From such conduct the law implies malice.252

241. Actual Intent to Kill.

(a) In General.-Whenever an accountable man kills another intentionally, he is guilty of murder with express malice unless the killing is justifiable or excusable,253 or unless there are such circumstances of provocation as will reduce the homicide to manslaughter.254 And if a man voluntarily and willfully does an act, the natural and probable consequence of which is to cause another's death, an intent to kill will be presumed.255

(b) Killing a Person not Intended.The same is true if a man kills one person when he intends to kill another. If a man shoots at one person with intent to kill him,

252 See Hadley v. State, 55 Ala. 31, Beale's Cas. 468. See, also, ante, § 62, and notes thereto. 253 Post, § 266 et seq.

254 Post, 256 et seq.

255 No principle is better settled in the criminal law than the principle that "a person must be presumed to intend to do that which he voluntarily and willfully does in fact do, and that he must intend all the natural, probable, and usual consequences of his own acts." Per Chief Justice Shaw in Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711. See ante, § 58; post, § 244.

and unintentionally kills another, or sets poison for one person and another drinks it and dies, it is murder with express malice of the person killed, even though he be a friend.256 The intention need not even be to kill any particular person. It is murder to willfully shoot into a crowd, or to do any other dangerous act, with a general intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.257

256 1 Hale, P. C. 466; Gore's Case, 9 Coke, 81 a, Beale's Cas. 209; Rex v. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627; Saunders' Case, 2 Plowd. 473; Golliher v. Com., 2 Duv. (Ky.) 163, 87 Am. Dec. 493; State v. Smith, 2 Strob. (S. C.) 77, 47 Am. Dec. 589, Beale's Cas. 468; State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98; Angell v. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. Rep. 380; Johnson v. State, 92 Ga. 36; Durham v. State, 70 Ga. 264; State v. Montgomery, 91 Mo. 52; Wareham v. State, 25 Ohio St. 601. See, also, Reg. v. Latimer, 16 Cox, C. C. 70, Beale's Cas. 217.

If two persons engage in a duel, and one accidentally kills a bystander, he is guilty of the murder of the bystander. State v. Raymond, 11 Nev. 98.

If a person attempts to poison one person, and unintentionally poisons and kills another, he is guilty of the murder of the latter. Saunders' Case, 2 Plowd. 474; State v. Fulkerson, Phil. (N. C.) 233.

257 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 29, § 12; 1 Hale, P. C. 275; Reg. v. Fretwell, Leigh & C. 443, 9 Cox, C. C.

242. Absence of Actual Intent to Kill-In General.

One may be guilty of murder at common law, though there may have been no actual intent to kill. Whether or not the offense is murder depends upon the nature and extent of the injury or wrong actually intended. It has been said that there are really only four cases in which an unintentional killing will constitute murder,-only four cases, that is, in which the law will imply malice where there was no actual intent to cause death. These are: (1) Cases in which there was an intent to inflict great bodily harm; (2) cases in which, conceding that there was no actual intent to injure, an act was done or duty omitted willfully, and without justification or excuse, the natural tendency of which was to cause death or great bodily harm; (3) cases in which the death was caused while engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, some other felony; and (4) cases in which the death was caused

471; Golliher v. Com., 2 Duv. (Ky.) 163, 87 Am. Dec. 493; Hopkins v. Com., 50 Pa. St. 9; Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686; Herrin v. State, 33 Tex. 638; Robinson v. State, 54 Ala. 86; Presley v. State, 59 Ala. 98.

while resisting a lawful arrest, or obstructing an officer in an attempt to suppress a riot or affray. A homicide unintentionally committed in doing an unlawful act not coming within any of these cases is generally involuntary manslaughter, 258 punishable at all, and is not murder.259

or not

243. Intention to Inflict Great Bodily Harm.

All the authorities agree that, where death is caused, though unintentionally, by an act done with intent to inflict great bodily harm, and without justification or excuse, nor under circumstances reducing the homicide to manslaughter, it is murder. The intent shows such a disregard of consequences that the law implies malice, and it is no defense in such a case to say that there was no intent to kill.260 Thus, killing a person by cruel torture, wantonly inflicted, and causing grievous bodily injury, is murder, even conceding that there was no intent to cause death.261

258 Post, 262 et seq.

259 See Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16.

260 See Fost. C. L. 259; 1 Hale, P. C. 491; State v. Hoover, 4 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 365, 34 Am. Dec.

244. Acts or Omissions Tending to Cause Death or Great Bodily Harm.

(a) In General. It is also settled that, if death is caused by a willful act or omission, the natural tendency of which is to cause death or great bodily harm, the homicide is murder unless justifiable or excusable, or reduced to manslaughter by extenuating circumstances. An intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm will be implied as a matter of law, and without inquiry into the actual intent, on the principle that a man is to be presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. And it can make no difference in such a case that the act was done in sudden anger or in recklessness, and without an actual intent to kill.262 Thus, it is murder at common law to kill a person by willfully riding an unruly and vicious horse into a

383; McWhirt's Case, 3 Grat. (Va.) 594, 46 Am. Dec. 196.

261 State v. Hoover, 4 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 365, 34 Am. Dec. 383.

262 Grey's Case, J. Kelyng, 64, Beale's Cas. 463; Reg. v. Serne, 16 Cox, C. C. 311, Beale's Cas. 465; Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16; State v. Smith, 2 Strob. (S. C.) 77, 47 Am. Dec. 589, Beale's Cas.