against the statute is that it was beyond the power of the Legislature to make evidence inadmissible that is otherwise relevant.

is that the action of the Legislature rests in, or might well be thought to be founded in, reason and sound policy. It is not merely colorable or arbitrary. The right to affect third parties by the offer of reward is no greater than the right to affect them by making a bet in Lord Mansfield's time. The Legislature might have declared the contract void as against public policy. If so, the Legislature might properly enact that certain evidence of the acts of its tribunals shall be a sealed book to parties who are not concerned except as they have voluntarily made themselves concerned, knowing in advance, since they are presumed to know the statutes, that the evidence was forbidden.

We may add that the offense in the present case took place after the passage of the act of 1916, and the question of impairing the obligation of contracts does not arise.

Let the judgment be reversed, and the record remitted for a new trial in the district court.

as a contract, but the court held that the particular wager was void because a judicial inquiry into the matter tended to indecent [2-8] The question of the power of the evidence and to disturb the peace of the Legislature to make evidence inadmissible individual and of society. In the present is different from the question so frequently case the Legislature has in effect said that passed upon of the effect of proof of eviden- in the case of offenses by juvenile offenders tial facts as prima facie proof of facts in there shall be amnesty and oblivion, except issue. We do not suppose that the Legisla-under certain circumstances not affecting the ture could, under the guise or form of a rule present case. All that this court can say of evidence or procedure, deprive parties of substantial rights. On the other hand, the Legislature certainly has the power to prescribe what proof shall be essential, as, for instance, to comply with the statute of frauds; and it has also power to prescribe what contracts shall be void as against public policy, as, for instance, contracts in restraint of trade, or immoral contracts, or contracts bonos mores. We see no reason why the Legislature may not prescribe rules of evidence; for example, rules regulating the competency of witnesses and excluding them for interest, as at common law, and as we still do in the case of transactions with a decedent, even though the effect may be to prevent enforcement of a legal contract. Clearly the Legislature, in creating a new tribunal like the court for the trial of juvenile offenders, may prescribe what record it shall keep, or whether it shall keep any record at all, and, if it does, what use, if any, shall be permitted of the record. It is equally clear that the Legislature may prohibit parol proof of the court's action. On general principles proof must be by the record. The fact that exclusion of parol proof because proof must NORTHERN R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. be by the record, and exclusion of the record by legislative enactment, may result in preventing a party from recovering on a contract because of the impossibility of proof, is no argument against the legislative restrictions. The right to contract is not unlimited. Cases are frequent where contracts are condemned as against public policy, and the Legislature, as long at least as its condemnation is based on substantial reason and is not merely arbitrary or colorable, may determine what is public policy. We see no reason why the Legislature may not enact that it is against public policy to hold over a young person in terrorem, perhaps for life, a conviction for some youthful transgression. If it may pass an act of general amnesty, it may surely pass an act of amnesty as to juvenile offenders. The right of contract does not go as far as to forbid such legislative action. On the contrary, it was long ago settled that there were limits to the right of contracting parties to prove facts which might disgrace third persons. In the famous case of De Costa v. Jones, Cowper, 729, Lord Mansfield would not permit recovery on a wager as to the sex of Chevalier D'Eon. There was nothing in English law at the time to prohibit the wager

DEMAREST.

(94 N. J. Law, 68)

(Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 25, 1919.) 1. WILLS 693(7) — INTEREST OF

BENEFICIARIES ON EXERCISE OF POWER OF DISPOSITION.

Under a will devising property in trust for daughter with provision that if she made a will or any writing before arriving at the age of 60 years, disposing of the property among her children, testator's executors were to distribute tion of a will by the daughter before she became the property as directed by the daughter, execu60 years of age immediately passed an equitable estate in fee to the beneficiaries or devisees, regardless of a conveyance by the trustees. 2. EMINENT DOMAIN

177-CONDEMNATION

OF LAND HELD IN TRUST WITHOUT MAKING
TRUSTEE A PARTY.

