APPENDIX 7

NEWS CONFERENCE AT SHANGHAI, FEBRUARY 27, 1972, oF DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE MARSHALL GREEN

Mr. ZIEGLER. You have had a chance to read over the communique. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss it with you and take your questions. What Dr. Kissinger says is on the record. Together with Dr. Kissinger is Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, who, as you know, participated in all the meetings with Secretary of State Rogers when he met with the Foreign Minister, and he is here also to discuss the communique with you and to take your questions, together with Dr. Kissinger. We will begin with Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make a few preliminary observations before we go to your questions. Let me do it in two parts: the process, and there is obviously the communique produced; and secondly, what does it mean in general terms? Then I believe that I will be prepared to answer questions.

First, how was the communique produced? From the beginning of our contacts with the People's Republic of China, there were some obvious general considerations of what the outcome of a meeting between the President and the leaders of the People's Republic might be.

During the interim visit, there was some exploratory conversation of an outcome in the conventional sense in which both sides tend to state general positions which they afterward choose to interpret, each in their own way.

It was therefore decided early in the meetings on this occasion between the President and Prime Minister that such an approach would make no sense. It would not be worthy of the purposes that were attempted to be served.

It was therefore decided that each side would state its position on issues in a section which it would produce more or less independent of the other. It would not pretend to an agreement which did not exist and which would have to be interpreted away in subsequent implementations. Therefore, the beginning part of the communique represents in effect a statement by each side of some of its general principles.

On our side, they were deliberately not phrased in a contentious way. While in discussions some of the arguments made by the Chinese side were, of course, rebutted, we did not feel that this was the appropriate vehicle to do so, but rather to state what our positive view was.

For that matter, the Chinese side did not rebut arguments which we made in our section that they did not particularly agree with.

In order to present these two views on an equal basis, it had been decided that in the text issued by the American Government, the U.S. position would be stated first; and in the text to be issued by the Chinese Government, the Chinese version would be stated first. I mention this only so that you will not be surprised if the Chinese version follows a different sequence from the American version. This is by agreement. Both versions are official and are being put out on the basis of this agreement.

The procedure that was followed here was that issues of general principle were first discussed in the meetings between the President and the Prime Minister. They were then, after they had been explored for some time, transferred to the meetings chaired by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China. Then, if any additional issues arose, they might be referred back to the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister.

In drafting the communique, various sections were produced by various elements of the American side. I played the role of go-between on our side, and the Vice Foreign Minister, whose name I despair of ever learning to pronounce, on the Chinese side.

In this manner, as we put together the various paragraphs that were supplied to us on our side by various individuals, if we reached a point at which agreement seemed near or possible, we would then go back to our principals and to the Secretary of State. Through this process, the communique was finally achieved.

For example, some of the sessions were quite prolonged. The last few nights the sessions went on until the early hours of the morning with the President. In Peking, the Chinese delegation had a house in the guest complex, and most of the sessions took place in that house. As a paragraph was finished, it would typically go back then to the President, who was in the next house, and this went on Friday night until about 5 in the morning.

So much for the process. Let me say something about the content. Obviously neither side would have written this communique this way if it had been able to draft it entirely by itself. Therefore, it represented an attempt by two countries that had been out of contact for a long time to find a basis to convey first some immediate understandings, but beyond that, to start a process by which they could bring about a closer relationship over a period of time and by which they could, where interests converged, act in a more nearly parallel fashion and where interests differed, to mitigate the consequences of those disagreements. So the communique ought to be seen in two aspects: first, in terms of the specific principles and conclusions it states; and, second, in terms of the direction to which it seeks to point. It is on that basis that we are presenting it to the American people and on which the People's Republic is presenting it as well.

Now, this is all that I want to say by way of introduction. I wonder whether Marshall Green would like to add a few words, and then we will be glad to answer questions.

Mr. GREEN. I have just a few words. First of all, with regard to the People's Republic of China authority with whom Dr. Kissinger was maintaining the discussions, it was Chiao Kuan-hua-just to clarify that point.

I don't think I really have much to add. Our talks under Secretary Rogers on our side, and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei for the People's Republic of China, extended over, I believe, 10 hours altogether.

