Nothing in the Chinese press-either on Taiwan or the China mainland— gives the slightest hint that Chinese planners are thinking in terms of any future economic cooperation between Taiwan and the mainland in what might be, in effect, a Taiwan free port area of the People's Republic of China. In fact, most foreign observers are inclined to believe, notwithstanding the intriguing possibilities suggested by Dr. Kissinger's November press conference, that Taiwan with its growing affluence was likely to drift, with American acquiescence, toward Japan-oriented independence. Or, they believed that Peking would seize Taiwan, sooner or later, through intimidation, subversion or outright assault, and thereafter make it submit to Peking's overall authority.

But Peking's attitude toward Hong Kong justifies hesitation in jumping to either of those conclusions. Long before the "expulsion" of the Republic of China from the United Nations, thoughtful Chinese on Taiwan were ridiculing the notion of return to the mainland by military means and envisaged a return of Chinese on Taiwan to their homeland as highly sophisticated, ideologically agnostic technocrats. Implicit in that dream seems to have been the expectation of "dynastic changes" on the mainland and the emergence there of a new liberalizing leadership. It was recognized that whether guided by Mao or his successors, Peking would control the timing and terms of such an event. Were Mao himself to permit it, Peking's motive might be twofold. First, it would end ambiguities as to military commitments and intentions in the Taiwan Strait which encourage the drift of Taiwan toward independence and the prospect of major war at a time when greater threats to China's safety bear down upon Peking from the north.

Second, it would gain China a modernizing Taiwan free port area and economic system, at last under the security and foreign policy control of Peking itself. Meanwhile, in Taipei one anxiety about moving toward peaceful co-existence would overshadow others that are obvious: Can a government in Peking which has suffered repeated upheavals over the past 20 years be expected to deliver on an arrangement which present leaders might enter into with Taipei? The United States should ponder the costs and gains for the international community were Peking induced to progress toward a one China dual economic system. With a growth-oriented foreign trade and investment sector made up, functionally, of Hong Kong's 4 million and Taiwan's 14 million, linked perhaps with Shanghai's 12 million, trading preferentially with a Chinese continental system-still, for strategic and ideological reasons, necessarily committed to full employment and cultural egalitarianism-this one China could constitute an economic and social force of formidable maneuverability on the international scene. Its "export-oriented" sector alone might soon match the economic powers of a Holland or a Belgium.

Under present assumptions, Japanese projections of mainland China's foreign trade forecast a value of only $8 billion by 1980; American projections are far lower. "China trade," including the trade of Hong Kong and Taiwan, and mainland China's trade through these entrepôt areas as well as directly with various foreign countries, provide dynamic possibilities which could alter dramatically previous notions of China's trade potentialities. And, no less important, movement in this direction would reassure China's neighbors that Peking is truly committed to its five principles of coexistence because it is ready to abide by their spirit even within the one China system itself.

Peking insists that it must reclaim Taiwan, but that assimilation could be a lengthy process. It is fair to ask what might be going on, economically, during that time. Taipei has had a good experience with its own free port area at Kaohsiung. Perhaps that could persuade Peking to try the same model with Taiwan. Or, if the mutual gain from trade is clearly recognized, perhaps the German Zollverein of the early 19th century might be the model-or, a payments union under which foreign-exchange earnings could be pooled.

If Peking and Taipei were to proceed, despite great difficulties, toward understandings on arrangements for economic coexistence, this could create the precondition which might justify Taipei and Washington in terminating the 1954 mutual defense treaty. This would end the anomaly of Washington trying to relax tensions and normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, while being committed, as a matter of history, law and honor, to mutual defense arrangements with what Peking regards as one of China's provinces. It might go far toward easing Prime Minister Sato's difficulties in proceeding toward normalization of Tokyo's relations with Peking, blocked now by Peking's

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insistence that Japan repudiate its peace treaty with the Republic of China. There can be, strictly speaking, no normalization of relations between Peking and Washington until the U.S. defense treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China is terminated. If the American intention to carry out the obligations of that treaty is seen as uncertain and ambiguous, Seoul, Tokyo, and perhaps even our NATO allies would begin to suspect that the United States is entertaining the possibility of adopting new attitudes toward all treaty commitments. For this reason, if no other, the White House must believe and Peking would probably honor the motive-that neither national interest nor world order would be served by a United States betrayal of its contract with Taiwan.