Condemnation proceedings were valid notwithstanding a trustee holding the land under a will was not a party thereto, where the beneficiaries who were the owners of the entire beneficial estate were parties.

3. EMINENT DOMAIN 191(6)-SUFFICIENCY

OF DESCRIPTION.

Petition describing land to be condemned by a railroad, as beginning at a specific point, easily ascertainable, and running by a definite

(108 A.)

5. ADVERSE POSSESSION 8(4)-ADVERSE POS-pany. Defendant denied plaintiff's title, and

[2] In any event the condemnation proceedings were valid, notwithstanding the trustee under the will of James Jay was not a party thereto, and in virtue thereof the railroad MINTURN, J. The suit was in ejectment, company acquired full rights against Mary and was tried before a jury at the Bergen O'Kill and her three children, who were the circuit, and the verdict was for defendant. I owners of the entire beneficial estate. Natl. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

Ry. Co. v. Eastern & Amboy R. R. Co., 36 N. | burden is cast upon defendant to prove that J. Law, 181. he has been in possession for the statutory period necessary to give him a right to possession superior to plaintiff's title, and to sustain such burden defendant must prove that he and those under whom he claims have held adverse possession for 20 years. If the defendant fails in such proof it is immaterial whether plaintiff has been in possession at any time within 20 years, for the legal title draws to it the possession, and defendant must overcome that status by clear and convincing evidence. Rowland v. Updike, 28 N. J. Law, 101; Van Cleve v. Rook, 40 N. J. Law, 25; Myers v. Folkman, 86 N. J. Law, 29, 90 Atl. 1051.

[6] But the evidence established the fact by a great preponderance of testimony that defendant had acquired no title by adverse possession within 20 years, and it therefore became immaterial whether plaintiff had maintained possession during that period. manifest. State v. Weinberger, 87 N. J. Law, In ejectment the defendant can never defend his possession against the plaintiff upon a title in himself, by which he could not recover the possession if he were out, and the plaintiff in possession. Hickey v. Stewart, 3 How. 750, 11 L. Ed. 814.

(108 A.)

(93 N. J. Law, 353)

QUEEN et al. v. JENNINGS.

or, where the new trial is ordered because the damages are excessive or inadequate, and for no other reasons, the verdict shall be set aside

(Supreme Court of New Jersey. Nov. 7, 1919.) only in respect of the damages, and shall stand

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. BROKERS 53-SUFFICIENCY OF SERVICES TO ENTITLE BROKER TO COMMISSION.

The duty which an agent undertakes, the obligation he assumes as a condition of his right to demand commissions, is to bring the buyer and seller to an agreement. The agent, to earn commissions on the sale of property, must be the efficient or procuring cause of the sale. 2. BROKERS 88(3)-IDENTITY OF PERSON WITH WHOM CONTRACT WAS MADE FOR JURY. When the question appears by the evidence to be disputed, the question of the person with whom a contract was made should be left to the jury. When there is real doubt upon the point, such doubt must be solved by the jury as a fact.

3. BROKERS 88(2, 3)-DISCHARGE IN GOOD FAITH AND PROCURING CAUSE OF SALE FOR

THE JURY.

In this case, the evidence examined, and held, whether the plaintiff was discharged in good faith, or whether he was the efficient or procuring cause of the sale were questions of fact, properly submitted by the trial court, to be determined by the jury.

4. EVIDENCE 595-NEW TRIAL 72-VER

DICT RESTING UPON INFERENCE SUFFICIENT.

good in all other respects.

Action by Emmet Queen and others against Edward H. Jennings. Verdict for plaintiffs, and defendant obtained a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted. Rule discharged as to liability, new trial granted limited to question of damages, and the verdict sustained in all other respects.

Argued June term, 1919, before GUMMERE, C. J., and MINTURN and BLACK, JJ.

