when a statute uses other terms, which have a settled meaning in the common law, this meaning is to be given them, unless there is something to show that the legislature intended otherwise. Thus, the words "dwelling house," "breaking," and "entry," in statutes defining and punishing burglary, "burning," in statutes defining and punishing arson, "from the person," "or by violence or putting in fear," in statutes defining and punishing robbery, etc., are, unless a contrary intention appears, to be given a construction in accordance with their meaning at common law.1

181

to the common law, the common-law definition applies. Prindle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 551, 37 Am. St. Rep. 833; State v. Twogood, 7 Iowa, 252; Com. v. York, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 93, 109; Houston v. Com., 87 Va. 257; and other cases cited above.

181 Com. v. Humphries, 7 Mass. 242; Pitcher v. People, 16 Mich. 142; State v. Calhoun, 72 Iowa, 432, 2 Am. St. Rep. 252; Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293, 320; Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, 62 Am. Dec. 714; Finch v. Com., 14 Grat. (Va.) 643; Nicholls v. State, 68 Wis. 416; Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y. 561, Beale's Cas. 789; Schwabacher v. People, 165 Ill. 618; Mary v. State, 24 Ark. 44, 81 Am. Dec. 60; People v. Gates, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 159. See post, §§ 379, 409, 416.

In an Alabama case it was said: "When words are used by the legislature in relation to a matter

Statutes defining and punishing offenses are also to be construed in accordance with the common law in relation to principals and accessaries, responsibility of children, insane persons, etc., and the necessity generally for a criminal intent.182

(f) Change of the Common Law.—It must be remembered, however, that it is competent for the legislature to create new offenses, and to extend the common-law definitions of particular offenses, so as to punish, under common-law names, acts not embraced

or subject, which, when used in reference to the same subject at common law, have obtained a fixed and definite meaning, the inference is irresistible that they were intended to be used in the common-law sense." Ex parte Vincent, 26 Ala. 145, 62 Am. Dec. 714.

182 Duncan v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 148; post, §§ 56, 70.

Statutes punishing any person who should dispose of crops or other property after giving a mortgage thereon have been construed in the light of the common-law principle that the contract of an infant is voidable at his option, and it has been held that an infant's sale of property on which he has given a mortgage, being a disaffirmance and avoidance of the mortgage, does not render him liable under such a statute. State v. Howard, 88 N. C. 650; State v. Plaisted, 43 N. H. 413.

183 Ante, § 14.

in the common-law definitions.183 And it follows that identity in the name of offenses at common law and under a statute does not necessarily imply that the same elements, and no others, enter into both.184 Whether a statutory offense is the same as an offense known to the common law must depend upon the language of the particular statute, and the intention of the legislature.

(g) Prior Judicial Construction.-When the legislature enacts a statute which is substantially the same as one which has already received a judicial construction, it will be presumed to have known that construction, and to have intended to adopt it.185

(h) Construction as a Whole--Giving Effect to All Parts.-In construing a statute, the intention of the legislature is not to be ascertained from any particular expression or section, but from the whole act. It is a cardinal principle that a statute is to be construed as a whole, and effect is to be given, if possible, to every section and clause.186

(i) Construction of Statutes Together.In ascertaining the meaning of a particular

184 People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108.

185 O'Byrnes v. State, 51 Ala. 25; State v. Brewer, 22 La. Ann. 273.

statute, all statutes in pari materia are to be taken into consideration. In other words, all statutes on the same subject, whether enacted on the same day, or on different days of the same session, or at different sessions, are to be taken together as one law.187

Ah Ho, 1 Idaho, 691; People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. Ah Ho, 1 Idaho 691; People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375, 379; People v. Todd, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 446, 451; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 195.

187 Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355, 362; State v. Hope, 15 Ind. 474; State v. Rackley, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 249; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226; Myers v. State, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 98; Howlett v. State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 144, 151; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330.

Statutes in relation to the same offense must be taken together, and construed as if the matters to which they relate were embraced in a single statute. State v. Wilbor, 1 R. I. 199, 36 Am. Dec. 245.

In Indiana, a statute approved June 10, 1852, provided that any person who should be the keeper of "any gaming apparatus," for the purpose of winning or gaining any article of value, should be deemed a professional gambler, and subject to punishment in the penitentiary. Another statute, approved on June 14th, declared that any person who should be the keeper or exhibitor of "any gaming table, roulette, or billiard table," for the purpose of winning any article of value thereon, should be liable to a fine. In State

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(j) Construction in Connection with the Constitution.-Unless a contrary intention clearly appears, it is to be presumed that the legislature intended a statute to be in accordance with constitutional provisions, and statutes, therefore, are to be construed in connection with the constitution, and, if possible, so as to be in accordance therewith. "It is a well-recognized principle that courts will not so construe a statute as to render it unconstitutional, if any other reasonable construction can be placed upon it, which will render it effective and legal."188

(k) Expression of One Thing an Exclusion of Others.-The maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, applies in the construction of penal statutes. Thus, where a statute provided that certain games of chance might be kept on being licensed, and declared that

v. Hope, 15 Ind. 474, it was held that these two statutes must be construed together, and that, as the last-mentioned statute specially prohibited the keeping of a billiard table for gaming, and made it a misdemeanor only, the keeping of such a table was not a felony, within the first-mentioned statute, though it might have been so regarded except for the second statute.

188 People v. Peacock, 98 Ill. 172, 177. And see Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30.