COMMITTED TO "LIBERATE" TAIWAN

Of course, it is true that in the communique the Chinese Communists said nothing about their aim to "liberate" Taiwan. We said nothing about our stated resolve to prevent such "liberation" by force.

True enough, all that means is the situation in regard to these factors is absolutely unchanged today. Neither side has backed off an inch. Just because they don't say anything about it in the communique is the clearest indication that it is nonnegotiable on both sides; therefore, we agree not to talk about "liberation" in a public communique.

PRECEDENTS FORMER CHINESE TERRITORY RETAINING INDEPENDENCE

Mr. WHALLEY. Your statement says that a million mainland Chinese went into Taiwan in approximately 1949. Would that not be 4 million or 5 million Chinese on Taiwan today.

Directly or indirectly, would that not create some sort of feeling between the mainland and Taiwan?

Mr. Rowe. That is the basis of the feeling. This is, of course, a situation in regard to China which has been repeated over and over and over again in the long history of China; namely, that with internal disturbances in China, with changes of regime in China, comparable, really, in the magnitude of their effect inside of China to the modern Chinese Revolution, pieces of what Chinese consider to be China have dropped off and have had for long periods of time independence and autonomous existences but always have been in history reamalgamated or almost always.

The big exception is Indochina. Vietnam, you know, was settled by Chinese in the same pattern as I described in my opening statement. These Vietnamese are Chinese, by origin; they now have an independent existence. They drove these aborigines up into the mountains, where they are still Montagnards today, who were the aboriginal inhabitants. But this area has split off in spite of the efforts of China to reamalgamate it or assert title.

So there is a mixed history. But this business of having a piece of China split off and for a long period of time remain split off, and in some cases permanently split off, has many precedents in Chinese history.

Mr. WHALLEY. Has not the rivalry between Mao and Chiang continued to keep this friction going? Would it be better if Chiang would not be going to accept the leadership again of Taiwan? Would it be better if he stepped aside, and Mao also, in a reasonably short time, to get the two top officials out of it? Would that help the situation or not?

Mr. Rowe. Well, it is arguable whether it would or not, but the fact is that the domination of these two people in their respective areas is, in my opinion, assured until they die.

The only question then is who is going to take over and whether it will be any different, and nobody knows the answer to that.

U.N. A FORUM FOR "LIBERATING” TAIWAN

Mr. WHALLEY. How about Red Chinese activities in the U.N.? Has there been much said by them concerning Taiwan, or is their talk pretty much on something else?

Mr. Rowe. They have reiterated at the United Nations their intention, their irrevocable intention, to "liberate" Taiwan, and said "no force on earth can stop us." That is the crux of their attitude on that, as expressed in the United Nations.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Whalley.

POSSIBLE LIMITS TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Professor Rowe spoke about updated colonialism. I would ask you one question, Mr. Reisman. The policy of self-determination, would you extend that everywhere for instance, the many peoples of India, Pakistan, the scattered tribes of Africa-or is not the doctrine of self-determination really an outdated one, as some people think, where the application produces much turmoil and bloodshed?

Mr. REISMAN. Mr. Chairman, if there was no word "self-determination," we would have to invent it. We always encounter the demands of people to affiliate, to form groups as a way of realizing certain shared interests. When people want a degree of protection from a larger group, they make a claim on the international legal process, and now we generally characterize that claim as "self-determination." We will have to recognize that any people that forms in this way may make these claims. We may not always respond with a grant of full sovereignty; the response of the international community may be a graduation of some degree of international protection, minority treaties, on through to full sovereignty. But the claim for self-determination will always be very loud and very vigorous. We cannot stop it. Mr. GALLAGHER. No question but it is one of the troublesome terms of our times as to the proper application.

Mr. REISMAN. Yes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Where do we begin and where do we end?

I want to thank you, gentlemen. I think we are imposing on your time.

If anyone has anything further to add, you may send it to us.

I want to thank you very much for an excellent contribution and for adding to the education of the Congress, which is an awesome task at best.

Mr. Rowe. I would like to express my appreciation for the invitation of the committee to come and speak before it; I appreciate it very greatly.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4.32 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Thursday, May 4, 1972.)

THE NEW CHINA POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON THE

UNITED STATES AND ASIA

III. The New China Policy: Its Impact on Korea and Thailand

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:15 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we continue our inquiry into the impact of the new United States-China policy on our traditional friendships and alliances in Asia. Our focus will be Korea, Thailand, and Burma.

We are fortunate to have with us today Prof. John Badgley of the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins here in Washington and Prof. Robert Scalapino who has flown in from Berkeley, Calif., to be with us today.

We are also honored with the presence of the distinguished Ambassador from Thailand who is with us today.

Professor Scalapino is well known to this subcommittee for the excellent testimony he offered just a year ago during our hearings on United States-Korean relations. We are happy to welcome Professor Badgley in his first appearance before the subcommittee. Thank you for coming, Professor Badgley.