King & Vogt, of Morristown, George A. Bourgeois, of Atlantic City, and Brainard Avery and George W. Alger, both of New York City (Jay E. Whiting, of New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs.

Lindabury, Depue & Faulks and R. V. Lindabury, all of Newark, and Clarence L. Cole, of Atlantic City (Wm. M. Robinson, of Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for defendant.

BLACK, J. The trial of this case, at the Atlantic circuit, resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $450,452. The defendant obtained the rule to show cause, reserving all the exceptions taken throughout the trial. The reasons assigned for a new trial by the defendant are that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, that it is contrary to and inconsistent with the charge of the court, the issues raised by the pleadings, and the evidence produced in support of the 5. NEW TRIAL 72-VACATION OF VERDICT AS issues. Also that it is the result of prejudice

The verdict of a jury may rest upon inferences, such as jurors are permitted to draw. It

will not be set aside, although in the opinion of the court the jury might upon the evidence

have found otherwise.

AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

To justify the setting aside of a verdict as against the weight of evidence, it must be so clear as to give rise to an inference that the verdict was the result of mistake, passion, or prejudice.

6. NEW TRIAL 140(1), 143(1)—AFFIDAVIT OF

JUROR INCOMPETENT TO IMPEACH VERDICT.

The affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received for the purpose of impugning or destroying a verdict in which he has joined, or proving the ground of the verdict. This on the grounds of public policy. But misconduct on the part of the jury or the court officers in charge of the jury may be shown by proper testimony.

7. TRIAL 337-VERDICT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THEORY CONTRARY TO THAT SUB

MITTED.

A verdict cannot be supported upon a theory of the law contrary to that upon which the case was submitted to the jury.

8. NEW TRIAL 9-GROUNDS IN GENERAL UNDER PRACTICE ACT.

Under Practice Act (P. L. 1912, p. 397) §§ 72, 73, a new trial shall only be granted of the question or questions with respect to which the verdict is found to be wrong, if separable,

or passion.

[1, 2] The purpose of the suit was to recover commissions alleged to have been agreed to be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant for procuring the sale of 941,000 shares of the common stock of the Pure Oil Company, a New Jersey corporation. The contract for made on or about the 20th day of March, such commissions is alleged to have been made on or about the 20th day of March, 1916, at the city of Pittsburgh, in the state of Pennsylvania. The contract was not in writing. The compensation for such service was to be the sum of $1 for each share of such stock sold, at a price satisfactory to the defendant. The stock, it is alleged, was sold through the plaintiff to William A. Read & Co. and Ohio Cities Gas Company for $23,054,500, a price satisfactory to the defendant, which was at the rate of $24.50 per share. The defendant denies that the plaintiff sold to or secured William A. Read & Co. and Ohio Cities Gas Company, or either of them, to purchase such shares, but admits that in May or June, 1917, a large number of such shares were sold to the two above-named companies. The defendant in his testimony, at page 390 of the record, admits that he made a contract

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

with the plaintiff, based upon 25 cents a share | sale. Vreeland v. Vetterlein, 33 N. J. Law, and no more, and that contract was always 247; Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. in existence until April 19, 1917, when the 378, 38 Am. Rep. 441; 19 Cyc. 257; 9 C. J. deal was broken off. The two problems, 613, 4 R. C. L. par. 42, p. 298. therefore, for solution on the question of liability are: Was the contract terminated between the parties on April 19, 1917, and, if not, was the plaintiff the efficient or procuring cause of the sale of the stock? These questions were clearly and pointedly submitted to the jury by the trial judge. Does the testimony therefore justify the conclusion reached by the jury in finding both of these questions in favor of the plaintiff? Or is the weight of the evidence so clearly against the verdict that it justified this court in setting it aside? Our examination of the record leads us to the conclusion that both of these questions must be answered in favor of the plaintiff. On the first proposition, the defendant insists that the contract was terminated on the 19th of April, 1917, immediately after the negotiations with William A. Read & Co. were broken off. "I told him that I was completely through with it, and washed my hands of the whole business."