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Moreover, against the history of past antagonisms, Washington must fear even mutually advantageous economic arrangements for coexistence between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China within a monly understood and accepted frame of one China might require, for a while an external guarantee that such arrangements would not serve aggressive or subversive purposes. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 remains such a guarantee for Taiwan and the Pescadores, and within its terms and tradition, the United States furnishes military assistance, stations personnel on Taiwan, and has created links between Taiwan and surrounding U.S. base areas. Washington, Peking, Taipei, and Tokyo would all gain if there were credible selfperpetuating understandings to demilitarize the Taiwan Strait because the real self-interest of all participating parties would be obvious. Having participated in such understandings, the United States could then totally remove its involvement in the military establishment on Taiwan and terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. International participation in provisional guarantees during a period of transition would end when both Peking and Taipei desired to remove all foreign participation in their relations with each other.

If we take seriously Chou En-lai's anxieties about a Washington and Tokyo sponsorship of Taiwan independence, some eventual pattern of accommodation of this sort is very probable if only because its alternative is likelihood of a war from which all of the countries of northeast Asia would suffer deeply, and only the Soviet Union-if even it-might benefit. Meanwhile, the matrix for the refinement and elaboration of future security understandings could be the peaceful coexistence of the economic systems of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.

APPENDIX 6

[From the Congressional Record, Aug. 28, 1970]

STATEMENT BY HON. DONALD M. FRASER IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENT

ATIVES, AUGUST 28, 1970, TITLED "POLITICAL REPRESSION IN 'FREE CHINA'"

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Speaker, on July 29, 1970, I presented a paper at a Members of Congress for Peace Through Law-MCPL-luncheon. The subject of my paper was "Political Repression in 'Free China.'" In it I stated:

"If the United States wants a resolution of the political impasse now existing in (the Formosa Straits area), the United States cannot continue its extensive support of the Nationalist regime simply because it is the lesser of two evils."

Mr. Speaker, I feel this very strongly. My paper amply documents the suppression of basic political liberties by the Nationalist Chinese regime. At the same time I recognize that the mainland Communist regime represents the greater evil. A recent New York Times Magazine article by Richard Hughes provides current evidence that this is the case.

It is clear that just as we must cease our support, moral and material, of the Nationalist regime on Formosa, we must not surrender the fate of Formosa to the Chinese.

It is my hope that the Congress will look closely at the China issue and seek initiative. Hoping to contribute to a rational debate of the subject, I place in the Record my MCPL paper:

POLITICAL REPRESSION IN "FREE CHINA"

(By Donald M. Fraser)

INTRODUCTION

This paper details the authorization nature of the regime controlling Formosa (Taiwan). The suppression of basic political liberties is amply documented.

What are the implications for the United States' China policy? A fresh start on U.S. policy must take the country as it is, not as it might have been. The United States undoubtedly bears responsibility for helping establish on Formosa and continue in office the existing Nationalist Chinese Government. And most Taiwanese (Formosans), as well as the transplanted mainlanders, if faced with the choice would prefer the present regime, coercive as it is, to the mainland Communist regime. But if the United States wants a resolution of the political impasse now existing in that part of the world, the United States cannot continue its extensive support of the Nationalist regime simply because it is the lesser of two evils. The people living on Formosa want to and must become masters of their own destiny.

