distinct legislatures of the Dutch republic, did not finally ratify a treaty with the United States, until the 8th of October 1782; negotiated by John Adams, on the part of the United States, and George Van Randwyck and seven others on the part of the United Provinces of the Netherlands. This treaty was ratified by Congress on the 23d January 1783.

The stipulations of this second treaty, formed by the American government, did not, in its provisions, differ materially from the previous treaty with France. In his usual manner, Mr. Lyman has given the Dutch treaty as a note, and with appropriate remarks in the text;-remarks, which in this instance, open the vista which shows, in the remote distance, that the United States, still of comparatively small national importance, had, nevertheless, then begun to influence the political atmosphere of the world.

The British ministry, obstinately as they had pursued a course into which they had blindly rushed, were not altogether infatuated, and therefore were convinced, long before they acknowledged it, that the North American colonies were lost to Great Britain, and added to the nations who held British supremacy as an encroachment on the commercial and political independence of mankind.

For many

The agents of the colonies, avowed and concealed, were introducing representations of the great commercial advantages held out by a new nation on the west side of the Atlantic. centuries past, and under various forms, a species of republic has bound together commercial men over the civilized world; and up to this moment, it is commerce, more than all other causes combined, which unites together distant nations. Great Britain and Spain, in an attempt respectively to secure colonial commerce as a monopoly, infringed a right common to all mankind. If, therefore, it did not flow from profound views of policy, the American agents pursued, from no matter what motive, a system most admirably adapted to forward their

cause.

As early as May 1777, William Lee of Virginia was sent commissioner to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, empowered to " propose treaties of friendship and commerce with these powers, on the same commercial principles as were the bases of the first treaties of friendship and commerce, proposed to the courts of France and Spain by our commissioners, and approved in congress on the 17th of September 1776."

We have already shown, in part, the reception of Mr. William Lee at Berlin, and the disposition of the king of Prussia towards the revolted colonies; but no formal treaty was effected with that government, until one of amity and commerce was concluded in September 1785, negotiated on the part of the United States by Messrs. Franklin, Jeerson and Adams; and on that of Prussia by M. de Thulmeyer.

Though the first to enter into friendly corres

pondence with an American commissioner, the king of Prussia was the fourth in order of time, of the powers of Europe, to form positive stipulations by treaty with the new nation of the west.

There were circumstances peculiar to the first treaty between the United States and Prussia, which confer upon its history great interest. It was amongst the last political acts of two of the most remarkable men of their age, Franklin and Frederic II. Soon after its ratification, the former returned to his native country, and on the 17th of August of the following year, the latter closed his eventful life and reign. The treaty itself, "has been called," says Lyman, "a beautiful abstraction; is remarkable for the provisions it contains, though it does not appear that they have been attended with any good consequences to the parties, or have been of practical utility to the world. Blockades of every description were abolished; the flag covered the property; contrabands were exempted from confisca tion, though they might be employed for the use of the captor, on payment of their full value. This, we believe, is the only treaty ever made by America, (U. S.) in which contrabands were not subject to confiscation; nor are we aware, that any other modern treaty contains this remarkable provision. We are probably indebted to Dr. Franklin for the article. It had long been a favourite subject with him to procure the exemption, from the evils of war, of all persons engaged in private pursuits or occupations, and to abolish privateering. was desirous of having similar articles inserted in the treaty with England of 1783, and proposed them to Mr. Oswald,*"

He

The treaty of 1785, between the United States and Prussia, failed in its object, as is usual when too much is attempted, but it is a document of the highest interest, in another science much more exalted than diplomacy. It proves, that the Theory of Humanity began to assume consistence; and by reference to the works referred to in the margin, particularly Pagannel, it will be seen, that the enlightened, venerable, and humane Franklin, if he did make the proposals alluded to, made them to well inclined ears. The treaty, by its own limitations, has long ceased to operate; and its negotiators have long been numbered with the dead; but the principle remains; and is not the same principle the power which has nearly destroyed the detestable rade in slaves?

It is only the philosophy of history that is of any value; but of all branches of history there is none from which the philosophy is with so much difficulty separated from the mere policy, as that of the United States. It is this distinction which renders a good history of the United States so necessary, and so little to be expected whilst the actors remain on the scene. To ignorance of their actual situation relatively, may be attributed the rupture when it happened. Neither party, from 1765 to 1775, thought of separation; and, until gradually impelled beyond recession, nothing would probably have

more effectually checked the colonists, than to have been convinced that their measures were leading to separation. On the other side, the British government overrated its own strength, and despised that of the colonies. This mistake was fatal to every plan, if any such had been formed, of conciliation before blood was shed, and to reconciliation afterwards. Separation became inevitable.

