Bastardy Proceedings.-Where a statute subjects the father of a bastard child to proceedings, either in the name of the mother or in the name of the state, merely to charge him with the child's maintenance, and not to punish him by a fine or otherwise, the object is not to punish him as for a crime, but to give redress to the mother, or else to indemnify the county against liability for the support of the child as a pauper, and such a statute does not make the begetting of a bastard child a misdemeanor. The proceeding, even though it may be in the name of the state, is civil, not criminal. 198 If a statute, however, provides for the imposition of a fine in bastardy proceedings, upon a finding of the issue of paternity against the defendant, in addition to the allowance to be made for the use of the mother, and declares that he shall be imprisoned in default of payment, the begetting of a bastard child is thereby made a misdemeanor, and the proceeding is criminal.199

198 State v. Pate, Busb. (N. C.) 244; State v. Burton, 113 N. C. 655; State v. Johnson, 89 Iowa, 1; Hodge v. Sawyer, 85 Me. 285.

199 State v. Burton, 113 N. C. 655; Myers v. Stafford, 114 N. C. 234, 689; State v. Cagle, 114 N. C. 835.

IV. EXPIRATION AND REPEAL OF LAWS.

49. In General.-Laws may be repealed expressly or impliedly. Repeals by implication are not favored, and, as a rule, a law is not to be taken as repealed by a later law unless there is an irreconcilable conflict between them. There is generally an implied repeal, however, 1. When there is an

irreconcilable repug

nancy between the earlier and the later law.

2. When the later law undertakes to cover the whole subject matter covered by the earlier law.

An act cannot be punished after the law making it punishable has been repealed without a saving clause, though it may have been committed, and even though there may have been a conviction therefor, before the repeal.

Unless otherwise provided, the repeal of a repealing law revives the pre-existing law.

50. Implied Repeal of Statutes.

When the legislature intends to repeal a statute, it generally does so in express terms, but this is not always the case. Sometimes, when a statute is enacted on a particular subject, nothing at all is said about existing laws on the same subject, and the question may then arise whether an existing law is impliedly repealed. Repeals by implication are not favored, and the general rule is that an intention to repeal a prior law will never be im

plied if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction of the statutes. If both acts can be given full force without conflict, or if the later act is merely affirmative, or cumulative, or auxiliary, and not inconsistent, the carlier act is not repealed, and both must stand.200

200 Per Champlin, J., in People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 612. And see, to the same effect: Com. v. Wyman, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 237; Flaherty v. Thomas, 12 Allen (Mass) 428; Chamberlain v. State, 50 Ark. 137; State v. Rieger, 59 Minn. 151; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245; Cain v. State, 20 Tex. 355; People v. Platt, 67 Cal. 22.

The rule as to the repeal of a prior by a subsequent statute is well stated in Chamberlain v. State, 50 Ark. 137, by Judge Smith, as follows: "Subsequent laws do not abrogate prior ones unless they are irreconcilably in conflict. The courts have always leaned against implied repeals. A general affirmative statute does not repeal a prior particular statute, or particular provisions of a prior statute, unless negative words are used, or unless there be an invincible repugnancy between the two. The more specific provision controls the general, without regard to their order and dates. The two acts are interpreted as operating together, the specific provisions furnishing exceptions and qualifications to the general rule."

An amendatory statute providing only for the distribution of the penalty for a public offense in a manner different from that directed by the

On the other hand, if the two acts are so inconsistent that they cannot stand together, the earlier act is impliedly repealed.201 And the

original act does not affect the offense defined by the previous act, or work a repeal of the penalty. State v. Wilbor, 1 R. I. 199, 36 Am. Dec. 245.

In People v. Gustin, 57 Mich. 407, the court recognized the rule that repeals by implication are not favored, and held that a statute punishing the keeping of a house of ill fame was not impliedly repealed by a statute relating to "disorderly persons," and providing a different punishment for offenders of that class, among whom were enumerated "keepers of bawdy houses, or houses for the resort of prostitutes."

In Thompson v. State, 60 Ark. 59, it was held that a statute providing that the conversion of unmarked or unbranded cattle, hogs, or sheep over 12 months old, and running at large, should not be larceny, was not impliedly repealed by a subsequent statute providing that every person who should steal any kind of cattle, pigs, hogs, sheep, or goats should be guilty of a felony. The latter, said the court, is a general affirmative statute, without negative words, and its effect was to abolish the distinction as to the subjects enumerated in the act that had existed between grand and petit larceny. There does not seem to be an invincible repugnancy between it and the former act, and therefore both should stand.

201 Shannon v. People, 5 Mich. 71, 84; Flaherty v. Thomas, 12 Allen, 428; Sullivan v. People, 15

same is true when a later act undertakes to cover the whole subject matter of an earlier act.2

202

The reason for holding that a statute is impliedly repealed by a later inconsistent statute is because it is inferred that the legisla

Ill. 233. And see Miller v. State, 33 Miss. 361, 69 Am. Dec. 351; State v. Dolan, 93 Mo. 467; Homer v. Com., 106 Pa. St. 221, 51 Am. Rep. 521; Johns v. State, 78 Ind. 332, 41 Am. Rep. 577.

Thus, there are any number of cases holding that a statute imposing a different punishment for the same offense as is punished by a former statute impliedly repeals it, at least in so far as the punishment is concerned. See Com. v. McDonough, 13 Allen (Mass.) 581; People v. Sponsler, 1 Dak. 289; People v. Tisdale, 57 Cal. 104.

202 "Where a subsequent statute covers the whole ground occupied by an earlier statute, it repeals, by implication, the former statute, though there may be no repugnance." Com. v. Cooley, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 37. And see U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 88; Com. v. Marshall, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 350, 22 Am. Dec. 377, Beale's Cas. 5; Shannon v. People, 5 Mich. 71, 85; People v. Sponsler, 1 Dak. 289; Andrews v. People, 75 Ill. 605.

In U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 88, it was held that a statute which embraced all the provisions of a former statute on the same subject, and also contained new provisions, and which imposed different and additional penalties, operat