right to do the act with which he is charged.156 The same is true when ignorance or mistake of law is set up as a defense in prosecutions for illegally voting at an election,157 for gaming or keeping a gaming 156 See Medrano v. State, 32 State v. Hughes, 58 Iowa, 165; 29 Hun (N. Y.) 628. Tex. Cr. R. 214; In State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30, Beale's Cas. 309, a man and woman attempted to marry and cohabited while the woman had another husband living. On a prosecution for adultery, it appeared that her husband had married again, and that they were advised by the justice who married them that this gave her a right to marry again, and that they married and cohabited in good faith. It was held that this was no excuse, as they could not set up their ignorance of law. In Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57, which was a prosecution against a negro man for cohabiting with a white woman, in violation of a statute making it an offense for white and colored persons to intermarry or to live together in adultery or fornication, and declaring such marriages void, it was held no defense for the defendant to show that, prior to his attempted marriage with the woman, the probate judge advised him that it was lawful for him to marry her, since ignorance of the law was no excuse. "The maxim, 'ignorantia legis neminem excusat,'' said the court, "is a stern but inflexible and necessary rule of law, that has no exceptions in judicial administration." 157 U. S. v. Anthony, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) 200, house or device, etc.,158 or for obtaining property by means of false and fraudulent representations. 159 74. Reasonable and Unavoidable Ignorance of Law. The presumption that every person knows the law, within the meaning of this rule, is not a rebuttable presumption of fact, but it is a conclusive presumption of law. It can Fed. Cas. No. 14,459; Hamilton v. People, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 625; State v. Boyett, 10 Ired. (N. C.) 336; McGuire v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 54. And see State v. Sheeley, 15 Iowa, 404. The contrary was held under a statute punishing any person who should vote, "knowing himself not to be a qualified voter." Com. v. Bradford, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 268. 158 Thus, a person exhibiting and keeping a gambling device, in violation of a statute, cannot escape liability on the ground that he did so in good faith, believing he had a right to do so under a license, where the license was unauthorized and void. Atkins v. State, 95 Tenn. 474. In a prosecution for keeping and operating a pool room for betting on horse races, in violation of a statute, it is no defense that the accused was ignorant of the law, and believed that a license issued to him by the municipal authorities authorized his illegal act. Debardelaben v. State, 99 Tenn. 649. 159 When a person obtains another's property by making false representations, with intent to make no difference, therefore, in the application of the rule, that the accused was a foreigner, temporarily in the country, and that the act was permitted by the laws of his own country,160 The rule applies in all cases, even though it may clearly appear that the accused could not possibly know the law.161 It applies even though the state may admit his ignorance of the law at the trial.162 75. Mistake of Law Negativing Specific Intent. The rule that mistake of law is no defense does not apply where a specific evil intent is deceive, it is no defense that he did not know that he was violating the statute against false pretenses. Com. v. O'Brien, 172 Mass. 248. 160 See The Barronet's Case, 1 El. & Bl. 1, where a Frenchman fought a duel in England, by the laws of which dueling was unlawful, though it was lawful under the French law; and Rex v. Esop, 7 Car. & P. 456, Beale's Cas. 282, where a person from Bagdad committed an unnatural crime on a ship, at the dock in England, and was convicted, though, by the laws of his own country, it was not considered a crime. 161 See Rex v. Bailey, Russ. & R. 1, Beale's Cas. 280, where the defendant was convicted of a crime under a statute passed after he had sailed from England, the act having been committed on the vessel before its return to England. 162 Jellico Coal Min. Co. v. Com., 96 Ky. 373. an essential element of the offense charged, and proof of the mistake as to the law negatives the existence of such intent. Thus, on a prosecution for larceny or robbery, to constitute which an intent to steal is necessary, the accused may show that he believed in good faith that he had a legal right to the property.1 And on a prosecution for perjury the accused may show that there was no corrupt intent because he swore in good faith after seeking the advice of counsel.164 The same principle has been applied under a statute against "maliciously" setting fire to any furze or fern.165 163 IV. JUSTIFICATION. 76. In General.-There are some circumstances under which an act which would otherwise be a crime is justifiable. In such a case no crime at all is committed. The grounds which have been relied upon as constituting justification, and which may or may not justify, according to the circumstances, are: 163 Rex v. Hall, 3 Car. & P. 409, Beale's Cas. 281; post, §§ 327, 378. 164 U. S. v. Stanley, 6 McLean (U. S.) 409, Fed. Cas. No. 16,376; U. S. v. Conner, 3 McLean (U. S.) 573, Fed. Cas. No. 14,847; State v. McKinney, 42 Iowa, 205; post, § 431(d). 165 Reg. v. Towse, 14 Cox, C. C. 327, Beale's Cas. 1. Public authority. 2. Domestic authority. 3. Prevention of offenses. 4. Defense of one's person or property. 5. Defense of other persons. 6. Necessity. 7. Compulsion or command. 77. Public Authority. (a) In General.-It may be laid down as an undoubted principle that a person who does an act under valid public sanction or authority, and without exceeding or abusing such authority, is guilty of no crime, though the same act would be a crime if committed without such authority.166 Some of the plainest cases are the execution of a criminal by the proper officer in a proper manner under a valid conviction and sentence for a capital offense; 167 authorized arrest and imprisonment of criminals or persons accused of crime; 168 killing of a person necessarily in order to arrest for a felony or 166 See Reg. v. Lesley, Bell, C. C. 220, 8 Cox, C. C. 269, Beale's Cas. 311; State v. Mayor, etc., of Knoxville, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 146, Beale's Cas. 313. 167 Foster C. L. 267; Beale's Cas. 311; post, § 267. 168 See Reg. v. Lesley, supra. And see post, § 211. |