One mistake is general, and, if he is correctly quoted by Pagannel, was shared by Frederic II.; that is, that the English whigs were favourable to American independence. The truth of history instructs us, however, that if the British whigs and tories disagreed on every other topic, they most cordially united in a sentiment of horror against American independence. As political parties, one radical distinction existed between the British whigs and tories, on the colonial question. The whigs were for granting to the colonists the full fruition of all the rights of British subjects, but evidently only with a view of compelling them to remain subjects: the tories, attached to prerogative, sought only to establish their political principles of civil government in America as in the other colonies of Britain. The whigs foresaw and deplored the consequences, whilst the tories, without foresight beyond their own object, set at defiance the maxims of law and precepts of prudence. The course of events could not be turned by tory obstinacy; and three years of incalculable expenditure of blood and treasure, closed by the surrender of an entire army; and the alliance of the revolted colonies with France, brought the British ministry to offer as a boon, in 1778, what they had insolently denied in 1775.

Lord North's "Conciliatory Propositions," at the time of their appearance, marked the ignorance of their author, or authors, much more strongly than any other act of a ministry, notorious for unparalled faults. To a body rendered respectable in the eyes of the world by recent victory, emboldened by self confidence in its cause, and strengthened by foreign alliance, it was ludicrous to "grant pardons and immunities; to restore to the colonies their ancient charters, to exempt them from taxation, and not to require them to renounce their independence, till the treaty had been ratified by the king and parliament."

When such propositions were offered in the British parliament, it was no subject of wonder that a dull melancholy silence succeeded to the speech." This same ministry, in defiance of common sense, and deaf to the cries of humanity, had provoked the colonies to revolt, and forced them in self defence to declare themselves free and independent, and now an offer of pardon and immunity, to men before injured beyond all forgiveness, was received with cold contempt.

It is but justice to Lord North to state, that from Franklin's correspondence, it appears that the king, George III., was the real author of the American revolution, and the irremovable obstacle in the way of any rational means of arresting its progress with honour and safety to the mother country. When, therefore, Lord North offered his

Conciliatory Plan, in 1778, it is more than probable that he followed his real opinion; but the hour had passed, when that which the American people demanded, or rather implored, five years before, could be accepted.

Peace, the colonies could have had in 1778; but who was to restore the thousands fallen? Who was to rebuild the smoking ruins? Could time and its events reverse their order of procession? Independence! had any British minister dared to propose acceding to such a measure, he would have been dismissed from office, and perhaps his head would have been thrown at the feet of an enraged public.

"Where is the man that will dare to advise such a measure," thundered the dying Chatham, on the 7th of April 1778; and his voice from the brink of the tomb was responded by public opinion and feeling. "I rejoice," exclaimed the once terrible mouth, "that the grave has not closed upon me, that I am still alive, to lift up my voice against the dismemberment of this ancient and most noble monarchy.'

One cause of the political decline, whilst in the full vigour of his powerful mind, was, that Chatham advocated the rights of the colonies, only as colonies; and nothing showed the bent of public feeling in England, in 1778, more distinctly than that the expiring Chatham contributed to defeat the first motion made in the British parliament, to acknowledge the independence of the thirteen united colonies. The motion was made by Mr. Powys, in April 1778, and went to authorise commissioners to treat with the colonies as independent. Fox, Burke, and their friends, supported the motion, which was lost without a division, but commissioners were sent "to grant pardons," and were received as any man of ordinary good sense might have foreseen.

Thus stood matters early in 1778. France, contrary to the real wishes of her statesmen or diplomatists, had contributed to place Great Britain in such a situation as to compel her to offer every thing but independence to her revolted colonies: but we are justifiable in the induction, that the colonies themselves alone wished for such a consummation as independence. France had been involved too far to recede; and involved from mere views and feelings of national rivalry, and calculations of commercial and political advantages. It may be said, indeed, without danger of incurring the charge of national partiality, that the diplomatists employed by the united colonies conducted their correspondence and negotiations with an abili ty and unity of plan, alike unexpected by their allies, and displeasing to their enemies. It soon became evident, that the conceptions of such men were far above the confined local and momentary views of mere colonists. The unwelcome truth was revealed to Europe, that choice of masters had no part in the object of the Americans; and as this truth was gradually developed, the hopes of France were weakened.

