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LECTURE II.

OF THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NATIONS IN A STATE OF PEACE.

A VIEW of the rights and duties of nations in peace, will lead us to examine the grounds of national independence, the extent of territorial jurisdiction, the rights of embassy and of commercial intercourse.

Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim equal consideration for their rights, whatever may Equality and independence be their relative dimensions or strength, or however of nations. greatly they may differ in government, religion, or manners. This perfect equality, and entire independence of all distinct states, is a fundamental principle of public law. It is a necessary consequence of this equality, that each nation has a right to govern itself as it may think proper, and no one nation is entitled to dictate a form of government, or religion, or a course of internal policy, to another. No state is entitled to take cognizance or notice of the domestic administration of another state, or of what passes within it as between the government and its own subjects. (a) The Spaniards, as Vattel observes, violated all rules of right, when

(a) Grotius, de Jure belli et pacis, b. 1, c. 3, sec. 8; Vattel, Droit des Gens, b. 2, c. 4, sec. 54; Rutherforth's Inst. b. 2, c. 9. The principle of non-interference with the internal policy and government of other states, was emphatically declared by England and France in the autumn of 1830, and new strength and solidity were thereby given to national freedom and independence. But the right of intervention exists when impending danger requires it, as when it is necessary to prevent aggression by preventing the dangerous accumulation of the means of attack. An interference to preserve the balance of power among neighboring nations, is another case of the utmost moment and difficulty, and requires the most grave and comprehensive consideration. Such intervention has, within the last two centuries, been very frequent, and led to extensive and destructive wars. But it was necessary and just in some of the instances, and pre-eminently so with England, in 1803, and with Austria in 1813, under the dangerous preponderance and inveterate aggressions of France. "No governments," said General Washington, (Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. xi. p. 382,) "ought to interfere with the internal concerns of another, except for the security of what is due to themselves." War may be engaged in, in behalf of our neighbors, if it be very certain that we must suffer by their ruin. Tua res agitur, paries quum proximus ardet. Heinecc. Elem. Jur. Nat. et Gent. b. 2, c. 9, sec. 107. See Roman Law by Lord Mackenzie, (ed. 1862) 54, 55.

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they set up a tribunal of their own to judge the Inca of Peru according to their laws. If he had broken the law of nations *in respect to them, they would have had a right to punish 22 him; but when they undertook to judge of the merits of his own interior administration, and to try and punish him for acts committed in the course of it, they were guilty of the grossest injustice. No nation had a contention with itself, but the ancient Romans, with their usual insolence, immediately interfered, and with profound duplicity pretended to take part with the oppressed for the sake of justice, though in reality for the purpose of dominion. It was by a violation of the right of national independence, that they artfully dissolved the Achæan league, and decreed that each member of the confederacy should be governed by its own laws, independent of the general authority. (a) But so surprisingly loose and inaccurate were the theories of the ancients on the subject of national independence, that the Greeks seem never to have questioned the right of one state to interfere in the internal concerns of another. (b) We have several instances within time of memory, of unwarrantable and flagrant violations of the independence of nations. The interference of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in the internal government of Poland, and first dismembering it of large portions of its territory, and then finally overturning its constitution, and destroying its existence as an independent power, was an aggravated abuse of national right. There were several cases which preceded, or which arose during the violence of the French revolution, which were unjustifiable invasions of the rights of independent nations to prescribe their own forms of government, and to deal in their discretion with their own domestic concerns. Among other instances, we may refer to the invasion of Holland by the Prussian arms in 1787, and of France by the Prussian arms in 1792, and of wars fomented or declared against all monarchical forms of government, by the French rulers, during the early and more intemperate stages of 23 their revolution. We may cite also the invasion of Naples by Austria in 1821, and the invasion of Spain by France in 1823, under the pretext of putting down a dangerous spirit of internal

(a) Livy, b. 33, c. 30; Florus, b. 2, c. 7; Montesq. Consid. sur les Causes de la Grand. des. Rom. c. 6.

(b) Mitford's Hist. of Greece, vol. v. 127.

revolution and reform, as instances of the same violation of the absolute equality and independence of nations. (a)

Every nation has an undoubted right to provide for its own Rule of in- safety, and to take due precaution against distant as well terference. as impending danger. The right of self-preservation is paramount to all other considerations. (b) A rational fear of an imminent danger is said to be a justifiable cause of war. Posse vicinum impediri, ne in suo solo, sine alia causa suaque evidenti utilitate, munimentum nobis propinquum extruat, aut aliud quid faciat,

