App. Div.] FOURTH DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1903. the agreement made at the time of the organization of the defendant corporation between it and this plaintiff, and appropriate relief was demanded. In May, 1899, the action was tried and resulted in a judgment which adjudged, in substance, that this defendant (the plaintiff in that action) was the equitable owner as against the defendants, including this plaintiff, of the inventions in question, and the judgment required the defendants in that action to assign to this defendant all the interest which they or any of them had in or to said inventions. From that judgment an appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, and the judgment was in all things affirmed. (Rochester Folding Box Co. v. Brown, 55 App. Div. 444.) From such judgment of affirmance an appeal has been taken to the Court of Appeals, and is now pending. Thus it has been judicially determined that at the time the contract in suit was executed, the plaintiff had no interest in the inventions in question which he could assign or transfer to the defendant. It has been judicially determined that at that time the defendant was the owner of such inventions, and that it, as matter of right, was entitled to an assignment by the plaintiff and his assignees of any and all interest which they or any of them claimed to have therein, wholly independent of the contract in suit, to the end that the defendant might thus acquire the legal as well as the equitable title to the property which it owned. Plaintiff's assignments of the invention in question to the defendant amounted to nothing; were no better than so much blank paper, because, as determined by the judgment of the court, he had nothing to assign; and such assignments were equally ineffectual to perfect the legal title of the defendant in and to such inventions. What was expected to be accomplished by such assignments failed, and the defendant was, therefore, required to resort to a suit in equity to accomplish the purpose for which the contract in suit was made. It should be stated in this connection that at the time of the execution of the contract in question the legal title to a one-half interest in one of the patents in suit was in plaintiff's name, the other one-half interest having been assigned by him to Browne's wife. Such assignment, however, was made without consideration, and that patent, like all the others involved, in fact belonged to the defendant, by virtue of the agreement made when the defendant FOURTH DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1903. [Vol. 81. corporation was organized as was determined by the former judg ment of this court. Upon the foregoing state of facts, we think it must be held that the agreement made by the defendant to assign to the plaintiff a one-quarter interest in the inventions and patents described in the judgment was wholly without consideration and void. The proposition cannot be more pointedly put than by saying that at the time the contract was made which provided for an assignment by the plaintiff to the defendant of such inventions, he had nothing to assign; owned no inventions or patents and had no interest in any. He was not in a position to do any act in connection with the subject-matter of the contract, which could be of benefit to the defendant, that he was not legally and morally bound to do independent of such contract, and, as matter of fact, the defendant was obliged to accomplish through other means the purpose for which the contract was executed, to wit, the bringing and successfully maintaining an action in the Supreme Court, and which could not have been accomplished in any other manner, so far as the plaintiff was concerned. In full compensation for his services for at least one year the plaintiff was to and did receive from the defendant thirty-five dollars per week. For vesting in the defendant his interest in the inventions in question the plaintiff was by the terms of the contract to be reinvested with a one-quarter interest upon leaving the defendant's employ. He had no interest in such inventions which by any act of his he could vest in the defendant; he did not even have the legal title to them, as it was supposed he had when the contract was executed, and so by his assignment the defendant obtained nothing, and could not obtain anything, by virtue of that part of the contract which this action was brought to enforce. It is claimed, however, and it is stated in the opinion of the learned trial court to be a fact, that it was a part of the agreement between the parties, although in no manner alluded to or expressed in the written contract, that the defendant should commence an action or actions to enforce its rights in and to the patents or inventions in question, acquired by it by virtue of the original agreement, and “that the plaintiff would be a witness for the plaintiff (this defendant) in the action or actions which were to be brought, App. Div.] FOURTH DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1903. and testify and give evidence in behalf of the Folding Box Co. for the purpose of recovering the patents in furtherance of their agreement;" and it is urged that as the plaintiff was a witness and testified for and on behalf of the defendant in the action brought by it in which it was successful, such agreement on the part of the plaintiff furnished a sufficient consideration to support the contract in suit. We think it ought not to be held that such an agreement, if made, was sufficient as a consideration to render the contract valid. The defendant knew, independent of any information which it obtained from the plaintiff, that it was the equitable owner of the inventions and patents in question, by virtue of the agreement which had been made