body of men is evident. Hence refults the neceffity of a different or ganization.

It is obviously impracticable, in the federal government of these States, to fecure all rights of independent fovereignty to each, and yet provide for the intereft and fafety of all. Individuals entering into fociety must give up a fhare of liberty to preferve the reft. The magnitude of the facrifice muft depend as well on fituation and circumstances, as on the ob ject to be attained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between thofe rights which must be furrendered, and thofe which may be reserved; and on the prefent occafion this difficulty was increased by a difference among the feveral States as to their fituation, extent, habits, and particular interefts.

In all our deliberations on this fubject, we kept fteadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the confolidation of our union, in which is involved our profperity, felicity, fafety, perhaps our national existence. This important confideration, feriously and deeply impreffed on our minds, led each State in the convention to be lefs rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and thus the conftitution, which we now prefent, is the refult of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and conceffion which the peculiarity of our political fituation rendered indifpenfable.

That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not perhaps to be expected: but each will doubtlefs confider, that had her interefts been alone confulted, the confequences might have been particularly difagreeable or injurious to others: that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe: that it may promote the lafting welfare of that country fo dear to us all, and fecure her freedom and happiness, which is our moit ardent with. With great refpect, we have the honour to be, Sir, your Excellency's mot obedient, and humble fervants,

GEORGE WASHINGTON, Prefident

By unanimous order of the Convention.

His Excellency the Prefident of the Congrefs.

The conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the conflitution expreffed a defire, in order to prevent mifconftruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive claufes fhould be added: and as extending the ground of public confi dence in the government will best enfure the beneficent ends of its infti tution, it was

RESOLVED by the Senate and Houfe of Reprefentatives of the United

States

States of America in Congrefs affembled, two-thirds of both houfes concurring, That the following articles be proposed to the legislatures of the feveral States, as amendments to the conftitution of the United States, all or any of which articles, when ratified by three-fourths of the fuid legiflatures, to be valid to all intents and purpofes, as part of the faid constitution: viz.

ART. I. After the first enumeration required by the first article of the conftitution, there fhall be one reprefentative for every thirty thoufand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion fhall be fo regulated by Congress, that there fhall be not less than one hundred representatives, nor less than one reprefentative for every forty thousand perfons, until the number of representatives fhall amount to two hundred, after which the proportion fhall be fo regulated by Congress, that there fhall not be less than two hundred representatives, nor more than one reprefentative for every fifty thoufand perfons.

ART. II. No law varying the compenfation for the fervices of the fenators and representatives fhall take effect, until an election of reprefentatives fhall have intervened.

ART. III. Congrefs fhall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercife thereof; or abridging the freedom of fpeech, or of the prefs; or the right of people peaceably to affemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

ART. IV. A well-regulated militia being neceffary to the fecurity of a free ftate, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

ART. V. No foldier fhall in time of peace be quartered in any houfe without the confent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prefcribed by law.

ART. VI. The right of the people to be fecure in their perfons, houfes, papers, and effects, against unreasonable fearches and feizures, fhall not be violated, and no warrants fhall iffue, but upon probable caufe, fupported by oath or affirmation, and particularly defcribing the place to be fearched, and the perfons or things to be feized.

ART. VII. No perfon fhall be held to anfwer for a capital, or otherwife infamous crime, unlefs on a prefentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cafes arifing in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual fervice, in time of war or public danger; nor fhall be compelled in any criminal cafe to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due procefs of

law;

law; nor fhall private property be taken for public ufe without juff compenfation.

ART. VIII. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime fhall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the na ture and cause of the accufation; to be confronted with the witneffes against him; to have compulfory process for obtaining witneffes in his favour; and to have the affistance in counfel for his defence.

ART. IX. In fuits at common law, where the value in controversy fhall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury fhall be preferved, and no fact, tried by a jury, shall be otherwife re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

ART. X. Exceffive bail shall not be required, nor exceffive fines impofed, nor cruel and unufual punishments inflicted.

ART. XI. The enumeration in the conftitution, of certain rights, fhall not be conftrued to deny or difparage others retained by the people.

ART. XII. The powers not delegated to the United States by the conftitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are referved to the States refpectively, or to the people.

The following States have ratified all the foregoing articles of amend. ment to the constitution of the United States, viz, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, New York, Virginia, and Vermont. New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennfylvania reject the fecond article; and Delaware rejects the first article. No official returns, to our knowledge, have been made from the other States."

