I am aware, in conclusion, that some of these concrete suggestions may not meet with your approval, although I hope you will consider them. What seems to me most important is to try to get agreement within the American Government and American people that the direction we need to head, if we are going to build a new partnership for the future, is one in Asia which is based on detente with all of the countries of Asia within a partnership with Japan.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Morley.

Mr. Yager.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. YAGER, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE

ANALYSES

BIOGRAPHY

Mr. Yager serves as Acting Director of the International and Social Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses. A former State Department official, his posts included Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei from 1959 to 1961, Director of the Office of East Asian Affairs from 1961 to 1963, and member and then Vice Chairman of the Policy Planning Council from 1963 to 1968.

Mr. YAGER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, as a member of a think tank, I am obliged to begin by reminding you that I appear personally, not as a representative of IDĂ.

I also associate myself with Mr. Ball's remarks, and I believe with most of Professor Morley's. In fact, I have learned in the past that I don't know really what I think until I have heard Jim Morley speak. I would say that if there is a difference between us, it is that Professor Morley says we had a bad situation with adverse trends, and the President's China initiative made the situation worse. I would say that, at least in the security field, the trends were promising and the China initiative may have turned them around.

PRE-NIXON TRIP AGREEMENT ON SECURITY POLICY

My basic thesis, in fact, is that in mid-1971 there was a healthy convergence in United States and Japanese thinking on security questions. The United States was moving toward the Japanese view of the threat to our common security interests and, based on a moderating of our threat appreciation, we were lowering our military posture in the area in a way that the Japanese could approve of.

Specifically, we had moved in November 1969 to agree to the reversion of Okinawa.

On their side, the Japanese were gradually developing conventional forces which were quite compatible with U.S. strategy, and their leaders were becoming increasingly willing to make public declarations on security problems quite consistent with our own views.

TRIP'S ADVERSE IMPACT ON SECURITY CONSENSUS

The surprise announcement on July 15 of the President's plan to visit China created, I believe, a real danger that the United States and Japan will drift apart, and there may be particularly serious adverse consequences in the security field.

I don't believe that I will read my entire prepared statement, but summarize some of it and read extracts from it.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Yager appears on p. 163.)

I think that the first question that must be considered is how serious and how lasting may the effects of the China shock be. I am afraid that my conclusions are on the pessimistic side.

We have to remember that when the surprise announcement was made in July last year we were in the process of implementing the Nixon doctrine. I have suggested that this was in the right direction in terms of our future relations with Japan, but at the moment and in this transitional period our intentions were unclear to the Japanese and others, so the surprise announcement came in a context of psychological uneasiness.

Also, as others have mentioned today, this announcement came after a period of bitter controversy over economic issues. I have had Japanese speak to me about the shock they felt over the cold way in which we dealt with those issues. It was not their view of the proper United States-Japanese relationship.

Perhaps more serious is the Japanese perception that we are now engaged in a cynical balance-of-power policy and, specifically, that we are prepared to balance Japan, supposedly our friend, against China, supposedly our common rival.

If we must conclude that the general effects of the China shock are potentially quite serious, the next question is, what might the effects be in the security fields?

DOUBTS ON RELIABILITY OF GUARANTEES

First, we might look at the immediate effects on Japanese security policy, and in order to identify those we must ask what was Japanese security policy at the time of the China shock? I might read a few passages from my prepared statement on that point.

Japanese security policy has been distinguished by the absence of any sense of imminent threat to the national security and by a near total reliance on the United States to keep any threat from arising. National security has been seen largely in terms of homeland defense, although some appreciation of wider security interests has appeared to be emerging.

If there is no threat, one may ask why Japan has any armed forces at all. There is a stylized justification that the Japanese Government sometimes puts forward. They say they are preparing against the possible attack by Soviet conventional forces against Hokkaido, accompanied by conventional bombing attacks throughout Japan.