For all practical purposes, the State Department no longer recognizes any claim by the Nationalist Government to mainland China. Inevitably the fiction that the Nationalist regime represents all of China must be abandoned. This, in turn, will force the Nationalist Government to receive a mandate from the people living on Formosa or lose the legitimacy it now claims.

When these changes will occur is uncertain. Members who serve in the three national congressional bodies now based in Taiwan (Formosa) were elected in the late 1940's before the flight from the mainland. Now, as national assembly members die, quorum requirements are lowered. The passage of time alone will force some change in the present system and outlook. But the abandonment of the current Nationalist fictions of legitimacy will be fiercely resisted as long as possible by the present regime.

Our present Ambassador to Taiwan recently said: "The established policy of our Government is to prevent the renewal of hostilities in the Taiwan Strait area which could easily imperil the peace of Asia." I agree that this should be a part of our policy. But this is not enough. Although we have no vital security interest in Formosa, we have a great humanitarian interest in and concern for the people who live on Formosa.

Thus, we should neither explicitly nor tacitly encourage incursions by the Nationalists onto the mainland or the expansion of Formosan military airfields to accommodate U.S. military aircraft as large as B-52 bombers. We should encourage more realistic military defense levels. And until a process begins that will result in the destiny of Formosa being placed in the hands of all those who live there, we should scale down or discontinue military and other support to the Nationalist regime. We should strongly assert our belief that the people living on Taiwan be given full political rights including self-determination.

Beyond reducing our support for the regime, it is unclear how the United States can directly aid the growth of political freedom on Formosa. Were we better equipped, we might find other ways to contribute to the growth of freedom there. But it is clear that the most important contribution the United States can make is its support of the morally right position-self-determination. The people of Taiwan are capable of directing their own affairs.

In any event, a more realistic appraisal of the facts about Formosa must underlie new U.S. policies toward the regime, and the American public must become aware of the realities.

BRIEF HISTORY OF FORMOSA

Chinese, primarily from Fukien Province, began to migrate in substantial numbers to the island of Formosa in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. During the 17th century, various colonial powers (the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch) and dissident Chinese vied for the island. In 1683 the Ching Dynasty formally annexed Formosa. For the next two centuries, Formosa was very loosely controlled by China. After being defeated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, China ceded Formosa to Japan and agreed to Korea's "independence." Although Korea was not annexed by Japan until 15 years later, Formosa was annexed immediately. For the next 50 years, Formosa was ruled by Japan.

In 1943, at a meeting in Cairo, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-shek issued a declaration which read in part: "All territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as *** Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." The terms of this declaration were repeated 2 years later at the Potsdam Conference. When Japan surrendered, General MacArthur authorized the Chinese Nationalists to accept the surrender of Formosa from the Japanese and to occupy the island in behalf of the allied powers. Peace treaties subsequently signed with Japan ended that nation's "right, title and claim" to Formosa. But the island's status was left in limbo. The official position of the United States is that the status of Formosa remains unresolved.

When the Chinese came to Taiwan in 1945 and 1946, they found a highly literate (80 percent) and modern state. Chinese troops took advantage of the relative prosperity of Formosa and numerous incidents of pillage, rape, and murder occurred. A former resident of Formosa, Albert Axelbank, wrote in Harper's: "Formosan rage (at the conduct of the occupation forces) exploded February 28, 1947, after police beat to death a woman who allegedly sold untaxed cigarettes." Blood literally flowed in the streets of Taipei. A recent State Department paper summarized a memorandum submitted by Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart to President Chiang on April 18, 1947: "The memorandum recounts numerous incidents of widesperad and indiscriminate killings by government police and troops, particularly after reinforcements began to arrive from the mainland on March 8. Some of these incidents which occurred in Taipei were observed by American consular officials; others were reported by foreign residents there and elsewhere. U.S. official documents, written well after the event, generally have accepted the figure of 10,000 persons as the approximate number killed during the period which extended until the end of March 1947." The Formosans have not forgotten.