when the corporation was organized, and which induced it to transfer to the plaintiff and his associates $60,000, par value, of its full paid capital stock. It, therefore, knew that the plaintiff had no right to sell or transfer such inventions, and that if he had done so it was in fraud of its rights, and when informed that such transfers had been made by the plaintiff without consideration, the defendant had a right to assume that he would testify to the truth about the transaction, and it had the legal right to compel him to do so. He ought not to be heard to say that it was necessary for the defendant to promise him a certain interest in its property for the purpose of inducing him so to do. If it was, in fact, the understanding of the parties that the plaintiff should have an interest in such property, as a condition of giving testimony which would enable the defendant to establish its title thereto in an action brought for that purpose, such intention or agreement is contrary to public policy and ought not to be given force or effect by any court. The agreement as claimed to have been made did not involve the expenditure of any time or the incurring of any expense by the plaintiff. He was in defendant's employ when the action was commenced and tried; he was paid a weekly salary, and by the contract in suit had agreed to work for the defendant "faithfully and to further its interests in all ways." The agreement which it is claimed was made between the parties, although not expressed in the written contract, and which it is now urged furnishes an adequate consideration therefor, is repugnant to every instinct of propriety and justice, as it in effect provides for FOURTH DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1903. [Vol. 81. pay as a consideration for giving evidence in an action which it is agreed shall be brought. In the case of Lyon v. Hussey (82 Hun, 15) the rule is concisely stated in the head note as follows: "A contract to furnish evidence to establish the claim of one of the parties to an action about to be commenced is against public policy and will not be enforced." Justice VAN BRUNT, in writing the opinion for the court, said: "But it may be proper to call attention to the fact that part of the contract, damages for the breach of which this action was brought to recover, was to furnish evidence to establish the claim of the defendant in a litigation to be commenced. It is clear that such a contract is against public policy. The recognition of contracts of this character would be the introduction of all sorts of fraud and deception in proceedings before courts of justice, in order that parties might receive compensation out of the results of their successful manufacture of proofs to be presented to the court, thus holding out a premium upon subornation. The mere statement of the proposition seems to show that such a contract could never be recognized in any court of justice." We think the language of the learned justice which we have quoted is especially applicable to the case at bar. Having concluded that that part of the contract which this action was brought to enforce is void because without consideration, we deem it unnecessary to consider any of the other questions involved upon this appeal. It follows that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide event. SPRING, WILLIAMS and HISCOCK, JJ., concurred; NASH, J., not sitting. Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide event upon questions of law only, the facts having been examined and no error found therein. App. Div.] FOURTH DEPARTMENT, MARCH TERM, 1903. 81 423 2656 JOEL PICKERT, Respondent, v. ARNOLD L. EATON, Appellant, 81 Bankruptcy-the title of a receiver to a mortgage of the debtor which the receiver has brought suit to foreclose more than four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy is not affected thereby-discharge of the judgment lien. The title of a receiver, appointed in proceedings supplementary to execution, to a real estate mortgage owned by the judgment debtor, is not affected by the judgment debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, the petition for which was not filed until more than four months after the receiver had commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage, notwithstanding the fact that the judgment foreclosing the mortgage was not rendered until after the discharge in bankruptcy was granted. In such a case an order, made under section 1268 of the Code of Civil Procedure, discharging the lien of the judgment upon which the supplementary proceedings were instituted may properly provide, "but such cancellation of record is not to impair any rights or lien which the receiver may have acquired in the property of said judgment debtor." APPEAL by the defendant, Arnold L. Eaton, from that part of an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Oneida Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Herkimer on the 24th day of December, 1902, discharging a judgment of record which retained the same in full force for the benefit of the receiver of the said defendant as to the personal property acquired by him. Myron G. Bronner, for the appellant. Charles J. Palmer, for the respondent. SPRING, J.: On the 16th day of June, 1898, the plaintiff recovered a judg ment in the Supreme Court against the appellant on a promissory note for $1,045.92. In proceedings supplementary to execution founded on this judgment a receiver was appointed of the property of the judgment debtor who claimed title to a real estate mortgage given by the defendant Fred W. Eaton to the appellant. In December, 1899, the receiver commenced a foreclosure of this mortgage by action, and separate answers were interposed by the present defendants alleging payment of said mortgage as an affirmative |