37 S. W. 627. Contra: Bank of Mobile v. Brown, 42 Ala. 108; Dillard v. Evans, 4 Ark. 175; Rindskoff v. Barrett, 11 Iowa 172; Huse v. Hamblin, 29 Iowa 501; Chambers v. George, 5 Litt. (Ky.) 335. But otherwise as to "Kentucky currency." Hicklin v. Tucker, 2 Yerg. 448.

similar to the original does not destroy its negotiability. Anniston Loan and Trust Co. v. Stickney, 108 Ala. 146; 31 L. R. A. 234.

9-A note made payable to the order of M's estate is negotiable. Peltier v. Babillon, 45 Mich. 384. An instrument in the form of a certificate of deposit acknowledg

A clause attached to a promissory note and providing that the payee or his assigns may indefinitely extend the time of payment destroys its negotiability. Smith V. VanBlarcom, 45 Mich. 371.

The provision in a promissory note "that the payee or holder of this note may renew or extend the time of payment of the same from time to time as often às required without notice, and without prejudice to the rights of such payee or holder to enforce payment against the makers, sureties and indorsers and each them, parties hereto, at any time when the same may be due and payable," destroys the negotiability of the note. Second Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 75 Mich. 546. To same effect Glidden v. Henry, 104 Ind. 278, 54 Am. Rep. 316.

of

But an option indorsed upon the back of a negotiable note for its extension for a definite time by giving a new note at the option of the makers and indorsers

lars from Z., and reciting “and on five days' notice will pay in current funds the like amount with interest to the said Z or her assigns," is not a negotiable instrument in that it is not payable to order or bearer. Zander v. N. Y. Security & Trust Co., 81 N. Y. Supp. 1151 (a case under the statute); Westberg v. Chicago L. & C. Co., 117 Wis. 589 (a case under the statute).

The North Carolina and Wyoming acts read: "Must be payable to the order of a specified person or bearer." The words, "specified person" are really unnecessary inasmuch as section 10 provides that an instrument is payable to order where it is drawn payable to the order of a specified person.

10-It is essential to the validity of a bill of exchange that there be a clear designation of the person upon whom it is drawn. There cannot be a bill without a drawee. Peto v. Reynolds, 9 Exch. 410; Watrous v. Halbrook, 39 Tex. 572.

It is not necessary that the drawee be named. He may be identified by some other designation than his name. For example, a bill addressed to steamer C. W.

Dawrence and owners was held a sufficient designation of the drawee. Alabama Coal Mining Co. V. Brainard, 35 Ala. 476. The same concerning a bill which contained no address, but specified that it was to be "payable at number one West street, etc." Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739, 4 E. C. L. 361.

The fact that the bill does not designate a drawee will not vitiate it after it has been accepted. Acceptance is an admission that the party accepting it was the party intended. Wheeler v. Webster, 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 1. This case is in conflict with Peto v. Reynolds, supra.

156

In Funk V. Babbitt, Ill. 408 it was held that instruments in the form following "Thirty days after date pay to the order of E. D. Babbitt $350 for value received." (Signed) Funk and Lackey, but not addressed to any person as drawee, were to be regarded, in legal effect, as addressed to the drawers themselves as drawees, and that the signatures of such drawers to such instrument bound them as drawers and acceptors; that the firm sustained to the bills the triple relation of drawers, drawees, and acceptors; that the drawers and drawees being the same, the bills were in legal effect promissory notes and might

be treated as such, or as bills, at the holder's option. In Forward v. Thompson, 12 U. C. Q. B. 103, a similar instrument was held not to be a promissory note inasmuch as it lacked the very essence of a promissory note,—a promise in terms by the maker which makes him primarily liable to pay the money.

The Wisconsin act adds the following: "But no order drawn upon or accepted by the treasurer of any county, town, city, village, or school district, whether drawn by any officer thereof, or any other person, and no obligation or instrument made by any such corporation or any officer thereof, unless expressly authorized by law to be made negotiable shall be, or shall be deemed to be negotiable according to the custom of merchants in whatever form they may be drawn or made. Warehouse receipts, bills of lading, and railroad receipts, upon the face of which the words 'not negotiable' shall be plainly written, printed, or stamped, shall be negotiable, as provided in section 1676 of the Wisconsin statutes, 1878, and in section 4194 and 4425 of these statutes, as the same have been construed by the Supreme Court."

In Michigan village orders are not negotiable. Miner v. Vedder, 66 Mich. 101.

