318

reduce a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter is not altogether clear.3 The weight of authority is in favor of the rule that, if the homicide was committed after such provocation as the law deems adequate to reduce a killing under the influence of passion and heat of blood caused thereby to manslaughter, evidence that the accused was drunk at the time of the homicide may be admitted and considered in determining whether the killing was in the heat of blood caused by the provocation, or whether it was with. malice.319 But it must be regarded as settled that the mere fact of drunkenness will not reduce to manslaughter a homicide committed on inadequate provocation, or on adequate provocation after the lapse of a reason able time for the blood to cool. In other words, if the provocation would not reduce a homicide by a sober man from murder to

318 As to what constitutes voluntary manslaughter, see post, § 255, et seq.

319 Rex v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 817; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484, Beale's Cas. 264. See, also, McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514; Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118; Malone v. State, 49 Ga. 210; Shannahan v. Com., 8 Bush (Ky.) 463, 8 Am. Rep. 465. And see Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, C. C. 144, Beale's Cas. 261.

manslaughter, it will not so reduce a homicide by a drunken man.

320

IX. RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS.

109. In General.-A corporation is liable to indictment:

1. For nonfeasance.

2. By the weight of authority, for misfeasance, if the offense does not involve the ele ment of personal violence or the element of malice or actual criminal intent.

3. But it seems that it is not indictable for an offense of which malice or an

actual

criminal intent is an essential element.

4. It is not indictable for felony.

110. Nonfeasance.

In view of the fact that a corporation is, in

320 Rex v. Carroll, 7 Car. & P. 145; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484, Beale's Cas. 264; Shannahan v. Com., 8 Bush (Ky.) 463, 8 Am. Rep. 465; Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray (Mass.) 463; Keenan v. Com., 44 Pa. St. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 414; Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232; McIntyre v. People, 38 Ill. 514; Rafferty v. People, 66 Ill. 118; State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483.

"The

In Shannahan v. Com., supra, it was said: proper rule is that one in a state of voluntary intoxication is subject to the same rule of conduct, and to the same rules and principles of law, that a sober man is; and that, where a provocation is offered, and the one offering it is killed, if it mitigates the offense of the man drunk, it should also mitigate the offense of the man sober."

the language of Chief Justice Marshall, “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law," it was at one tme doubted whether a corporation could be guilty of any crime. Lord Holt is reported as having said that " a corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it are."321 This, however, is not now the law. A corporation cannot be imprisoned, but it may be deprived of its charter, or it may be fined; and it is now well settled that it may be indicted and fined for offenses consisting in mere nonfeasance, as for failure to repair a public road or a bridge, or to perform other duties imposed upon it by law.322

321 Anon., 21 Mod. 559.

322 Reg. v. Birmingham & G. R. Co., 3 Q. B. 223, 9 Car. & P. 469; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 13 Bush (Ky.) 388, 26 Am. Rep. 205; State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268, 43 Am. Rep. 586; State v. Godwinsville, etc., Road Co., 49 N. J. Law, 266, 60 Am. Rep. 611; Susquehanna & B. Turnpike Road Co. v. People, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 267; People v. Albany Corp., 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 539, 27 Am. Dec. 95; Delaware Division Canal Co. v. Com., 60 Pa. St. 367, 100 Am. Dec. 570; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. State, 3 Head (Tenn.) 523, 75 Am. Dec. 778. State v. Monongahela

River R. Co., 37 W. Va. 108; Com. v. Central

111. Misfeasance.

In several of the earlier cases a distinction was made, with respect to the criminal responsibility of corporations, between nonfeasance and misfeasance, and, while it was conceded.

Bridge Corp., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 242. And see 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d. Ed.) 841, 842.

It was said by Bigelow, J., in Com. v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray (Mass.) 339, Beale's Cas. 277: Corporations cannot be indicted for offenses which derive their criminality from evil intention, or which consist in a violation of those social duties which appertain to men and subjects. They cannot be guilty of treason or felony, of perjury, or offenses against the person. But beyond this there is no good reason for their exemption from the consequences of unlawful and wrongful acts committed by their agents in pursuance of authority derived from them. Such a rule would, in many cases, preclude all adequate remedy, and render reparation for an injury committed by a corporation impossible, because it would leave the only means of redress to be sought against irresponsible servants, instead of against those who truly committed the wrongful act by commanding it to be done. There is no principle of law which would thus furnish immunity to a corporation. If they commit a trespass on private property, or obstruct a way, to the special injury and damage of an individual, no one can doubt their liability therefor. In like manner, and for the same reason, if they do similar acts,

that an indictment would lie for nonfeasance, it was held that it would not lie for misfeasance, as for a nuisance in erecting a dam across a navigable river,323 or in obstructing

to the inconvenience and annoyance of the public, they are responsible in the form and mode appropriate to the prosecution and punishment of such offenses."

Thus, in Susquehanna & B. Turnpike Road Co. v. People, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 267, it was held that a turnpike-road company was liable to indictment at common law for suffering its road to be out of repair.

And in Com. v. Central Bridge Corp., 12 Cush. (Mass.) 242, it was held that a provision in the charter of a toll-bridge corporation, that the bridge should "at all times be kept in good, safe, and passable repair," required the company to light the bridge, if necessary to make it safe and convenient for passage at night, and that an indictment would lie for failure to do so.

And in Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Com., 13 Bush (Ky.) 388, 26 Am. Rep. 205, it was held that it was the duty of a railroad company to cause signals to be given, where the safety of travelers on intersecting roads demanded that a warning should be given of approaching trains, and that an habitual failure to give such signals or warnings was an indictable nuisance.

323 State v. Great Works Milling, etc., Co., 20 Me. 41, 37 Am. Dec. 38. Contra, State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268, 43 Am. Rep. 586.