essential element of murder is implied from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon, without justification or excuse, from the fact that the accused, when he committed the homicide, though it was committed unintentionally, was engaged in resisting a lawful arrest, or in committing some other felony, or from a wanton or reckless act dangerous to life.57 63. Specific Criminal Intent. (a) In General.-In some crimes a spe from the naked fact of the homicide, and 'express' when established by other evidence. That this is the true original meaning of these terms, when used in connection with this crime, is apparent, I think, from the natural import of the words themselves, as well as from their accustomed use in other branches of the law. They are appropriate terms to express different modes of proof, and are habitually used for that purpose, but are not adapted to the description of different degrees of malicious intent. The phrase 'implied malice' is properly applied to a case where the evidence shows that the accused did the act which caused the death, but where there is no other proof going to show the existence or the want of malice. In such cases, the law does not impute a malicious intent, irrespective of its real existence, but it presumes, in accordance with the settled rules of evidence, that such an intent did actually exist." Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120, 136, 137. 57 Post, § 242 et seq. cific intent is an essential ingredient, and no other intent will suffice. On a prosecution for such an offense, the state must affirmatively prove this particular intent, or facts from which it may be inferred.58 Illustrations. Thus, to constitute a burglary, the breaking and entering of the house must be with the specific intent to commit a felony, and this intent must be shown as a fact.59 Arson is the willful and malicious burning of another's house, and requires an intention to burn. The crime is not committed by one who burns another's house unintentionally, though he may at the time be engaged in the commission of some other felony. In larceny and robbery there must be a specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the goods of his property therein. No other intent will do.61 In malicious mis 60 58 Dobb's Case, 2 East, P. C. 513, Beale's Cas. 181; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781; Hairston v. State, 54 Miss. 689, 28 Am. Rep. 392; State v. King, 86 N. C. 603; Coleman v. People, 58 N. Y. 555; Reagan v. State, 28 Tex. App. 227, 19 Am. St. Rep. 833. 59 Dobb's Case, 2 East, P. C. 513, Beale's Cas. 181; Price v. People, 109 Ill. 109; post, § 407. 60 Post, § 415. 61 Post, §§ 326 et seq., 378. chief there must be a willful and malicious injury to the property of another. The of fense is not committed by one who unintentionally injures another's property while attempting to commit some other wrong.62 In every prosecution for an attempt to commit a crime, it must be shown that the accused intended to commit that particular crime. And to sustain an indictment charging an assault with intent to murder, to rape, or to rob, etc., a specific intent to murder, rape, or rob must be shown.64 62 Rex v. Kelly, 1 Craw. & D. 186, Beale's Cas. 182; Com. v. Walden, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 558; post. § 391. 63 Rex v. Davis, 1 Car. & P. 306; Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1; Sharp v. State, 19 Ohio, 379; Reagan v. State, 23 Tex. App. 227, 19 Am. St. Rep. 833; post, § 121. 64 Hairston v. State, 54 Miss. 689, 28 Am. Rep. 392; Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1, 31 Am. Rep. 1; People v. Keefer, 18 Cal. 636; Barcus v. State, 49 Miss. 17, 19 Am. Rep. 1; Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 26 Am. St. Rep. 44; post, § 208. In Rex v. Boyce, 1 Mood. C. C. 29, Beale's Cas. 182, a burglar was indicted under a statute for feloniously cutting and maiming a man, “with intent to murder, maim, and disable" him. The jury found that he struck with a crowbar a watchman in the house into which he had broken, but 148 Start CRIMES (b) May be Inferred from Act.—When a specific intent is necessary, it need not necessarily be shown by direct or positive evidence, but it may be inferred from the circumstances. The principle that a man is presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts applies.65 The inference, however, is one of fact, and may be rebutted. Thus, on a prosecution for burglary, if it be shown that the accused broke into the house, and then committed larceny therein, it may be inferred that he broke and entered with intent to steal.66 And on a prosecution for shooting or beating another with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, or for administering poison with such intent, the specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of the deadly weapon or the administering of the poison.67 On the same principle, an intent to that he did so only with intent to produce a tem- 85 Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 173, Beale's Cas. 183. 66 State v. Squires, 11 N. H. 37; post, § 407 (c). 67 Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 173, Beale's Cas. 103; post, § 208. defraud a particular person will be inferred from a forgery or the utterance of a forged instrument, if such is the necessary effect of the forging or uttering. 64. Motive. 68 It is a clear principle of law that motive does not enter into any crime as an essential ingredient. Neither failure to prove any motive nor proof of a good motive will prevent a conviction. (a) Absence of Motive.-The absence of any motive for a crime, as in the case of homicide, for example, may be considered by the jury as a matter of evidence in determining whether the accused did the act charged, or whether he acted willfully or maliciously; but if it otherwise appear to their satisfaction that he did do the act, and that he did it willfully and without justification or excuse, the fact that no motive is shown is altogether immaterial.69 68 Rex v. Sheppard, Russ. & R. 169, Beale's Cas. 174; post, § 397. 69 State v. Coleman, 20 S. C. 441; State v. Workman, 39 S. C. 151; State v. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564; Johnson v. U. S., 160 U. S. 546; People v. Feigenbaum, 148 N. Y. 636. "Proof of motive is not essential to conviction |