necessity of a new line of boundary between the British and the Canadian territories.

Posterity will scarcely believe, though history must attest the mortifying truth, that in acceding to the independence of the states of America, their territory was not merely allowed to them, but an extent of country, then a portion of the province of Quebec, nearly of equal magnitude to the thirteen provinces or states which then composed the union, was ceded to them, though not a foot of the country so ceded was or could be at the time occupied by an American in arins.

"Yet such was the ignorance of the then minister of Great Britain and those whom he employed, in regard to the geographical position and local importance of the territory ceded, that when the merchants of London, interested in the Canada trade, waited on Mr. Oswald the negotiator, to represent the impolitic and improvident cession of the upper country and the posts commanding the same, he literally burst into tears, and acknowledged his com plete ignorance of such posts being in our possession, and of the country given away being an object in any respect worthy of notice."

It is also worthy of remark that

"The ceded country was inhabited by numerous tribes and nations of Indians who were independent both of us and the Americans; they were the real proprietors, and we transferred to others what did not belong to ourselves."

In 1794, the ceded territory was yielded to the Americans, and all its strong posts evacuated by the British. From that period, an uninterrupted system of vexation has been pursued to exclude the British from trading with the Indian inhabitants, but hitherto without success: an arbitrary and cruel measure was also resorted to, by which the Indians were despoiled of their lands, which clearly proved that the utter extermination of the natives was be the real object of the American government.

The river Penobscot ought to have been our boundary, and the independence of the six nations ought to have been secured, but we were driven back to the river Saint Croix; the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, important to the trade of New Brunswick, were contrary to the treaty afterwards occupied by the Americans, and the Indian territory was conceded to them, by which they obtained immediate access to the Lakes.

The possession of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay by America, enables them to carry on an extensive contraband trade of great value, to the detriment of the inhabitants of New Brunswick, which trade in time of peace it is impossible to check or to prevent.

VOL. III. JANUARY, 1815.

D

Our

Our author offers convincing proofs that the friendship of the United States is not essential to the welfare of any part of the British Empire. God forbid that this consideration should stimulate our hostility to injustice, or that we should show a wanton spirit of resentment, even for unprovoked injuries, on account of the perfect independence of all our colonies upon the trade with the United States! It is, nevertheless, not to be doubted, that our West Indian Islands can be well supplied from Canada and New Brunswick with every article of necessity usually exported to them by the Americans, and if that trade should be regulated without considering the more general relations of policy, (which our author recommends, but we by no means coincide in his sentiment) at the recurrence of peace, happen when it may, they would be excluded from its advantages.

Far more reasonable and important it will be to exclude them "for ever from the British ports in India. We might enlarge greatly on this interesting topic, but shall reserve our observations till a future opportunity, when we intend to consider fully the subject of our Eastern policy. It suffices now to observe, that while we maintain a domestic monopoly to the prejudice of British adventurers, it is most absurd, and perhaps unjust, to permit and favour foreign competition.

Our author touches but lightly on the incorporation of the Floridas and Louisiana with the Republic. We would not inflame that hostile feeling in the minds of our countrymen which commercial rivalship has created, and a long accumulation of injuries and insults perpetrated by the American government has greatly irritated; we nevertheless maintain that the aggrandizement of a rival state however attained, if it endanger our security, is, under all circumstances, a justifiable cause of com plaint and hostility. If it were possible that by any process of barter, or chicatiery of negotiation, the Netherlands should again be conceded to France, would any British minister doubt that such a transaction was a breach of every subsisting treaty, and an ample provocation to war? When Louis the fourteenth claimed to his family the undivided inheritance of the Spanish monarchy, what Englishnan regarded the usurpation as the less atrocious for the pretended will of Charles the third, or the more offensive for being a breach of the treaties of partition: If we are desirous of maintaining our transatlantic empire, it behöves us now and at all times to resist the principle, that any European states, who are hostilely disposed towards us, can be allowed to annoy us by important concessions to these our natural rivals, or that they might lawfully make acquisitions of territory by covinous purchases, either from European poten

:

tates

tates or the native powers. If we admit that most pernicious principle, our great possessions in that distant hemisphere, the sources of our commercial greatness, and the nurseries of our seamen, are enjoyed by a most precarious tenure.

There are some who consider the boundary of 1783 as permanently fixed against this country, and attach no importance to the subsequent aggressions of the Americans. There are some who conceive this country already worn out with great exertion, and sinking in the decrepitude of age. They deem it almost impious and absurd to resist the youthful energies of republican America, destined, as they assume, to realize, at no distant period, all the pretensions which her present rulers advance; and not only to realize them, but aided by a popula tion for ever progressive, happy, virtuous, and irresistible, destined to overwhelm us in the new, and to contend for empire in the old world. If indeed such apprehensions are rationally formed, we come to a different conclusion from that which is sought by such advocates for peace. The boundary established in America by the treaty of 1783, is not more sacred in our view than that established in Europe by the treaties of Luneville and Amiens. If our enemy already too strong for our security is progressive in strength, we must acquire a firmer frontier to oppose him, and this is the day for the attempt. Fatally pusillanimous is that council which would suspend contention admitted to be at last inevitable, till the hostile power every day growing in stature shall be most invigorated, or would hope to conciliate his favour and disarm his resentment by aiding those resources, and acceding to those pretensions which he tells us will ultimately be applied to our destruction.

