DE FACTO ALLIANCE BETWEEN INDIA AND SOVIET UNION

Mr. BURKE. What about the future of the relations, then, of the Chinese People's Republic with Indonesia and Pakistan and what effect. will this in the long run have regarding the attitudes of the Soviet Union in the Far East?

Mr. SCALAPINO. Certainly, the entire problem of the South Asian subcontinent is an extremely complicated one. In my own view, the relations between India and China are likely to remain competitive and relatively hostile. The Soviet Union has acquired great new power in this area, and great new responsibilities also. One of the interesting questions to me is whether by the end of the 1970's, the Soviet Union will face some of the same issues of priority as the United States; how much to spend for domestic needs versus international commitments. No major power in the world has expanded its international commitments as rapidly and drastically as the Soviet Union in recent years. I would imagine the Soviet Union will continue to have a great stake in the subcontinent, primarily as a part of its policy of containment of China, as least as long as Chinese-Soviet Union relations remain bad.

In all of this, we can see a classical balance of power being worked out in practice with India and the counterpoints. India in effect has abandoned its nonalignment policy, the policy heralded in the Nehru era, and, has accepted a slightly camouflaged alliance with the Soviet Union both for security and for economic and political reasons.

China, on the other hand, despite extensive ideological and political differences, has established close relations with Pakistan and is seeking such relations with several Himalayan states, for similar reasons, hoping to achieve a political military equilibrium. I happen to feel that this could be conductive to peace, if a true balance could be maintained, but recent developments make such a balance questionable. I would also feel there may be some hope in Southeast Asia, an area you and Professor Badgley were talking about a moment ago. I see some hope in the new diplomacy of the 1970's, in that the major external powers may ultimately find it in their mutual interests to accept the neutralization of this area, to accept the fact that no single major power can or should have exclusive influence here. Hence, an acceptance of some type of neutralization formula may be forthcoming. In my opinion, this would be the best way to ultimately to underwrite the peace of the region.

PROSPECTIVE CHINESE OUTLET INTO INDIAN OCEAN

Mr. BURKE. Wouldn't it be to the advantage of the Chinese People's Government to have an outlet into the Indian Ocean by future negotiations with India and Pakistan?

Mr. SCALAPINO. It might be of some advantage, but I should think China's first concern with respect to the territorial waters of Asia would be with respect to Northeast Asia and the China Sea because, if she is to obtain Taiwan or if her quest for Taiwan continues, it is in the so-called Taiwan Straits that her naval strength could have the most immediate importance, in my opinion. I should think, therefore,

that China's first concern with naval power would relate to that region.

Mr. BURKE. Thank you very much. I thank you both.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Burke.

KOREA A TESTING GROUND FOR US

Professor Scalapino, we want to thank you for being here, but I can't help feeling in looking at Korea's role in the future and our role, vis-a-vis Korea, that perhaps we should think of Korea different than as a dagger poised at the major powers. Perhaps Korea's role in the future will be that of a key that great powers need if the search for peace is to be a successful one.

Korea is where the activities of the great powers come into potential conflict, which is why I think it is so important that no one dominates Korea except the Koreans. In this regard I think it is essential the United States continue its commitments to Korea to assure it the stability it needs to grow and prosper under its present leadership which has the support of the Korean people. I can think of no American ally that has the same depth of support not only of our government, regardless of the party in power, but also of the people of the United States.

In the great quest for peace now going on in the world, we should look to Korea as a place where peace can be sustained if we remain firm in our commitments. I support the firm U.S. commitments to Korea, and I feel this will be, as I said in the conclusion of my statement, a real testing spot for the kind of peaceful coexistence in Asia to which all major powers are now giving lip service. If this lip service is to become a reality, I feel not only the United States but also Japan, the Soviet Union, and China must support an independent and viable Korea, whether this be as two countries at present or ultimately, through long political evolution, as a unified state.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will stand adjourned. (Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to call of the Chair.)

THE NEW CHINA POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON THE

UNITED STATES AND ASIA

IV. The New China Policy: Its Impact on Japan

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:15 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we continue our indepth inquiry into the impact of the new United States China policy on our traditional friendships and alliances in Asia. Our focus will be on Japan.

We are fortunate to have with us today former Under Secretary of State George Ball, Prof. James Morley of Columbia University, and Joseph Yager of the Institute of Defense Analysis. Mr. Ball is well known to this subcommittee as a frequent commentator on the international political scene. His article, "Mr. Nixon's Appointment In Peking-Is This Trip Necessary?"1 ́appeared in the New York Times Magazine.

Dr. Morley heads the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. He has written extensively about Japan and served in Tokyo from 1967 to 1969 as special assistant to U.S. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson.

Mr. Yager is the Acting Director of the International and Social Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis. The subcommittee will remember him as a State Department Asian expert. I wish to thank all of you for being with us today.

INTRODUCTION

May I start off on a personal note. I am concerned at the serious deterioration in the U.S. relationship with Japan as a result of the so-called Nixon shocks. We have heard during the opening days of these hearings from Professor Reischauer and others that Japanese faith in the United States as friend and ally has been severely shaken. Clearly, repair of this relationship with Japan is a first order of business for this administration.

We will hear first from Mr. Ball. Because of his broad perspective on Asia we have asked Mr. Ball to give us his general observations

1 See appendix, p. 286.

about recent developments in the Far East as well as advise the subcommittee on the impact of the new United States-China policy on Japan.

Professor Morley will then draw on his Japanese expertise in giving us his thoughts about United States-Japanese relations.

In the cleanup slot will be Mr. Yager who will discuss the Japanese national security role during the 1970's decade in the light of the new United States China policy.

I suggest that Mr. Ball lead off, followed by Professor Morley and then Mr. Yager. We will hold all questions until Mr. Yager is finished, and then the subcommittee will question the witnesses individually and as a panel. I would suggest that the subcommittee encourage the witnesses to comment on each other's testimony, so we can have a general exchange.

Mr. Ball, you may proceed as you choose, reading, summarizing, and adding any additional thoughts you have.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE W. BALL, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE AND SENIOR PARTNER, LEHMAN BROTHERS

BIOGRAPHY

Mr. Ball served from 1961 to 1966 as Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Now a Senior Partner with Lehman Brothers, the New York investment banking concern, Mr. Ball is a frequent commentator on the international political scene. His "Nixon's Appointment in Peking—Is This Trip Necessary?" appeared recently in the New York Times magazine. And his “Discipline of Power", published in 1968, drew on his U.S. Government experience and his post-World War II role as an architect of European integration.

Mr. BALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Within the past month I have again been in Japan. I spent a week or 10 days there and had an opportunity to talk with many people so that what I say today reflects the impressions that I gained during this trip.

In any assessment of the impact of our changing relations with the People's Republic of China on the other countries of the Far East, we must take note, not only of the nature of that changed relationship, but also of the manner in which it was brought about.

LIMITED ACHIEVEMENTS OF NIXON TRIP

In substantive terms one might argue that all that has been achieved is an improvement in communications, although one byproduct of last summer's diplomatic activity was undoubtedly to hasten the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations. But we still have no formal diplomatic relations with Peking, nor are we likely to achieve any until the Taiwan issue has been resolved, and certainly no one can contend that, in political terms, our two governments are yet on a friendly basis.

Had all these arrangements been made through quieter diplomatic channels, the impact would have been very different on several Far Eastern countries.