you have heard of the hospitality of St. Louis. St. Louis is famous for that. I welcome you to our hearts and homes, and I hope when you leave here it will be with very pleasant recollections of St. Louis and its people.

Hon. John P. Briscoe, of Maryland:

I move you, Mr. President, that the Chair appoint a committee on nominations to name officers of the Section for the ensuing year.

The motion was seconded and carried.

The President:

I will appoint on that committee John P. Briscoe, of Maryland; Orrin N. Carter, of Illinois; and Peter W. Meldrim of Georgia.

The gentlemen who are to read papers before the Section will limit themselves to 20 minutes each, and after each paper is read it will be open to discussion. I introduce Hon. Frank T. Dunn, of the Supreme Court of Illinois.

(For Judge Dunn's paper, see page 383.)

The President:

The subject of Judge Dunn's paper is now before the meeting for discussion.

Hon. Thomas C. McClellan of Alabama:

At the recent session of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State laws this subject [Declaratory Judgments] was accorded illuminating, enlightening, perfecting consideration. Judge Dunn's contribution, at this time, to the learning upon and treatment of the subject is notable and valuable. The principle of Declaratory Judgments is illustrated, in a limited way, in practically all the states. It has worked well in such instances. It has served worthy purposes. Naturally, the success thus attained offers encouragement to broaden the scope of the principle; and that is, it seems to me, the true design and object of the present proposal. The only basis for doubt in respect of the acceptance of a more comprehensive procedure for Declaratory Judgments lies in one detail—a factor that does not, in my opinion, at all reflect upon the principle underlying the procedure, progressive to the concluding adjudication of then present or prospective substantive right. This objection or fault may be removed by the adoption of some method that would at least tend to avert the capricious or vexatious invocation of the remedy, or its prostitution by unnecessary or undesirable recourse to it. To unrestrictively open the courts to enter Declaratory Judgments may unwisely invite or or encourage litigation. Whether a mere judicial discretion to entertain a concrete proceeding, looking to a Declaratory Judgment, would serve to restrain the function within wholesome limits may be sufficiently hopeful to justify its trial. Observation in one Southern state inclines me to think that the general public is disposed to litigate where the opportunity to do so is made favorable; and, also, that too many people are prone to speculate, with a view to their advantage, through the hailing into court of a person or corporation whose interest is opposed to theirs. It seems to me that the discovery of some reasonable method of regulating the circumstances under which parties might invoke the judicial power to render Declaratory Judgments would remove the only serious menace to the success of the plan. Undoubtedly, the chief practi

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