cipal in the first degree, and not merely as a principal in the second degree or accessary before the fact, if he procures the commission of an offense by an innocent human agent, as by a person who is not guilty because of ignorance of fact, youth, or insanity.30 Thus, one who causes an innocent person to take poison, or to give poison to another, and thereby causes death, is as much the principal in the first degree in the murder as if the poison had been administered by his own hand.31 30 4 Bl. Comm. 35; 1 Hale, P. C. 617; Reg. v. Bannen, 2 Mood. C. C. 309, Beale's Cas. 379; People v. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 190, 45 Am. Dec. 468; Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173; Com. v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136; People v. McMurray, 4 Park Cr. R. (N. Y.) 234; Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 107, 130. And see Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511. Larceny or receiving stolen goods by means of innocent agent. People v. McMurray, supra. Obtaining money or property by false pretenses. Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173. In this case, a man in Ohio sent a letter to a person in New York, and had it presented there by an innocent agent, and thus obtained money by false pretenses. It was held that he was guilty as principal in New York, and not merely as principal or accessary in Ohio. 31 Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 81 a, Beale's Cas. 209; Mem., J. Kelyng, 52, Beale's Cas. 377. The same is true of one who delivers counterfeit money or a forged instrument to a child of tender years, or to an innocent adult, with instructions to utter the same, which is done,32 and of one who procures an innocent person to sign another's name to a note by falsely representing that the person whose name is signed has authorized it.33 This cannot be the case, however, if the person by In Reg. V. Michael, 9 Car. & P. 356, 2 Mood. C. C. 120, a woman was indicted for the murder of her infant child by poison. It appeared that she purchased a bottle of laudanum, and directed the person who had the care of the child to give it a teaspoonful every night. That person did not do so, but put the bottle on the mantel piece, where another little child found it, and gave part of the contents to the prisoner's child, who soon after died. It was held that the administering of the laudanum by the child was, under all the circumstances of the case, as much, in point of law, an administering by the prisoner, as if she had herself actually administered it with her own hand. See, also, Rex v. Harley, 4 Car. & P. 369. 32 Com. v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136; Rex v. Palmer, 2 Leach, C. C. 978; Gregory v. State, 26 Ohio St. 510, 20 Am. Rep. 774. 33 Reg. v. Clifford, 2 Car. & K. 202; Gregory v. State, 26 Ohio St. 510, 20 Am. Rep. 774. whose hand the deed is done is himself a guilty agent. 34 | 169. Several Persons Committing Offense. When several persons combine to commit an offense, and each actually performs some act constituting a part of the offense, all are guilty as principals, though neither may be present when the others perform their part. Thus, if several persons combine to forge an instrument, and each executes by himself a distinct part of the forgery, in pursuance of the common plan, they are all guilty of the forgery as principals, though they may not be together when the forgery is completed by one of them adding the signature." 35 III. PRINCIPALS IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 170. Definition.—A principal in the second de gree is one who is present when a felony is committed by another, and who aids or abets in its commission.36 To constitute one a principal in the second degree 1. There must be a guilty principal in the first degree. 34 Mem., J. Kelyng, 52, Beale's Cas. 377; Wixson v. People, 5 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 119; People v. Lyon, 99 N. Y. 210; People v. McMurray, 4 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 234; Rex v. Soares, Russ & R. 25. 35 Rex v. Bingley, Russ. & R. 446, Beale's Cas 381. See Hammack v. State, 52 Ga. 397. 2. The principal in the second degree must be 171. Guilty Principal in the First Degree. There cannot be a principal in the second degree unless there is a guilty principal in the first degree. As we have seen, one who procures the commission of a crime by an innocent agent is himself guilty as the principal. in the first degree.37 On the trial of a person indicted as a principal in the second degree, it is necessary to show the guilt of the principal in the first degree.38 172. Presence When the Offense is Committed. Presence, actual or constructive, at the time the offense is committed, is necessary to render one a principal in the second degree. If a person procures or counsels the commission of a crime by another, and is absent when it 36 4 Bl. Comm. 34; 1 Hale, P. C. 615. See State v. Brown, 104 Mo. 365. 37 Ante, § 168. 38 Jones v. State, 64 Ga. 697; Mulligan v. Com., 84 Ky. 229. is committed, he is merely an accessary, 39 and at common law he cannot be convicted under an indictment charging him as a principal. Thus, where a servant let a person into his master's house on an afternoon, and concealed him there all night, in order that he might commit a larceny in the house, but left the house early the next morning, and was absent when the larceny was committed, it was held that he was not a principal in the second degree, but an accessary before the fact.40 173. Constructive Presence. It is not necessary, however, in order to charge one as a principal in the second degree, as distinguished from an accessary before the fact, that there shall be a strict, actual, and immediate presence at the time and place of the commission of the offense. Nor is it necessary that he shall be an eye or ear witness of the criminal act. A person is con 39 Reg. v. Tuckwell, Car. & M. 215; Rex v. Stewart, Russ. & R. 363; Norton v. People, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 137; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 496, 516, 20 Am. Dec. 491, 503, Beale's Cas. 383; Smith v. State, 37 Ark. 274; Able v. Com., 5 Bush (Ky.) 698. 40 Reg. v. Tuckwell, Car. & M. 215. Compare Rex v. Jordan, 7 Car. & P. 432. |