But it was not just the talks themselves. We had frequent occasion, as you could imagine with all the fine food you have eaten-occasionally waiting to have that fine food to have extensive talks also, and a number of matters could be discussed in that context.

Also, it was not just that, but the Secretary did have a chance to meet on a number of occasions with the Prime Minister. Most recently, coming down on the plane, he had an hour and a half from Peking to Hangchow. And then today the Prime Minister called on him in his hotel room for about 40 minutes.

I would say that the talks and the counterpart meetings were characterized by candor, friendliness, and courtesy and hospitality, as I am sure you have all seen, on the part of our Chinese hosts. There was no pulling of punches-not physically, of course. They were outspoken, no effort to cover up or paper over differences, but to have it out. It is good for the system. I think in so doing one has a much better appreciation of the other person's point of view.

As far as the specifics are concerned in the talks, I really can't say much more than what already appears in the communique itself, although some of the points there may raise questions.

Question. On page 4, in stating that the United States will progressively reduce its forces in military installations on Taiwan, was that decision a result of the discussions here in China?

Dr. KISSINGER. No; this is a general statement of our policy which we have enunciated on innumerable occasions in innumerable forums. It says that we maintain the amount of forces that is required by the general situation and not by any abstract determination. It is a statement of our general policy, but not a mutual decision.

Question. Is there any sign now that the conditions would lead to a reduction of the American military force in Taiwan shortly?

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to speculate on what will be done over a period of time, but if you speak about "shortly," I would not expect that.

Question. Why did not the U.S. Government reaffirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done on numerous occasions?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me take this occasion to deal with that particular aspect, and let me deal with it once and not answer it in innumerable elliptical forms in which, no doubt, it will be presented.

The particular issue which Mr. Kraslow (David J. Kraslow, Los Angeles Times) raised is, of course, an extraordinary difficult one to discuss on the territory of a country with which we do not maintain formal diplomatic relations and for which this particular issue is a matter of profound principle.

Let me, therefore, state in response to this and any related question-and let me do it once and not repeat it: We stated our basic position with respect to this

issue in the President's world report in which we say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that position.

But I would appreciate it if that would be all that I would be asked to say about it in these circumstances. But the position of the world report stands and has been unaltered.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, the possibility is mentioned of the United States sending a representative to Peking from time to time. Is there any likelihood that this process might be reversed and Peking might send a representative to Washington?

Dr. KISSINGER. The situation of the two sides is not exactly equal in this respect, because in Washington there is a Chinese representation different from that that would be sent under the hypothesis which you mention. However, what we envisage is the establishment of a contact point, to begin with, in which the discussions about the exchanges and trade that are mentioned in the preceding paragraphs will be formally conducted and as soon as this contact point has been established, it will be announced and the visit of a U.S. representative to Peking would take place as the need arises, and as particular issues of great importance need to be discussed. This, however, is not to the exclusion of any other possibility.

Question. What do you mean by "a contact point"?

Dr. KISSINGER. For example, there existed for a while, and formally still exists, a forum in Warsaw where United States and Chinese officials met-something of this kind. As soon as that is established, which we expect will be in the reasonably near future, we will announce it.

Question. Will that be established in the United States or Canada or some other country?

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't expect it to be in the United States, but I don't want to speculate beyond that.

Question. Can we assume that the President and Prime Minister discussed all these differences face-to-face, specifically their differences over Vietnam and the reduction of troops on Taiwan? Were these positions stated openly?

Dr. KISSINGER. All differences were discussed by the President and the Prime Minister face-to-face, candidly and seriously, including those which you mentioned.

Question. Can you point to anything in this document in which the People's Republic of China goes any significant step beyond its position at the time of the first ping-pong exchanges?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: We are not approaching this from the point of view of a scoreboard of seeing who scored how many points on which issue. At the time of the first ping-pong exchange, if I understand the position of the People's Republic of China, it was that some very low-level people-topeople exchanges would occur.

The formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two Governments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two Governments, the establishment of diplomatic mechanisms for continued contact, the joint statement of some general principles of international relations, the joint statement of some basic approaches to the view of the world with respect to, for example, the section which includes the reference to hegemony-these, I believe, are matters that most of us would have considered unthinkable at the time of the invitation to the pingpong team.