Yet no peace could be made with men whose wounded pride had not yet been sufficiently hum

bled; and the war continued with a widened range of action. That misguided ministry which had produced the war, maintained their places, and prolonged a destructive contest four more years; and it was not until the 22d of February 1782, that any effective step was taken to arrest a cruel waste of human blood. On that memorable day, General Conway made his motion to put an end to the American war. This was a trying moment; a debate followed, which was protracted until two o'clock in the morning, and lost by 193 votes to 194. The closeness of the vote evinced a turn of the tide, and on the 27th the motion was renewed by Mr. Fox, and carried, 234 to 215; thus prostrating the North ministry. If we could smile at an event so productive of human misery, we might well smile at the following extract from Lyman:

"The administration had suffered itself to be conquered in America; but the triumph of its adversaries at home was a tardy and faint one. The House of Commons relinquished the contest with evident reluctance. Indeed, we shall shortly see, that these votes did not at all indicate the feelings of that body on the subject of independence; and that a portion of the members still believed that the colonies would be re-annexed to the empire. Lord North was abandoned, because it was out of the question to continue the war; but this did not necessarily lead, in the minds of all, to the further immediate consequence-the acknowledgement of independence. The next cabinet, even formed as it was on the ruins of the war ministry, refused to recognise the act of July 1776: it was dissolved partly on account of this circumstance, and partly on account of the death of the Marquis of Rockingham. Mr. Fox, one of the secretaries of state, withdrew when it was ascertained that a principal condition on which it had been composed, the independence of America, was disavowed by a majority of the cabinet. It would not be, therefore, quite correct to say, that the vote of February 27th, though it settled, as far as England was concerned, the question of war, decided, in the same view, that of independence."*

We see how decidedly averse were the whigs of Great Britain to recognise an undeniable fact--the independence of the American colonies. As a kind of emanation from "The Armed Neutrality," in 1781, a proposition came from the courts of Russia and Austria, to arrange under their mediation a general peace. These proposals occupied the continental courts of Europe for some months, but whether from sound judgment or from strong feeling, they were properly rejected by Great Britain. As far as the interest of the colonies was concerned, the wreck of Poland served as a beacon.

The course of events, however, flowed on, and swept with it kings and ministers, prejudices and those who blindly sought a shore no longer in existence. The dreaded hour came, when the more dreaded truth was acknowledged: "The United States are free and independent."

"This is the first effort, recorded in history, of

* Lyman's Diplomacy, vol. i. page 92.

a proud and powerful government meeting, in recognition, revolted and aspiring colonies: and we may add, the first instance where a parent state has proposed and consented to arrange, in a solemn instrument, even after a bloody contest, the terms of a solid and sincere reparation; to create, by the simple process of a treaty, made in the usual forms, another great and independent nation; an event probably as unexpected to the European courts, as was the discovery of the continent, where that nation was founded."t

Another circumstance which gives sublimity to this part of history, was, that whilst the very courts who offered their mediation were extinguishing the lamp of one of the ancient kingdoms of Europe, another powerful nation rose to vindicate the insulted rights of mankind; and whilst Great Britain saw with apathy the partition of Poland, she found her punishment by her own dismemberment. These two mighty causes, as will appear from a review of the past, have yet produced but a minor share of their effects.

It was one of those happy positions assumed at the declaration of independence, and maintained with skill and perseverance, which saved the United States from the lures of European cabinet policy. After the declaration of independence in 1776, however much the states differed on some points of internal regulation, they were unanimously determined to make an acknowledgement of national independence, not merely a sine qua non of any treaty, but a basis of any negotiation with Great Britain. It was fortunate that such a principle was adopted; for every art was used by France and Great Britain to pursue their diplomacy, leaving either entirely neglected, or vaguely expressed, the fundamental reward of blood, toil, and victory. Truces, suspensions of arms, and every half-way measure were proposed, but in vain. Their wise adherence to forms, which were, in such a case, matters of substance, went so far, that the British government was compelled to renew the commission of Mr. Oswald, having, in the first instance, omitted the proper name, and used the term "colonies." This was regarded, perhaps correctly, as intentional, was objected to, and, before the negotiations could be opened, the commission of the British envoy contained the emphatic appellation, "The Thirteen United States of America." This commission in fact contained the demanded acknowledgement, and all beyond was form and arrangement of minor objects; such as the fisheries, dispositions in favour of or against the American loyalists, now exiles; and the share that France, Spain, and the Dutch republic, might have in the final articles of the pending treaty or treaties.