The plaintiff denies this, and testifies that Jennings, the defendant, wanted him to revive it, i. e. the negotiations which he did, "and for me to keep my ear close to the ground and see what was going on, and keep it going," which I did. He saw Mr. Martin, of William A. Read & Co., the next day; "he told me several times later that things were moving along." On cross-examination, after being shown Jennings' telegram of the 21st, in answer to Queen's telegram of the same date, Queen was asked this question:

"That doesn't look as if you were continuing negotiations at his request?" A. Oh, I don't claim to have continued them at that time. He knew that; he got pretty well in mind that the trade was practically made. I agree with you he tried to lose me. He never lost Martin, though, or Read."

Most of the testimony at the trial was directed at this point. The case took five days for trial, the record consists of a bulky volume of 556 pages. The plaintiff's exhibits are 143, mostly letters, and telegrams. The controversy is not so much over disputed facts as the correct conclusion to be drawn from admitted or conceded facts. Thus, the contract by which the shares of stock of the Pure Oil Company was sold was in writing. It was put in evidence by the plaintiff. It is not disputed that the final negotiations for the sale were made by Norton H. Weber, the vice president and treasurer of the Pure Oil Company and Mr. B. G. Daws of the Ohio Cities Gas Company. The buyer in the contract named is not William A. Read & Co., but Edward M. Hagar. Mr. Arlington C. Harvey, the attorney for the Ohio Cities Gas Company, testified that he and Mr. Eugene Mackay, the attorney for the Pure Oil Company, drew the contract for the sale of the stock in the Bellevue-Strafford Hotel in Philadelphia. The contract is dated June 2, 1917. The purchaser's name was left blank. Mr. Mackay gave Mr. Weber instructions what to do with the contract

"That he was to take the contract, and after it was signed by all the directors of the Pure Oil Company he was to take it to New York, and have it signed by whoever William A. Read & Co. suggested, and he would fill in that blank whosever name was to go there. Mr. Weber was to have it signed by that man, and that Mr. Weber, without letting it out of his possession, was to have it assigned, * * * and have the contract assigned by Mr. Hagar to the Ohio Cities Gas Company."

Mr. Robert W. Martin, a member of the firm of William A. Read & Co., testified that Mr. Edward M. Hagar was selected by that firm as a party to the contract "as a function in connection with our underwriting of this transaction." The contract shows that it was signed by Mr. Edward M. Hagar; that it was then assigned and transferred to the Ohio Cities Gas Company; and that company

The jury had the benefit of seeing both parties. This testimony raised a jury question. The jury found the fact in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant's claim of discharge. This question was clearly and properly left to the jury to say whether the plaintiff Queen was discharged, and, if dis-assumes and agrees and becomes bound by charged, whether such discharge was in good faith, the trial judge saying:

"Now in determining this question, you must do as I have said, search the facts diligently

and find out what the actual truth is."

[3] The next question is was the plaintiff, Queen, the efficient or procuring cause of the sale of the stock? The legal rule applicable to the facts is well and firmly settled.

The duty which an agent undertakes, the obligation he assumes as a condition of his right to demand commissions, is to bring the buyer and seller to an agreement. The agent

all the duties, obligations, and liabilities of the purchaser, Edward M. Hagar. It would serve no useful purpose to recite the testimony at length. The jury found as a fact that Hagar was William A. Read & Co.'s agent, that the sale of stock of the Pure Oil Company was made to William A. Read & Co., and not to Ohio Cities Gas Company, as contended by the defendant. The jury also found that the plaintiff, Queen, was the efficient or procuring cause of the sale.

[4] Chief Justice Beasley said in the case of Vreeland v. Vetterlein, 33 N. J. Law, 249, "When there is real doubt upon that point,