(a) The British government declined being a party to the promulgated doctrines and proceedings of the congress of the great powers of continental Europe at Troppau and Laybach, in 1821, and at Verona, in 1822, and which gave sanction to the invasions of Naples and Spain. It was not supposed by Great Britain that there existed in either of those instances, a case of such direct and imminent danger to the safety of other states, as to warrant, upon principles of international law, a forcible interference. The allied sovereigns who assembled at Laybach and Verona, do not appear to have differed essentially with Great Britain, as to the general principles which ought to regulate the interference of other states in the internal affairs of Naples and Spain, but they differed in the application of those principles to the cases before them. They justified their interference on the ground that it was "necessary for protecting Italy from a general insurrection, and the neighboring states from the most imminent dangers," "that there existed a vast conspiracy against all established power and against all those rights consecrated by that social order under which Europe had enjoyed so many centuries of glory and happiness." That, in respecting the rights and independence of all legitimate power, they regarded as disavowed by the principles which constitute the public right of Europe, all pretended reform operated by revolt and open hostility." Their object was to protect the peace of Europe" against those disastrous attempt which would spread the horror of universal anarchy over the civilized world"—"against a fanaticism for innovation, which would soon have rendered the existence of any public order whatever, problematical."—"That they were far from wishing to prolong this interference beyond the limits of strict necessity, and would ever prescribe to themselves the preservation of the independence and of the rights of each state." Circular Despatch and Declaration of the Sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia; Laybach, May, 1821 ; Annual Register for 1821, p. 599. The quadruple alliance in 1834, between France, Spain, Great Britain, and Portugal, was made for the purpose of putting an end to a war in regard to the succession to the crown of Portugal, waged between the Emperor Don Pedro, contending for the rights of the Queen of Portugal, Donna Maria 2d, and the Infante Don Miguel, who had usurped the throne, and also, for the purpose of expelling from the Peninsula the Infante Don Carlos, who disputed with Queen Isabella 2d the succession to the crown of Spain, and is another instance of interference with the internal concerns of nations. The object of the interference and quadruple alliance was effected by the expulsion of the two Infantes. So far, the armed interference in this case went on the momentous questions of dynasty and succession, and on the pretence of putting an end to a destructive and interminable civil war. See Roman Law by Lord Mackenzie, (ed. 1862,) 55; Lord Palmerston's Despatch, 5th April, 1847 -- Parliamentary Papers.

(b) Vattel, b. 2, c. 4, sec. 49, 50; Kluber, Droit des Gens, c. 1, p. 75; Grotius, b. 2, c. 1. See Despatch of Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons on the "Trent" affair, 1862.

unde justu formido periculi oriatur. (c) The danger must be great, distinct, and imminent, and not rest on vague and uncertain suspicion. The British government officially declared to the allied powers in 1821, (d) that no government was more prepared than their own, "to uphold the right of any state or states to interfere, where their own security or essential interests were seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another state; that the assumption of the right was only to be justified by the strongest pecessity, and to be limited and regulated thereby ;- that it could not receive a general and indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements, without reference to their immediate bearing upon some particular state or states; that its exercise was an exception to general principles of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly grows out of the circumstances of the special case; and exceptions of this description could never, without the utmost danger, be so far reduced to rule, as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of states, or into the institutes of the law of nations. * The limitation to the right of interference *24 with the internal concerns of other states, was defined in this instance with uncommon precision; and no form in case of reof civil government which a nation may think proper to prescribe for itself, can be admitted to create a case of necessity justifying an interference by force; for a nation under any form of civil policy which it may choose to adopt, is competent to preserve its faith, and to maintain the relations of peace and amity with other powers.

Assistance

volt.

It is sometimes a very grave question, when and how far one nation has a right to assist the subjects of another, who have revolted, and implored that assistance. It is said (a) that assistance

(c) Huber de Jure civitatis, lib. 3, c. 7, sec. 4. (d) Lord Castlereagh's Circular Despatch of Annual Register, vol. lxv. Public Documents. Communications in January and March, 1823. Documents.

January 19, 1821, and of May, 1823.
See, also, Mr. Secretary Canning's
Annual Register, vol. lxvi. Public

(a) Vattel, b. 2, c. 4, sec. 56; Rutherforth, b. 2, c. 9. See, also, Grotius, lib. 2, c. 25, sec. 8; Puff. b. 8, c. 6, sec. 14. The American Secretary of State, (Mr. Webster,) in his letter to Lord Ashburton, of April 21, 1841, declared, that it was a manifest and gross impropriety for individuals to engage in the civil conflicts of other states, and thus to be at war, while their government is at peace"; and that "the salutary doctrine of non-intervention by one nation with the affairs of others, is liable to be essentially impaired, if, while the government refrains from interference, interference is still allowed to its subjects, individually or in masses"; and that "the United States have

may be afforded, consistently with the law of nations, in extreme cases, as when rulers have violated the principles of the social compact, and given just cause to their subjects to consider themselves discharged from their allegiance. Vattel mentions the case of the Prince of Orange as a justifiable interference, because the tyranny of James II. had compelled the English nation to rise in their defence, and call for his assistance. The right of interposition must depend upon the special circumstances of the case. It is not susceptible of precise limitations, and is extremely delicate in the application. It must be submitted to the guidance of eminent discretion, and controlled by the principles of justice and sound policy. It would clearly be a violation of the law of nations, to invite subjects to revolt who were under actual obedience, however just their complaints; or to endeavor to produce discontents, violence, and rebellion in neighboring states, and, under color of a generous assistance, to consummate projects of ambition and dominion. The most unexceptionable precedents are those in which the interference did not take place until the new states had actually been

established, and sufficient means and spirit had been displayed * 25 to excite a confidence * in their stability. (a) The assistance

that England gave to the United Netherlands when they were struggling against Spain, and the assistance that France gave to this country during the war of our Revolution, were justifiable acts, founded in wisdom and policy. And equally justifiable was the interference of the European powers of France, Great Britain, and Russia, in favor of the Greeks, against the Ottoman Porte, by the treaty for the pacification of Greece, concluded by those three Christian powers in 1827, and by means of which a ferocious and destructive war was terminated by the independence of the Greek state as a new kingdom, and a recognition of that independence by the Ottoman Porte in 1832. So, also, there was a successful in terference in 1840, of four of the great European powers, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, in the civil war between the Ottoman Porte and Mehemet Ali, the Pacha of Egypt. These, as

been the first among civilized nations to enforce the observance of the just rule of neutrality and peace, by special and adequate legal enactments against allowing individuals to make war on their own authority, or to mingle themselves in the belligerent operations of other nations."

(a) The Comm. Pinheiro-Ferreira, in his Cours de Droit Public, tom. ii. pp. 6, 7, very decidedly justifies the recognition, when the revolted people have acquired such stability.