INTRODUCTION

May I start off on a personal note. Having served during the Korean conflict like many of us in the Congress, I retain an important interest in insuring that the Korean Peninsula continues to live in peace. I wish to underscore my commitment to the modernization program for the Korean Armed Forces. At the same time I want to learn more about the content and motives behind the recent North "peace offensive." If ever the Red Cross talks progress and broaden to the point that some relaxation of tensions is possible on the peninsula, clearly this will be all to the good.

Also, I wish to underscore my belief in the importance of our good friend and ally, Thailand, to the future of Asia. Thailand has given the United States substantial aid and assistance in the Vietnam war, and in so doing has departed considerably from its tradition of walk

ing a careful line between the great powers of the area. No doubt the Thai will want to develop closer relations with the People's Republic, but they should be permitted to do so at their own pace and in their

own way.

We will hear first from Professor Scalapino. Because of his broad perspective on Asia we have asked Dr. Scalapino to give us his general observations about recent developments in the Far East as well as advise the subcommittee on the impact of the new United States-China policy on Korea.

Professor Badgley will then compare how Thailand and its neighbor Burma have followed radically different paths in terms of their respective relations with the People's Republic. Professor Badgley will be suggesting that the Thai may have some lessons to learn from the Burmese example.

I suggest that Professor Scalapino lead off, and then we will hear from Professor Badgley. We will hold all questions until Dr. Badgley is finished, and then the subcommittee will question the witnesses individually and also as a panel.

The full statements of the witnesses will, of course, be submitted for the record.

Professor Scalapino, you may proceed as you choose, reading, summarizing where you wish and adding any additional thoughts you

have.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. SCALAPINO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

BIOGRAPHY

Mr. Scalapino is a professor and former Chairman of the Political Science Department at the University of California. An Asian scholar with a specialization in Korea Dr. Scalapino is editor of the Asian Survey and his books include "North Korea Today," "The Communist Revolution in Asia," "Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan," and "Democracy and the Party Movement in Pre-War Japan." Dr. Scalapino is consultant to the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Rand Corporation.

Mr. SCALAPINO. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be again with your subcommittee and to express my opinions on the general question of our changing Asian relationship and the impact on the Republic of Korea.

In my prepared remarks I sought to indicate first, the context in which our relationships with individual nations should be viewed, second, the primary factors as I saw them entering into our new and as yet untested relationships with China, and, third, the impact of those relations on the Korean Peninsula, including both North and South Korea.

(The prepared statement of Professor Scalapino appears on p. 109.) I would like therefore to excerpt certain parts of my prepared remarks for purposes of oral presentation. Let me outline the five basic conditions which I think characterize the general scene in Korea today.

LOOSE-KNIT MULTIPOLARISM IN ASIA

First, a loosely knit multipolarism is making its appearance on the global scene, with special consequences in Asia. The principal actorsthe United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and possibly

India-each betrays some uncertainty as to the implications of this event and the appropriate policies to be pursued. Most, if not all of these states, however, appear reconciled to a balance of power, once merely the goal of the United States.

SOVIET POWER CREDIBLE IN ASIA

Second, despite the partial demise of bipolarism, the credibility of Soviet power is at an alltime high in East Asia, the Russians having demonstrated both their strength and their resolve on many fronts. With success, however, has come new responsibilities and new problems. Thus, at present, Soviet policy must be concentrated extensively upon the containment of China. Having been the staunchest critic of John Foster Dulles during his lifetime, the Russians have now proven themselves to be his most apt pupils.

INTERNAL TRENDS IN CHINA UNCERTAIN

Third, the uncertainties surrounding China and her future role in Asia relate at least as much to questions of internal trends as to decisions on foreign policy. A new leadership in Peking could conceivably make some dramatic changes in policies at home and aboard. A succession crisis after Mao, moreover, might adversely affect China's unity and strength. Given the present structure of the political-military elite in China, political instability is very likely to continue in the years immediately ahead. The central question is whether that instability can be contained at elitist levels, as was the case during the purge of Lin Piao and his associates, or whether it will seep downward into the broader reaches of society, as it did temporarily, toward the climax of the cultural revolution.

At present, however, Peking is determined to thwart Soviet containment policies by resistance rather than accommodation; to enter into dialog with the United States, thereby increasing its flexibility while at the same time weakening the non-Communist alliance structure in Asia; and to contain Japan politically and militarily, if not economically. The Chinese People's Republic has also put the world on notice that it intends to be a nuclear power, and to play a special role in Asia.

U.S. CREDIBILITY IN DOUBT IN ASIA

Fourth, the credibility of the United States is currently in doubt in many quarters in Asia, precipitating fierce debates and sharp cleavages with respect to policies among America's allies, the neutrals, and its erstwhile opponents. The transition from an American-centered East Asia toward a multipolar Asia has proven to be a traumatic experience for many Asian states and leaders, with the ultimate outcome unclear at this point.

This is a period of striking paradoxes. No one questions, for example, American military power or even the essential strength of the American economy. The uncertainties revolve around the American will, and the impact upon foreign policy of the ongoing American revolution which has been underway for decades and now appears to be reaching a climax. Never in history has there been such an intimate connection between domestic and international politics.