Great Britain, exhausted by a war against the greatest part of the maritime force of the world, and dreading a too close alliance of her lost colonies with France, waved or evaded one difficulty after another; and her agents signed the provisional treaty of peace at Paris, on the 30th of November 1782. The negotiators on the part of the United

† Ibid. vol. i. page 93.

States, were, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, John Jay, and Henry Laurens; and on the part of Great Britain, Richard Oswald. The definitive treaty, emanating from and repeating substantially the articles of the provisional treaty, was signed at Paris on the 3d of September 1783; on the part of the United States by Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay, and on the part of Great Britain by David Hartley.

"The conduct of the American commissioners, in agreeing to the provisional articles without consulting the court of France, has never been fully explained," says Lyman.*

In formal terms, the conduct of the American commissioners, in this case, has not been, it is probable, explained; but does not the history of that age afford a full explanation? The stake at issue gained value, as the contests in the field and the cabinet proceeded, and a new nation had risen, claiming jurisdiction over more than the one fortieth part of the habitable earth. France expended much in the cause, but she expected too great a reward, and was disappointed. Spain presented, at an early hour, her claims to a large share of territory, within the bounds which the colonies considered as theirs by right of conquest and succession. France claimed the fisheries as her own. In brief, if we revert to the proper source, the human heart, we are at no loss to account for the readiness of the American commissioners to meet the advances of Great Britain, as soon as the latter had conceded national independence. The connexion between the colonies and the parent state was natural, whilst an alliance of the former with France or Spain could arise only from a combination of recent circumstances, and could not survive the momentary causes of production.

In one essential principle of this great event, all Europe was deceived. That was, the real views of the people of the United States. These views, vague it is most probable in 1775, became more clear as the struggle proceeded. We may even say that in the first instance very few persons in the United States regarded independence as the inevitable result of an appeal to arms. The whole war and its results were new to the world, though, when the local positions are taken into view in connexion with the moral and political features of the parties, few if any other series of great events ever flowed more naturally from causes to effects.

But of all the causes which operated in favour of the North American colonies in their revolutionary struggle, the opinion almost universal in Europe of their weakness, and the uncertain tenure of their confederacy, did them most service. The idea of easy victory infatuated the councils of Great Britain; and an expectation, that release from dependence on Great Britain, must be followed by dependence on France, had no small share in drawing the latter into the contest. A dissolution of the United States has not yet ceased to give day dreams to European politicians; reveries, which, unless the stream of events changes its course, will

be most fearfully interrupted before another half century, by an exaction of too much power.

The war between the colonies and Great Britain closed; and a general peace again beaming over a desolated world, the new-born nation lost for a short period that importance in the eyes of the world, which it had sustained whilst the contest raged. But the young heart and limbs were sound and vigorous, though wearied by a long and arduous wrestle with a giant. The neighbouring nations of the earth were convinced by time, that a new and vigorous member was added to their family. It is not within the scope or design of this head of our article, United States, to notice in particular only those negotiations which affected the geogra phical limits and extent of the United States, sketching briefly those diplomatic proceedings arising from mere commercial intercourse or views.

Under the latter head, may be classed not only the treaties with Sweden towards the end of the revolutionary war, and with Prussia soon after the definitive peace with Great Britain, but also that entered into between the United States and the States General of the Dutch republic, already noticed.

We may here remark to its honour, that the United Provinces of the Netherlands, was the second state of Europe to acknowledge the independent existence of the United States of North America.

Sweden followed the United provinces of the Netherlands in order of time, in entering into amicable stipulations by treaty. On the 3d of April 1783, Benjamin Franklin on the part of the United States, and Philip de Creutz on that of Sweden, negotiated and signed at Paris a treaty of amity and commerce. This instrument was duly ratified by congress on the 29th of July 1783; of course it preceded the definitive treaty of peace with Great

Britain.

The first commercial treaty with Sweden being for twelve years, expired on the 29th of July 1798. Though the relations were in most cases amicable between the nations, there existed no formal treaty between them from 1798, until 1816. In the latter year, Jonathan Russell, on the part of the United States, and counts d'Engerstroem and A. G. de Morner, on that of Sweden, signed at Stockholm a treaty of amity and commerce, which was ratified by congress the 25th of September 1818. In force for eight years, of course it expired in 1826.

The existing treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and Sweden, was negotiated in 1827, at Stockholm, by J. J. Appleton on the part of the United States, and on the part of Sweden by Count de Wetterstedt. The latter, being for twelve years, will expire in 1839.

Prussia, at the commencement and throughout the revolutionary war, from the personal character of her monarch, held a rank amongst nations far above what, in ordinary cases, her relative physical force would have enabled her to assume.

