Massachusetts and some of the other states it

Lafferty, Tappan (Ohio) 113; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17, 76 Am. Dec. 780; Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, 16 Am. Rep. 569, Beale's Cas. 128; State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 360; Pierson v. State, 12 Ala. 149; Porter v. State, Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.) 226; Fields v. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 156; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 356; State v. Twogood, 7 Iowa, 252; State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 317, 333, 9 Am. Dec. 534.

In Com. v. Chapman, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 68, 69, Chief Justice Shaw said: "To a very great extent, the unwritten law constitutes the basis of our jurisprudence, and furnishes the rules by which public and private rights are established and secured, the social relations of all persons regulated, their rights, duties, and obligations determined, and all violations of duty redressed and punished. Without its aid, the written law, embracing the constitution and statute laws, would constitute but a lame, partial, and impracticable system. Even in many cases where statutes have been made in respect to particular subjects, they could not be carried into effect, and must remain a dead letter, without the aid of the common law. In cases of murder and manslaughter, the statute declares the punishment; but what acts shall constitute murder, what manslaughter, or what justifiable or excusable homicide, are left to be decided by the rules and principles of the common law. So, if an act is made criminal, but no mode of prosecution is directed, or no punishment provided, the common law furnishes its ready aid, prescribing the mode of

was expressly recognized and adopted by the constitution or by statute.11

Our English ancestors also brought with them such of the English statutes as had been enacted and were in force at the time of their emigration, and were applicable to their new condition, and these also became a part of their common law, without being re-enacted.12 Other English statutes, enacted after their emigration, and before the Revolution, in amendment or modification' of the commou law, were adopted in the colonies by general

prosecution by indictment, the common-law punishment of fine and imprisonment. Indeed, it seems to be too obvious to require argument, that without the common law, our legislation and jurisprudence would be impotent, and wholly deficient in completeness and symmetry, as a system of municipal law."

11 See Com. v. Chapman, 13 Metc. (Mass.) 68; Com. v. Churchill, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 118, Beale's Cas. 6; Com. v. York, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 93, 110; Stuart v. People, 4 Ill. 395, 404; State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 360.

12 Com. v. Chapman, supra; Com. v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, Beale's Cas. 1; State v. Moore, 26 N. H. 448, 455, 59 Am. Dec. 354; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550, 559.

consent, and thus became a part of their common law. 13

In addition to these sources of our common law, some usages growing out of the peculiar situation and exigencies of the colonists were adopted by general consent.14

No part of the common law of England was adopted or is in force in this country that is inapplicable to our state and condition; and as the condition of the people may vary in the different states, what is recognized as common law in one state may not be so recognized in another.15

Louisiana and Texas, having been settled respectively by the French and Spanish, were originally subject to the civil law, but the common law as to crimes and criminal prose

13 Com. v. Chapman, supra; Com. v. Knowlton, supra.

Generally, however, statutes passed in England after emigration did not become a part of our common law. Com. v. Lodge, 2 Grat. (Va.) 580.

14 Com. v. Chapman, supra; Com. v. Knowlton, supra.

15 People v. Randolph, 2 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 174; Williams v. State, 14 Ohio, 222 45 Am. Dec. 536; Stuart v. People, 4 Ill. 395, 404; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 356.

cutions has been adopted by statute in both states to some extent.1 16

(b) Offenses against the United States.-The federal courts cannot exercise common

16 See State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. (La.) 545, 41 Am. Dec. 301; Grinder v. State, 2 Tex. 339.

In Louisiana, the act of 1805, for the punishment of crimes, defined many offenses, but, in the case of a number of the more familiar crimes, such as murder, rape, robbery, etc., simply described them by name, without further definition; and section 33 of the act provided that the crimes "herein before named" should be "taken, intended, and construed according to the common law of England." The present statute leaves out the words first quoted, and declares: "All crimes, offenses, and misdemeanors shall be taken, intended, and construed according to and in conformity with the common law of England," etc. It has been held that this does not adopt the common law, so as to punish in Louisiana all the crimes known to the common law, but merely adopted the common-law definitions of those offenses declared to be crimes by the act of 1805. State v. Smith, 30 La. Ann. 846; State v. Depass, 31 La. Ann. 487; State v. Gaster, 45 La. Ann. 636. Except to this extent, there can be no crime in Louisiana which is not defined and denounced by statute. Except as to the crimes denounced by name in the act of 1805, and which are to be taken according to the common-law definitions, the legislature must define crimes. State v. Gaster. 45 La. Ann. 636.

law jurisdiction in criminal cases. Under the constitution of the United States, they can exercise such power only as is conferred upon them by congress. Therefore, before any act can be punished as a crime against the United States, congress must make it a crime, affix a punishment, and declare the court which shall have jurisdiction of the offense.17 Congress has passed statutes making many acts crimes, and conferring jurisdiction of them upon the federal courts. In many instances it has merely designated the offenses by their common-law name, as "murder," "manslaughter," "robbery," etc. In such cases we must look to the common law for the definition of the offense.18 The offense, however, is purely a statutory one.

(c) Offenses in the District of Columbia. ---The common law of Maryland, as it existed at the time the territory embraced in the Dis

17 This was settled in 1812 in U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (U. S.) 32, Beale's Cas. 3; and it was held in that case that for this reason the circuit court of the United States for the district of Connecticut could not take jurisdiction of an indictment for a libel on the president and congress. See, also, U. S. v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677.

18 In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104: U. S. v. Coppersmith, 4 Fed. 198.