I think we have to write off this justification as a convenient rationalization of policy. If the Soviets were to attack, which I believe is most unlikely, there is no reason why they would so obligingly limit the nature and scope of their operations.

What then have the Japanese been trying to do in the security field? I think the best answer is that they are widening their defense options by creating armed forces which could be rendered combat effective or even expanded on short notice and by developing an increasingly sophisticated defense industry. Nothing, incidentally, has suggested any intention of acquiring even defensive nuclear weapons.

The immediate effects of the China shock on Japan have thus far been rather minor in the security field. The evolving closer relation

ship between Washington and Peking appears to have had two opposite effects, which have thus far tended to cancel one another out. On the one hand, the China threat, already remote in Japanese eyes, has been further reduced. On the other hand, uncertainty concerning the reliability of U.S. guarantees has been increased. Neither effect, however, has been very strong, and for the time being Japan's basic security policy remains unchanged. The Japanese are probably going to continue along the same track of building limited conventional forces. The only effect that I can ascertain right now is some new uncertainty concerning the extent of Japanese diplomatic backing for our security policy in Asia.

What may possible future developments bring particularly in the security field? Here, we find a somewhat different picture.

REMOVAL OF U.S. BASES

If we assume present trends, and I have laid out some specific assumptions in my prepared statement, I think that the China shock and related developments will continue to push Japan away from the United States. Japan will probably pursue an increasingly independent foreign policy and make little effort to coordinate that policy with the United States.

The Mutual Security Treaty will probably be retained because of the protection it would still provide against Soviet or Chinese nuclear blackmail.

Public opposition to U.S. bases in Japan will, however, probably grow and could lead to tightened restrictions on their use and, before the end of the decade, to a formal request for their removal.

I think we can anticipate that Japan will make a special effort to improve relations with Peking. Because of the Japanese public's strong emotional affinity for China, the Japanese Government may be forced to pay a high political price for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Peking.

Explicitly or implicitly, past Japanese backing for the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, and possibly also South Korea, may be disavowed. Serious doubt will arise concerning the availability of U.S. bases in Japan for purposes other than the immediate defense of Japan itself.

CONTINUED BUILDUP IN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

But despite these shifts in Japanese foreign policy, I would not expect very much change for a number of years in the size and mission of the Japanese self-defense forces. Confidence in the U.S. security commitment will probably continue to decline. But Japanese threat perceptions under the assumed projection of trends will also probably decline or, at worst, remain stable at a low level. The Japanese Government will, therefore, have little reason to abandon the comfortable concept that its own forces need only complement the protection provided by treaty with the United States.

I think that the most likely projection for Japanese security policy is that the fourth defense buildup plan covering the years 1972-76, or something very much like it, will probably be carried out. As a consequence, by the middle of the decade, the air self-defense forces would be

modernized and given a few more planes, the ground self-defense forces would be given five mechanized divisions. Only one is mechanized today. The tonnage of maritime self-defense forces would be increased about 70 percent, principally destroyer escorts and submarines. Research and development spending would increase 311⁄2 times over that under the third plan.

Over the longer run, the process of upgrading the conventional defensive capabilities of the self-defense forces would probably continue. Late in the 1970's, some acceleration in the buildup might take place if Japanese confidence in U.S. protection continued to decline and reached the point where it seemed unrealistic to cling to a complementary defense strategy.

JAPAN NOT GOING NUCLEAR

But even if Japan does eventually decide to create forces sufficient to give it protection against any conventional attack, it by no means follows that Japan would seek an independent nuclear deterrent. Public opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan is still strong, and I believe will remain so for many years. Also the international costs for Japan of going nuclear would be very heavy. Much the same may be said of Japanese development of offensive conventional capability, which would create similar problems at home and abroad.

REACTION TO COMMUNIST POWERS RAPPROCHEMENT

This smooth-line projection of the present trends almost certainly will be erroneous in some respect. Surprising developments, deviations in trends, and shocks to expectations are entirely possible.