Mr Ly

man has stepped a little out of his way, to tell us, that, "This monarchy sprung, to speak justly, from an entrenched camp," and we may be permitted to depart for a moment from our subject to remark, that the very same expressions would apply equally well to every nation of Europe. They have all had a military origin, but we notice the subject here, to correct a common error as regards the origin of both Russia and Prussia. These nations arose, it is true, from entrenched camps, but these camps were pitched as far back as those of even Great Britain or France. It would be just as correct to say, that the United States of North America sprung from the entrenchments raised in the revolution, as to say that Prussia or Russia rose in the respective reigns of Frederic I. or Peter I. In each of these cases, a great era in national history has been mistaken for its commencement.

In 1775, when the war of the revolution opened, we have already shown that the monarch of Prussia saw and comprehended the true nature of the dispute; but with a prudence which we ought to commend, from its perfect accordance with our own policy, he avoided all interference beyond his own opinion, which, strange as it may appear, was invariably given in favour of the British colonies. Yet, with all these private feelings, no public act of the Prussian king gave countenance to the United States, until 1785.

Spain, next to Great Britain, was the nation of Europe with whom the most perplexing subjects of negotiation arose, not only during, but subsequent to the revolutionary war. When the contest assumed a serious aspect, and still more, when an entire separation of the British North American colonies from the parent state was made a condition of peace by the colonies, Spain, like France, underrated the strength, mistook the sentiments, and expected to benefit itself from the weakness of the confederacy. From 1761, France and Spain might be virtually called one monarchy under two branches of the same family; but, by a singular fatality, the Bourbon monarchs of both nations, were negative, if not imbecile men, and of course their policy was founded on no fixed principles. The court of Spain was grasping and ambitious, whilst notoriously deficient in those talents which. could give force to its claims.

Under all the other circumstances of their situation, the United States derived infinitely more advantage from the alliance of France, and the rivalry between Spain and Great Britain, than could have been received if the two continental nations had been directed by men capable of bringing their disposable force into action. Spain and France were both at the time rich and powerful, but they were inert. Hatred and distrust of Great Britain, prevalent on continental Europe, constituted a pas sion in France and Spain; but, infatuated as was British policy in regard to the North American colonies, still Great Britain acted with an energy, which, with all her blunders, circumvented her Bourbon rivals, and prevented them from deriving

that aggrandizement which they each expected to receive from the colonial struggle.

Influenced by conflicting views, Spain was slow and reluctant in receiving the advances of the United States, though aided by the good offices of France. The acting of a double part produced its natural consequence; and Great Britain returning, what she was pleased to regard aggression, by reprisal, Spain was driven to declare war in June 1779. Allied now with France in a common war with their formidable rival, the natural course, and what was generally expected from Spain, was a recognition of the independence of the United States; but the event disappointed general calculation. That their independence would be acknowledged by Spain without delay, was the expectation of the American congress, and is evident from the date of Mr Jay's commission as minister plenipotentiary to Madrid, which was made out in September 1779. Enough, however, was known of the views and claims of Spain on the territory which was to be comprised in the United States, to induce Congress to modify their instructions to the ambassador accordingly, and he was instructed to guaranty the two Floridas to Spain, on condition that the free navigation of the Mississippi should be secured to the United States.

Mr Jay, contrary to his own expectations and those of his country, was not formally received in Spain, where he arrived early in 1780. On the principles of her steady policy from the commencement of her colonization in America, the possession of Florida, indeed of Louisiana, was valueless to Spain, unless the Mississippi could be closed against foreign commerce.

From 1779, the question of southern and western boundary was of much higher importance to the United States, than was that of independence. The latter, every man of sound unprejudiced mind considered as settled. Great Britain, when independence was once conceded, regarded the boundary as of but minor moment after it quit the border of Canada; Spain, on the contrary, seized the occasion to extend her claim of limits to the Ohio, and made no concealment of her pretensions. Count d'Aranda, the Spanish ambassador in France, traced lines of demarcation on Michel's map, which left the Ohio at the mouth of the Great Kenhawa, and thence to and around the western shores of lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan, and Superior. These claims, early in 1780, were communicated by the French ministry to congress, and were "the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi, the possession of the Floridas, and the lands on the left bank of the Mississippi.”*

These claims were not made to cover any ulterior object. They were the expression of a policy, which more genius, united with its actual means, could have rendered fatal to the best interests of the new confederacy; as, to its very existence, the left bank of the Mississippi was requisite. The boundaries afterwards recognised and stated in the definitive