This tragedy received little foreign attention because even as the Nationalists were occupying Formosa in 1947, they were engaged in a bloody civil war on the mainland. In 1949, Chiang and the remnants of his government and armies were driven out of China and sought refuge on Formosa. Chiang arrived on the island on December 10, 1949.

The area controlled by the Nationalist Government was reduced from 3,700,000 square miles and a population of 500 million on the Chinese mainland to Taiwan proper, the Pescadores, and the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu, with a combined area of 13,890 square miles and a population of 8 million. Today there are 14 million people on Formosa. Of that number, 85 percent are native Taiwanese.

PERMANENT "STATE OF SIEGE"

The Nationalist Government now had control over a relatively small territory and it had taken steps to ensure that its rule over Taiwan would be virtually complete. On May 19, 1949, the Nationalist Chinese Garrison Command in Formosa had proclaimed a general "state of siege" or martial law over Formosa and the other islands. The effect of the civil liberties of the people was devastating. Illustrative of its severity were the large number of offenses carrying the death penalty including: (1) circulating rumors and beguiling the public, (2) disrupting the money market, (3) striking by workers or traders, (4) encouraging students to strike, and (5) disrupting water supplies or electric and gas services.

Examination of these martial law regulations is essential to an understanding of the internal situation in Taiwan, because the "state of seige" still exists.1 Since 1949, a major portion of community life in Formosa has been under the control and surveillance of military authority. Most guarantees and protections of individual rights and freedoms written into the 1947 Chinese Constitution have been suspended, and the judicial system has become a pawn of the military. Political offenses are defined generally as "crimes which are incidental to and form a part of political disturbances, including offenses consisting in an attack upon the political order of things established in the country *** as well as offenses committed to obtain any political object." Several laws were added to insure complete control over the local population. The Statute for Punishment of Rebellion (June 21, 1949), the Statute for Denouncement and Suppression of Rebels (instituted in 1940 and amended in 1954), the Military Trial Law (instituted in 1956 and amended in 1959), and the Judicial Interpretation of the Council of Grand Justices (1956) have formed the basis for the militarization of the judicial system. Since 1949, political offenses have been under the control of a military court.

Special practices abrogate important provisions of the judicial system: (1) In practice, the statute of limitations is not applicable for political offenses. Individuals have been tried for political crimes allegedly committed nearly two decades ago.

(2) The principle prohibiting ex post facto laws is not applicable to political offenses. This results in trials and convictions of "offenders" for political acts committed before laws prohibited the act.

(3) Immunities and privileges of legislators are not recognized for political offenses. A member of the Legislative Yuan is "permanently responsible for opinions expressed in it if the opinion constitutes a political offense," even though the Constitution provides immunity for "an opinion expressed or a vote cast in the Yuan."

(4) Persons are not given remission of punishment for political offenses committed when they were underage. Recently, several persons were convicted of offenses committed over 24 years ago when they were less than 14 years old. (5) Leniencies given to an offender's family who shielded him are not applicable for political offenses. Everyone is obligated to renounce the "rebel." No one is safe from being reported by members of his family. Imprisonment of from 1 to 7 years is meted out to those who knowingly fail to denounce "rebels." (6) There is no parole for political offenders.

If you are not caught in the web of these laws, you can be politically detained under the Statute for the Denouncement and Suppression of Rebels. This law stipulates that "those who commit (political) offenses and need reform shall be sent for reform." There are two supplements to the fundamental laws already mentioned. They are "Measures for Control of Hooligans during the Enforcement of Martial Law in Formosa" and "Measures for the Reform of Rebels during the Period of Communist Rebellion." If the government cannot imprison you on a specific charge, it can intern you for suspected thoughts or behavior. The first term is 3 years and it is indefinitely renewable. Political internment can, without trial, amount to life imprisonment.

1 The material for this section has been obtained from a study of the laws and problems surrounding political offenses in Formosa. The study is by a lawyer with great experience in Taiwan affairs.