The recent law of the United States for arming their population by a process of conscription, we conceive a new aggression against the laws of civil polity. To repel an insolent invader, or to maintain a right without which a nation might cease to exist, or cease to exist with honour, let the last penny be brought to the public treasury, let all the youth be trained to martial exercise, and even the aged forego the crutch if he can wield a sword with effect. By such glorious efforts the oppres sor's rod has been often broken, and the most profound schemes of wanton ambition have been defeated. By such exertions in a recent instance, have the Russians attained a distinction among the nations of the continent to which they had not before ever aspired, and stand recorded the immediate liberators of the civilized world. But it is an expedient allowable only in the last extremity. When a banditti is known to be abroad, every measure of national defence is justifiable by the laws of self-preservation. But where no such danger can reasonably be appre

hended, such a conscription must be deemed a struggle for dominion, not a measure of national security, and as such, demands the most jealous scrutiny even on the part of those states, who are not immediate parties in the contest. The organization of a force incompatible with the safety of other states, would of itself be held a sufficient ground for interference. The United States pretended that we had violated their rights by a misinterpretation of public law in restraining their neutral commerce and subjecting their ships to visitation, and in certain cases to forfeiture. They complained also that their flag was insulted by a claim on our part, to the persons of natural-born British subjects found serving in their marine; and for these supposed injuries they declare war against us. They proceed in that war to the invasion of our dominions, and denouncing conquest and subjugation even after their first invasion is repelled, they form a plan by arming their whole male population to give effect to that threat. Twenty five years ago the publication of such a plan would have been novel in principle, and have astonished mankind. The republicans of France first conceived the daring experiment, and by its tremendous operation almost subdued the world. The republicans of America have followed the example, not for defence, but avowedly for a purpose of conquest. This is a measure which calls the attention of other countries no less than our own, of all those, to whose territories in the Western hemisphere, the aggrandizement of America must prove a dangerous, if not a fatal blow.

We have here briefly touched the several points which our ministers must have considered in the formation of that treaty which now waits the ratification of the American government. Of the conditions offered to the enemy we are informed nothing by authority. Having brought to so glorious an issue our contest with republican France, we trust that the energies of this great country are fully equal to secure all its objects in a contest with republican America. It is reasonable indeed, that after twenty years of such severe exertion, we should consider a state of universal peace as a blessing not hastily to be abandoned, and that after the labours of such a contest we should be inclined to recruit our energies in the security of uninterrupted repose. We must however declare our belief that if the Indian nations, our allies, are not restored to those territories of which they have been defrauded or plundered since the independence of the colonies was acknowledged, and if our remaining settlements are not secured by a barrier which cannot be forced whenever the Americans shall chuse again to try their strength in war; we cannot with justice consider the peace as a state of security. Our enemy has proclaimed his object, and evinced the means

with which he intends to pursue it.

our protection.

Vigilance must still remain

The acknowledgement of our maritime claims by acquiescence, is indeed an abandonment on the part of the United States of those objects for which they avowedly commenced the war. Their cession of the fisheries which were granted to them by former treaties, and their exclusion from trading with our East Indian dependencies, are points which are most important to our commercial interests, and may fairly be considered as recompensing us for all the expenditure attendant on this just and necessary contest. The treaty as it appears in unofficial statements, if not all that we desire is highly honourable, for on our part it was a defensive war, and the points contended for by the enemy are abandoned. The dangers which we have alluded to are nevertheless real. It might have, however, been inexpedient to agitate these questions at present; but we have no doubt that a day will arrive when the government of the United States, if they should long continue one federal republic, will resume its operations hitherto active alike in peace and in war, to expel the British from North America, and to possess itself

of the whole continent.

When the treaty of peace shall be published, we may judge of its provision with more propriety than at present; but no act of state is to be considered independently of many circumstances which to the superficial observer may seem unconnected, but are nevertheless intimately blended with it. The negotiations at Ghent must have been conducted on our part with reference to those at Vienna. In concluding the American war without the least sacrifice of honour, and obtaining for our merchants the splendid advantages of monopoly on the continent of Asia, and in the fisheries of Newfoundland, so much has been gained that it might at present be inexpedient to contend for more; and at the present crisis, by effecting a general pacification, more may be gained in our European relations than even the subjugation of the United States, if that were practicable, could counterbalance.

But an opinion has prevailed that Mr. Madison will not ratify the treaty. His refusal will be an additional proof that his object is not peace but conquest. A new insult will then be offered to our country: but having ascertained what British prowess can accomplish in a warfare of twenty years with the gigantic power of revolutionary France, we do not dread a prolongation of warfare with republican America.

ART.