(d) Compelling One to Kill Himself.What has just been said shows that a man does not escape responsibility for a homicide because it was immediately caused by the act of the deceased himself, if that act was caused by him. And this is true in many other cases. If a man, for instance, sets poison or a spring gun for another, he is responsible if the other innocently takes the poison or discharges the gun, and is thereby killed.21 And if men board a railroad train, draw deadly weapons on a passenger, rob him,

Cas. 430, the defendant and his wife had a fight, and on his starting for his knife, and threatening to cut her throat, she fled from the house. The next morning she was found frozen to death in the snow. After the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, it was held, on appeal, that the court properly instructed the jury to convict "if they believed that the accused used such force and violence as to cause the deceased to leave the house from fear of death or great bodily harm;" but that, as it appeared that the husband was a cripple, and the wife, from temper and physique, was well able to contend with him, it was error to refuse to submit to the jury the question whether such fear was well-grounded and reasonable. See, also, State v. Preslar, 3 Jones Law (N. C.) 421.

215 Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 81 a, Plowd. 575, Beale's

and by threats cause him to jump from the train while it is in motion, and he is thereby killed, they are guilty of murder.216 If a person puts poison in a glass of medicine with intent to cause another's death, and another innocently takes it and dies, he is none the less responsible because the deceased stirred the mixture and thereby made it deadly, and because it would not have caused death without the stirring.217

(e) Killing by an Innocent Third Person. -We have seen in a previous chapter that a man may commit a homicide himself through the agency of an innocent third person, as by giving poison to a child, or to an adult who is ignorant of its character, with directions that the latter shall give it to another.218

236. Casual Connection between the Act or Omission of the Accused and the Death-In General.

A man is not responsible for the death of

Cas. 209; Reg. v. Michael, 9 Car. & P. 356; Reg. v. Chamberlain, 10 Cox, C. C. 486, Beale's Cas. 187; Harvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516.

216 Adams v. People, 109 Ill. 444, 50 Am. Rep. 617.

217 Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 81 a, Beale's Cas. 209. 218 Ante, § 168.

another, unless it was caused by his own act or omission, or by the act or omission of some other person for which he is responsible under the rules stated in the chapter relating to principals and accessaries.2 If his unlawful act or omission was merely a condition, and not a cause of the death, he is not responsible.220

219

In a Massachusetts case it was sought to hold one of a party of rioters responsible for the death of a bystander who was shot by a soldier engaged in suppressing the riot, on the ground that it was a result of the unlawful act the riot-in which he was engaged. The court held that he was not responsible, as the death was not caused by his act, nor by the act of any of the persons with whom he was acting in concert. The riot was a condition, and not a cause of the death.221 And in a Michigan case, where a man was trampled and killed by a horse, after he had

219 Ante, § 163 et seq.

220 Reg. v. Pocock, 5 Cox, C. C. 172, Beale's Cas. 423; Rex v. Waters, 6 Car. & P. 328; Com. v. Campbell, 7 Allen (Mass.) 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705; People v. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503; Reg. v. Towers, 12 Cox, C. C. 530, Beale's Cas. 425.

221 Com. v. Campbell, supra.

been knocked down by the accused, and the accused was charged with manslaughter on the ground that his unlawful act was the cause of the death, it was held that the trampling by the horse was not a natural consequence of the act of the accused, and that he was not responsible.222

Omission to Act. The same principle applies where a man is charged with manslaughter because of omission to act. There must have been a personal duty, the neglect of which has directly caused death. Thus, it has been held that the trustees of a highway, who fail to have the highway repaired, are not for that reason guilty of the manslaughter of a traveler who is killed by reason of the want of repair. "In all the cases of indictment for manslaughter," said Erle, J.," where the death has been occasioned by omission to discharge a duty, it will be found that the duty was one connected with life, so that the ordinary consequence of neglecting it would be death."223

222 People v. Rockwell, supra.

223 Reg. v. Pocock, 5 Cox, C. C. 172, Beale's Cas. 423.

237. Contributing Causes.

(a) In General.-It is not necessary that the act or omission of the accused shall have been the sole cause of the death. If the unlawful act or omission of a person is a proximate cause of another's death, and not merely a condition, he is not relieved from responsibility by reason of the fact that other causes contributed.22- But if the death resulted solely from some independent cause, and not from his act or omission, he is not responsible; and it can make no difference that it would have resulted from his act or omis sion, if the independent cause had not intervened.225 These principles have been applied in a variety of cases. For convenience in treatment, they may be classified as cases in which the contributing or intervening cause was (1) the state or condition of the deceased at the time of the injury; (2) the conduct of

224 Rex v. Martin, 5 Car. & P. 130; Reg. v. Holland, 2 Mood. & R. 351, Beale's Cas. 164; Reg. v. Plummer, 1 Car. & K. 600; Reg. v. Swindall, 2 Car. & K. 230, Beale's Cas. 167; Reg. v. Haines, 2 Car. & K. 368, Beale's Cas. 170; Com. v. Fox, 7 Gray (Mass.) 586; Burnett v. State, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 439.

225 Livingston v, Com., 14 Grat. (Va.) 592,