Any marked change in Japan's own security role appears unlikely during the 1970's, given present trends. Only after a number of years might Japan's independent foreign policy find expression in an accelerated buildup of defensive military power. Even then, powerful domestic and foreign forces would probably keep Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons or developing strong offensive forces.

JAPAN MORE INCLINED TO "GO IT ALONE"

The second conclusion is that by appearing to abandon efforts to coordinate policy with Japan, the United States will be ill prepared to prevent Japan from reacting to conceivable contingencies by drastic actions, some of which could have a profoundly destabilizing effect in Asia. Close United States-Japanese collaboration has worked for stability and the consequences of its absence are at best unpredictable. The unanswered question is whether the fragile structure of confidence which has supported United States-Japanese cooperation in the past can be restored. One can only hope that the attempt will be made.

For example, a rapprochement between Peking and Moscow is not inconceivable. This could completely unhinge Japanese security policy, and everything I have said up to this point would be subject to severe question.

I think it is quite likely that in this event, lacking confidence in the United States, Japanese security policy would be drastically revised. There might be a crash program of rearmament, possibly including development of a nuclear weapons capability. Other possible contingencies are mentioned in my prepared statement.

SECURITY TREATY BUT NO U.S. BASES

I would like to end my remarks by highlighting two conclusions. The first is that, given present trends, Japan and the United States will probably drift apart. The United States will feel, first, the lack of Japanese diplomatic support for U.S. security commitments to Taiwan and possibly also South Korea. The availability of U.S. bases in Japan in the event of an attack on those two areas, particularly on Taiwan, will become increasingly uncertain. Eventually, we might lose our bases in Japan, although the security treaty would probably survive in an attenuated form.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Yager follows:)

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. YAGER, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

The current hearings on the changing United States-China relationship and its impact on certain Asian countries are most timely. I consider it an honor to be asked to give the subcommittee my views on an aspect of this important subject. In doing so, I should like to make clear that I am speaking personally and that nothing that I say should be attributed to my employer, the Institute for Defense Analyses, or to any of the sponsors of the institute's research program.

I have been asked to deal particularly with the future security role of Japan in light of the changing relationship between the United States and China. In approaching this problem, I believe that it is useful to begin with a brief description of Japanese security policy in mid-1971, just before the new direction in United States-China relations became evident. Having established a point of reference, it may then be easier to identify the effects of the new United StatesChina relationship on Japanese security policy thus far and to speculate about possible future developments and their implications for the United States.

I. JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY IN MID-1971

Japanese security policy on the eve of the first "Nixon shock" was distinguished by the absence of any sense of imminent threat to the national security and a near total reliance on the United States to keep any threat from arising. National security was seen largely in terms of homeland defense, although some appreciation of wider security interests appeared to be emerging.

The Japanese failure to perceive any imminent threat to their security can be viewed as no more than a realistic assessment of their true situation. But in this instance, realism is reinforced by deeper psychological factors. Japan has only two concevable major adversaries in the 1970's, China and the Soviet Union. Justifiably or not, the Japanese are confident that they can handle the Chinese. The Soviets are seen in a more sinister light, but since Japan could not possibly cope with an all-out Soviet attack, it becomes unthinkable. And in any case, the United States has been relied on to keep the Soviets off Japan's back.

If there is no threat, one may ask why Japan has any armed forces at all. Internal security provided the rationale for recreating such forces on a small scale during the Korean war, but, given Japan's large and effective police force, this rationale appears long since to have lost most of its validity.

The principal justification advanced by the Japanese Government for the successive defense buildup plans is the threat of a limited Soviet attack, which is described as an amphibious assault (usually on the northern island of Hokkaido) accompanied by conventional bombing attacks on targets throughout Japan. This "threat," however, is simply not credible. If the Soviets were to attack Japan, which appear most unlikely, there is no reason why they would so obligingly limit the nature and scope of their military operations.