and securing evidence, provided the device is not a temptation and solicitation to commit it.214 The crime of bribery furnishes a good illustration of this distinction. If a public officer solicits a bribe of his own accord, the fact that a trap is laid and the bribe paid in the presence of concealed witnesses does not render him any the less guilty, nor is such an entrapment contrary to public policy.215 But if a public officer, without previous solicitation on his part, is induced to accept a bribe by the active efforts and instigation of persons who wish to prosecute him, with the cooperation of the public authorities, he should La. Ann. 977. And see O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App. 665, 7 Tex. App. 181. 213 As was said by Judge Marston in a Michigan case: "Human nature is frail enough at best, and requires no encouragement in wrongdoing. If we cannot assist another, and prevent him from committing crime, we should at least abstain from any active efforts in the way of leading him into temptation." Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 222. See, also, Connor v. People, 18 Colo. 373, 36 Am. St. Rep. 295; State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, 24 Am. St. Rep. 360. 214 Ante, § 160. 215 State v. Dudoussat, 47 La. Ann. 977; People v. Liphardt, 105 Mich. 80. not be indicted or punished.216 It must be conceded that this view is not supported by the weight of actual decision,217 but the tendency of the courts is in its favor. As far as actual authority goes, it is no doubt safe to say that the fact that a private person has led another into the commission of 216 In State v. Dudoussat, supra, it was said that, on such a state of facts, the accused would be entitled to an acquittal. And in a Texas case it was held that a person who gave an officer money to influence his conduct was not guilty of bribery, under the Texas statute, where the officer first approached him for the purpose of entrapment, and expressed a willingness to accept a bribe, and thereby instigated the giving of it. O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App. 665, 7 Tex. App. 181. But see, as contra, People v. Liphardt, supra. 217 People v. Liphardt, supra (but compare Saunders v. People, 38 Mich, 218); Pigg v. State, 43 Tex. 108; People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200; State v. Jansen, 22 Kan. 498. In City of Evanston v. Myers, 172 Ill. 266, it was held that a person charged with selling intoxicating liquors in violation of law could not escape liability by showing that the public authorities furnished the purchaser with money to buy the liquor. a crime is no defense if the public authorities were not concerned in it.218 218 People v. Murphy, 93 Mich. 41; People v. Curtis, 95 Mich. 212; Pigg v. State, 43 Tex. 108; Johnson v. State, 3 Tex. App. 590. And see the cases cited ante, § 160. An indictment for disposing of forged bank notes will lie, notwithstanding the person to whom they were uttered was the agent of the bank, and applied to purchase them for the purpose of detection and prosecution. Rex v. Holden, Russ. & R. 154. CHAPTER V. PARTIES IN CRIME. I. IN GENERAL, ?? 163-165. II. III. V. PRINCIPALS IN THE FIRST DEGREE, 166-169. PRINCIPALS IN THE SECOND DEGREE, IV. ACCESSARIES BEFORE THE FACT, ? 176-180. VI. VII. VIII. PERSONS WHO MAY BE AIDERS AND ABET- COUNTERMAND OR WITHDRAWAL, 192. IX. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, AND MASTER AND SERVANT, 193-196. I. IN GENERAL. 163. Classification of Parties.-The parties to a felony are guilty either (1) as principals or (2) as accessaries. The distinction is not recognized in treason or in misdemeanors, but all who take part in such crimes, if punishable at all, are punishable as principals. Principals and accessaries are either 1. Principals in the first degree, those who actually commit the deed. 2. Principals in the second degree,-those who are present, actually or constructively, aiding or abetting the commission of the deed. 3. Accessaries before the fact,-those who procure, counsel, or command the deed, but who are absent when it is committed. 4. Accessaries after the fact,-those who receive, comfort, or assist another, knowing that he has committed a felony. 164. Offenses in Which These Distinctions are Recognized. (a) In General.—The distinction between principals in the first and second degree is necessarily recognized in all offenses, whether they be treason, felony, or misdemeanors. But it is in felonies only, as murder, rape, robbery, larceny, etc., that any distinction is made between principals and accessaries. All concerned are guilty and punishable as principals, if guilty at all, whether present or absent, in treason,1 and in misdemeanors, as in assaults and assault and battery, gaming, forgery and cheating at common law, keeping a gaming house or bawdy house, and other nuisances, betting at elections, etc.2 Hawk. 13 Inst. 138; 1 Hale, P. C. 612, 613; P. C. c. 29, § 2; 4 Bl. Comm. 35; Reg. v. Clayton, 1 Car. & K. 128, Beale's Cas. 388. 22 Hawk. P. C. c. 29, § 2; 4 Bl. Comm. 36; 1 Hale, P. C. 613; Reg. v. Clayton, 1 Car. & K. 128, Beale's Cas. 388; Stevens v. People, 67 Ill. 587; Hawkins v. State, 13 Ga. 322, 58 Am. Dec. 517; State v. Lymburn, 1 Brev. (S. C.) 397, 2 Am. Dec. |