AGAINST this conftitution, thus ratified, organized and established, objections may no doubt be urged, and defects pointed out; it may be faid that it contains no declaration of rights, and that the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and conftitutions of the feveral States, the declarations of rights in the several ftate conftitutions are no fecurity-nor are the people fecured even in the enjoyment of the benefits of the common law.

Owing to the finall number of members in the houfe of reprefentatives, there is not the fubftance, but the shadow only of reprefentation, which can never produce proper information in the legislature, or infpire confidence in the people—the laws will therefore be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with, their effects and confequences.

The

The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, and of origi nating appropriations of money, although they are not the immediate reprefentatives of the people, or amenable to them, thefe and their other great powers, viz. their power in the appointment of Ambaffadors, and all public officers, in making treaties, and trying all impeachments; their influence upon, and connection with, the fupreme executive. From thefe circumstances, their duration of office, and their being a conftant exifting body, almoft continually fitting, joined with their being one complete branch of the Legislature, will deftroy any and every balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish what ufurpation they please upon the rights and liberties of the people.

The Judiciary of the United States is fo conftructed and extended as to abforb and destroy the Judiciaries of the feveral States, thereby rendering law tedious, intricate, and expenfive, and juftice in confequence. unattainable by a great part of the community, as in, thus enabling the rich, to opprefs the poor.

The President of the United States has no constitutional Council-a thing unknown in any fafe and regular Government-he will therefore be unfupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favourites, or he will become a tool to the Senate; or a Council of State will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments, the worst and moft dangerous of all ingredients for fuch a Council in a free country; for they may be induced to join in any dangerous or oppreffive measures to shelter themselves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in office: whereas, had a conftitutional Council been formed, as was faid to have been propofed, of fix Members, viz. two from the Eaftern, two from the Middle, and two from the Southern States, to be appointed by vote of the States in the House of Reprefentatives, with the fame duration and rotation of office as the Senate, the executive would always have had fafe and proper information and advice; the Prefident of fuch a Council might have acted as Vice President of the United States, pro tempore, upon any vacancy or difability of the Chief Magiftrate, and the long-continued feffions of the Senate would, in a great meafure, have been prevented. From this fatal defect of a conftitutional Council, has arifen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legislature and the executive. Hence alfo fprung that unneceffary and dangerous office of the Vice Prefident, who, for want of other employment, is made Prefident of the Senate, thereby dangerously blending the legislative and executive VOL. I,

Gg

powers:

powers; befides always giving to fome one of the States an unneceffary and unjuft pre-eminence over the others.

The Prefident of the United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardon for treafons, which may be fometimes exercifed to fereen from punishment, those whom he had fecretly inftigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent the difcovery of his own guilt.

By declaring all treaties fupreme laws of the land, the executive and fenate have, in many cafes, an exclufive power of legislation, which might have been avoided by proper diftinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the affent of the Houfe of Reprefentatives, were it could be done with fafety.

Under their own construction of the general claufe at the end of the enumerated powers, the Congrefs may grant monopolies in trade and commerce-conftitute new crimes-inflict unusual and fevere punishments, and extend their power as far as they fhall think proper-fo that the State Legislatures have no fecurity for the powers now prefumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights.

There is no declaration for preferving the liberty of the prefs, the trial by jury in civil caufes, nor against the danger of ftanding armies in time of peace.

WE admit these objections in part to be juft, and view them as unanfwerable; but we confider them as deduéting but little from the beauty and order of the whole fyftem; they may all be corrected by the application of the fame principles on which the Conftitution is founded, and if all circumstances are confidered we fhall, perhaps, rather be aftonifhed that its defects are fo few and of fo little importance.

To form a good fyftem of government, for a fingle city or ftate, however limited as to territory, or inconfiderable as to numbers, has been thought to require the ftrongest efforts of human genius. With what confcious diffidence, then, muft the members of the convention have revolved in their minds, the immenfe undertaking which was before them. Their views could not be confined to a small or a fingle community, but were expanded to a great number of ftates; feveral of which contain an extent of territory, and refources of population, equal to those of some of the most respectable kingdoms on this fide of the Atlantic. Nor were even these the only objects to be comprehended within their deliberations. Numerous ftates yet unformed: Myriads of the human race, who will inhabit regions hitherto uncultivated, were to be affected by the refult of their proceedings. It was neceflary, therefore, to form their calculations, on a fcale commenfurate to fo large a portion of the globe.

Thus