First, With interest;1 or

1-A note providing for interest at 7 per cent and containing this additional stipulation: "if not paid when due I agree to pay 10 per cent interest from date until paid" is negotiable. Crump v. Berdan, 97 Mich. 293; See Flanders V. Chamberlain, 24 Mich. 305; Hope v. Barker, 112 Mo. 338; Dinsmore v. Duncan, 57 N. Y. 573; Parker v. Plymell, 23 Kan. 402; Smith v. Crane, 33 Minn. 144.

An instrument containing a promise to pay a certain sum together with any interest that may accrue thereon (the rate of interest not being specified) is not negotiable in that it lacks certainty as to sum. Lamberton v. Aiken, 2 F 189, [1899] Ct. of Sessions (a case under the corresponding provision of the bills of exchange act).

An instrument does not fall short of being a bill or note merely because it contains a stipulation for the payment of interest, but the interest must be ascertained from the face of the document or it must be capable of being ascertained by numerical

calculation from materials contained in the document. This would be the case where the document in question specifies the rate of interest, and date of payment, for then one could by simple calculation ascertain the amount of interest due.

2-A note for $1500 to be paid 20 per cent a month from July 1, 1871 is negotiable. Wright v. Irwin, 33 Mich. 32.

A nole providing for payment of the principal sum, with the reserved right on the part of the maker expressed in the body of the note to pay the same before maturity in installments of not less than 5 per cent of the principal, is negotiable. Riker V. Sprague Mfg. Co., 14 R. I. 402.

An instrument wherein the defendant promises in writing to pay the plaintiff 1707 with interest at 5 per cent as follows: the first payment, to-wit: 401 or more to be made on the 1st of February, 1873, and 51 on the first day of each month following until the note shall be fully satisfied, is a valid promissory note. Cooke v. Horn, 29 L. T. (n. s.)

369. The objection to the note was that if the first payment were more than 401, which the note provided it might be, the subsequent instalments and the final time for payment would be indefinite. Blackburn, J., said: "The amount of the note, however, is certain and any variation in the time will depend only upon the defendant. * I do not see why a stipulation which enables a maker of a note to reduce his liability for interest should prevent the instrument containing it

from being a promissory note."

3-Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184; Brooke V. Struthers, 110 Mich. 562; Wilson v. Campbell, id. 580; Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21 Mich. 254; Rice v. Rankans, 101 Mich. 378; Cox v. Cayan, 117 Mich. 599; Clark v. Skeen, 61 Kan. 526, 49 L. R. A. 190; Carlon v. Kenealy, 12 M. & W. 139; Thorpe v. Mindeman (Wis.) 101 N. W. 417 (a case under the statute). See also First Nat. Bank v. Carson, 60 Mich. 432; Choate v. Stevens, 116 Mich. 28.

An instrument in the form of a joint and several promissory note and providing for payment in instalments and that upon default in the payment of any one of the instalments the whole amount remaining unpaid should become due and payable is a negotiable promissory note within the meaning of the bills of exchange act. Kirkwood V. Carroll, 51 W. R. 374; 88 L. T. R. (1903) 52, approving Yates V. Evans, 61 L. J. Q. B. 446, (1892),

overruling Kirkwood v. Smith, 65 L. J. Q. B. 408 (1896).

4-Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 241; Johnson v. Frisbie, 15 Mich. 286; Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137; Second Nat. Bank v. Basuier, 65 Fed. 58; Whitle v. Fond du Lac Nat. Bank (Tex.) 26 S. W. 1106; Hastings v. Thompson, 54 Minn. 184, 55 N. W. 968; Contra: Culbertson v. Nelson, 93 Iowa 187. See note 6, sec. 3.

5 This provision changes the rule in Michigan as established by the following cases: Bul

lock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137; Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 517; Cayuga Co. Bank v. Purdy, 56 Mich. 6; Altman v. Rittershofer, 68 Mich. 287; Altman v. Fowler, 70 Mich. 57; Wright v. Traver, 73 Mich. 493; Second Nat. Bank v. Wheeler, 75 Mich. 546; Rice v. Rankans, 101 Mich. 378; Conrad Seipp Brewing Co. v. McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191; Strawberry Point Bank v. Lee, 117 Mich. 122; People v. Bennett, 122 Mich. 281; but affirms the rule sustained by the weight of authority. The reason of the rule in Michigan is based upon the proposition that the requisite of certainty must continue until the discharge of the instrument. In Altman v. Fowler, supra, the court said: "The certainty requi site to the negotiability of the instrument must continue until the obligation is discharged, and any provision which before that time removes such certainty prevents the instrument from being negotiable at all."

The rule in Michigan is the