the statutes, every confinement of a person is an imprisonment, whether, as was said by Blackstone, it be in the common prison, or in a private house, or in the stocks, or by forcibly detaining one in the public streets.146 Usually a false imprisonment includes an assault or assault and battery, but this is not necessarily the case. There may be an imprisonment by words alone, as where an officer tells a person that he is under arrest, and the person submits;147 but words alone are not sufficient to constitute an assault and battery, or even an assault.148 To constitute a false imprisonment, the means of detention are not material. There need be no actual force, nor even a touching of the person. As stated above, if an officer tells a person that he arrests him, and the person submits, there is a detention, and, if the arrest is unlawful, a false imprisonment.149 When there is no actual force, the party must

146 3 Bl. Comm. 127; 2 Inst. 589; State v. Lunsford, 81 N. C. 528; People v. Wheeler, 73 Cal. 252. 147 Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 493; Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212; note 149, infra.

148 Ante, § 198.

149 Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 493; Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing. N. C. 212; Smith v. State, 7 Humph.

reasonably apprehend force in case he does not submit.150 And he must submit.151 It is also necessary that the officer or other person shall intend a detention or restraint, and that the other party shall so understand.152 There can be no imprisonment unless it is against the will of the party imprisoned.153

The place of imprisonment is not material. As was stated above, it may be in a prison, or in a private house. Or it may be by merely detaining a person against his will in the street, or in a field, or in any other place whatever. 154

226. Unlawfulness of Detention.

To constitute a false imprisonment, the detention must be unlawful. In other words, it must be without sufficient lawful author

(Tenn.) 43. And see State v. Lunsford, 81 N. C. 528; Jones v. State, 8 Tex. App. 365.

150 Smith v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 43; McClure v. State, 26 Tex. App. 102.

151 Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383; Hill v. Taylor, 50 Mich. 549.

152 Limbeck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 663. 153 Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43, 54 Am. Dec. 250; State v. Lunsford, 81 N. C. 528.

154 3 Bl. Comm. 127; People v. Wheeler, 73 Cal. 252; Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43, 54 Am. Dec. 250.

ity.155

There is no false

false imprisonment

where an officer or private individual makes. a lawful arrest, or where a jailer detains a prisoner lawfully committed to his custody. If, however, an arrest is made without a warrant when a warrant is necessary, the arrest and detention are unlawful, and constitute a false imprisonment.156 The same is true if a warrant or commitment is void on its face, either because it was issued by a person having no authority, or because it is not in the form required by law, for a warrant or commitment that is void on its face is no protection.157 False imprisonment may also arise by executing a lawful warrant or process at an unlawful time, as on Sunday, when a statute prohibits its execution on that day, 158

A parent or teacher, or one in loco parentis, is not guilty of false imprisonment in re

155 3 Bl. Comm. 127; Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43, 54 Am. Dec. 250; Sewell v. State, 61 Ga. 496; Barber v. State, 13 Fla. 675; Cargill v. State, 8 Tex. App. 431; Beville v. State, 16 Tex. App. 70. 156 State v. Hunter, 106 N. C. 796.

157 Winchester v. Everett, 80 Me. 535, 6 Am. St. Rep. 228.

158 3 Bl. Comm. 127.

straining his child or pupil, if the restraint is not clearly unreasonable and immoderate,159 but it may be so clearly immoderate and cruel as to render him guilty.160

Abuse of authority, or of process that is valid, may render an officer guilty of a false imprisonment, as where he detains the person arrested for an unreasonable time before presenting him for examination or trial as required by law, 161 or wrongfully refuses to take bail, or to allow the prisoner to obtain his release on bail,162 or unlawfully detains a prisoner after he has become entitled to be discharged.163

227. Intent-Malice.

All persons are chargeable with a knowledge of the law, and, if a person unlawfully arrests or detains another with full knowl

159 Johnson v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 283; Com. v. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36.

160 Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395; Com. v. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36.

161 Anderson v. Beck, 64 Miss. 113; Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 39 Am. St. Rep. 408.

162 Manning v. Mitchell, 73 Ga. 660. Compare Cargill v. State, 8 Tex. App. 431.

163 Bath v. Metcalf, 145 Mass. 274, 1 Am. St. Rep.

edge of the facts, he is guilty of a false imprisonment, without regard to his motive. He must, of course, intend a detention, but his motive is entirely immaterial. Malice is not at all essential. Thus, a police officer or jailer is indictable for false imprisonment if he arrests or detains another under a warrant or commitment that is void on its face, though he may act in good faith, and in the belief that it is valid.16.

IV. KIDNAPPING.

228. Definition.—Kidnapping, at common law, is the forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or child from their own country, and sending them into another.165 Statutory definitions are somewhat different.

229. Nature of the Offense.

Both by the Jewish law and by the civil law, kidnapping was punished by death, but by the English common law it was merely a misdemeanor punishable by fine, imprisonment, and pillory.166 The offense is very generally punished by statute in this country, but it is not necessary under the statutes that the person kidnapped shall be taken into an

164 See 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 726. 165 4 Bl. Comm. 219.

166 4 Bl. Comm. 219.