58. Criminal Intention Presumed from Act.

It is a general rule that every man of sufficient mental capacity to know what he is doing is presumed to have intended the natural or probable consequences of his voluntary acts. This rule has repeatedly been applied in the criminal law, and to a great variety of cases. If a man voluntarily, and without any mistake as to the facts, does an act which, according to the natural course of events, will probably injure another in a particular way, it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that he intended such consequences.15

Conclusive Presumption.-In many cases a criminal intention will be conclusively presumed from voluntary acts.16

Common Law. Thus, where a man uses

15 Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 173, Beale's Cas. 183; Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, Beale's Cas. 179; Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686; State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am. Rep. 260; State v King, 86 N. C. 603; Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21; State v. White Oak River Corp. 111 N. C. 661.

16 "Where an act, in itself indifferent, if done with a particular intent becomes criminal, the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant, and, in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent." Per Lord

language towards another which is calculated to bring on an affray, and engages in a fight when the other assaults him, he cannot, on a prosecution for an affray, be heard to say that he did not intend to bring about a breach of the peace.1 So, if a person deliberately, and without ignorance of fact, shoots in the direction of another, it will be presumed that he intended to kill him, and he may be convicted of murder, or assault with intent to murder, according to the circumstances.18

Violation of Statutes.-If a statute prohibits an act under certain circumstances, and a person does the act, not under any mistake of fact, a criminal intention is conclusively presumed.19

Mansfield in Rex. v. Woodfall, 5 Burrows 2667. See, also, State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22.

17 State v. King, 86 N. C. 603.

18 Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686; Walker v. State, 8 Ind. 290; State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am. Rep. 260; post, §§ 208, 244.

19 Com. v. Connelly, 163 Mass. 539; State v. McLean, 121 N. C. 589; State v. White Oak River Corp., 111 N. C. 661.

Thus, if a person, in violation of a statute, intentionally opens a grave for the purpose of removing anything interred therein, a criminal intent is conclusively presumed. State v. McLean, supra.

59. Responsibility for Unintended Results.

(a) In General.-To constitute a criminal intent, so as to render a person responsible for the results of his acts, it is not always necessary that he shall have intended the particular results for which he is punished. If his intention was not innocent, he may in many cases be held criminally responsible for results that were clearly not contemplated.

(b) Intention to Commit a Crime.-If a person intends to commit one offense, and by reason of mistake of fact, or for any other reason, commits another, he may in many cases be punished for the latter.20 There is no injustice in this. Thus, a man who shoots and kills a person, thinking he is some one else, is guilty of the murder of the person killed.21 So, it is murder to unintentionally kill another, while engaged in the commission of

And so it is where a carrier discriminates in the transportation of passengers or goods, in direct violation of a statute. State v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 1052.

20 See State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa, 447. And see post, § 71.

21 Reg. v. Smith, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 567; State v. Smith, 2 Strob. (S. C.) 77, 47 Am. Dec. 589, Beale's Cas. 468; Angell v. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. Rep. 380; post, § 241 (b),

some felony.22 And it is manslaughter to unintentionally kill a person in committing an assault and battery.23 Many other illustrations might be given.2

24

(c) Immoral Acts. A criminal intent may also be imputed to a man because of an intention to do an immoral act. Thus, if a person has unlawful intercourse with a woman who is married, he is none the less guilty of adultery because he does not know that she is married.25 And there are many other cases. 26

(d) Consequences not Natural or Probable.-A person is not liable criminally for all possible consequences which may immediately follow his wrongful act, but only for such as are natural and probable. For this reason,

22 Reg. v. Greenwood, 7 Cox, C. C. 404, Beale's Cas. 424; post, § 248.

23 Reg. v. Towers, 12 Cox, C. C. 530, Beale's Cas. 425; post, § 263.

24 See Rex v. Conner, 7 Car. & P. 438; Rex v. Brown, 1 Leach, C. C. 148; Reg. v. Lynch, 1 Cox, C. C. 361; Barcus v. State, 49 Miss. 17, 19 Am. Rep. 3; McGehee v. State, 62 Miss. 772, 52 Am. Rep. 210; Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686; Callahan v. State, 21 Ohio St. 306.

25 Post, § 71 (b).

26 Post, § 71 (b).

where a man struck another with his fist and knocked him down, and a horse then jumped upon him and killed him, it was held that the assailant was not responsible for the death, and could not be convicted of manslaughter.27

(e) Acts Merely Mala Prohibita and Mere Civil Wrongs.-As will be shown in another place, the principle that a man is criminally responsible for results not intended by him, if engaged in an unlawful act, does not apply where the act is merely malum prohibitum, and not otherwise wrong.28 Nor does it apply where the act is a mere civil wrong, and neither a crime nor immoral, as where it is a mere civil trespass upon land or goods.29

60. Willfulness.

The common meaning of the term "willful" is "voluntary; due to one's own will; intentional." 30 An act, to be willful, must be le voluntary. In penal statutes, and in the criminal law generally, the term does not always mean an evil or corrupt intent. Thus, where

27 People v. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503. And see post, § 236.

28 Post, § 71 (c).

29 Post, § 71 (d).

30 Cent. Dict. & Eyc. "Willful."