But I would put them on the basis of mutuality rather than of any unilateral movemeint on the part of the People's Republic of China.

Question. Henry, is this the first time that a President of the United States has formally picked up the language of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have to say I am simply not sure. All I would reply, again, would be an answer in the same terms as I did to Mr. Frankel (Max Frankel, New York Times). The question is not who put forward the proposals. The question is: Does it contain principles that we can live by and since we have said we are prepared to apply these principles during the next one on the nonuse of force, and since both sides have stated this, it does not really make a crucial difference who put it forward first.

Question. How much progress was there made in advancing the ball, in response to the question asked by George Ball on the trips, "Is this necessary?" How much further did we go than in your original discussions with Premier Chou?

Dr. KISSINGER. The character of the discussions inevitably is entirely different when the President of the United States talks than when an assistant talks who cannot make any definitive statement. The basic objective of this trip was to set in motion a train of events and evolution in the policy of our two countries which both sides recognized would be slow at first and present many difficulties and in which a great deal depended on the assessment by each side of the understanding by the other of what was involved in this process and of the assessment by each side of the reliability of the other in being able to pursue this for the amount of time necessary to see it prevail.

In this sense it almost had to be conducted by the heads of the two governments, and in this sense I would say that in the depth and seriousness of the discussions it went, obviously, beyond what had been discussed in my visits and beyond our expectations.

Question. Did Chairman Mao participate? Did his participation go to the detailed substance of this matter, or was it largely philosophical and general? Dr. KISSINGER. I don't believe that it would be appropriate for me to go into detail about the content of the conversation with Chairman Mao. I may say, however, that Chairman Mao and the President discussed each of the essential categories in a general way and we have every reason to believe that the Prime Minister checked with the Chairman at every step along the way. But it was not just a vague philosophical discussion.

Question. The assertion of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, combined with the statement of respect for one China, could that be construed as meaning that the United States notes the claim of the Government of the People's Republic of China, it claims to sovereignty over Taiwan?

Dr. KISSINGER. Our view with respect to Taiwan has been exhaustively stated in that paragraph you refer to, and we add nothing to it.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us whether there is any timetable under which you are going to undertake to facilitate the contacts and exchanges in cultural, sports, and journalistic areas?

Dr. KISSINGER. There is no precise timetable, Walter, but I think it is correct to say that both sides understand that this will be pursued with some dispatch.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the statement by the Government of China that the Chinese side said that the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations, does this timetable depend on further progress in the solution of the Taiwan question?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. This is independent of the other, though at what point the two would become interdependent again, I cannot judge. But as this is written now, my answer to Walter Cronkite stands on its own feet.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, where the communique states, "Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the people of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries, to divide up the world into spheres of interest," was that a result of your talks about Sino-Soviet tensions or was the Soviet Union involved in the talks? Does this refer to how the United States views the relationship between China and the United States and the Soviet Union?

Dr. KISSINGER. We have said on many occasions, and I will say it again here, that as far as the United States is concerned, our relationship with the People's Republic of China is not directed against the Soviet Union and while the People's Republic is well able to speak for itself-and my megalomania has not reached the point where I believe that I can speak for it-I believe that it is clear to us that neither is the policy of the People's Republic of China in its relations with us directed against the Soviet Union.

We are pursung our policy with the People's Republic of China on the ground that a stable peace in the world is difficult to envisage if 800 million people are excluded from a dialog with the most powerful nation in the world, and we are conducting our discussions with the People's Republic entirely on the merits of that relationship.

The paragraph on hegemony will arise only if any country should seek it, but we had no particular country in mind when it was being drafted.

Question. In the paragraph referring to the reduction of forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes, is this an exclusive reference to Indochina as the area?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. It is a reference to the general area. It is not a reference to any particular part of Asia.

Question. What conditions in that area would keep American troops in Taiwan? What tensions in the area of Taiwan now require the presence of American troops there?

Dr. KISSINGER. We are talking about the general state of relationships in Asia and in the world. It is in reference to that that our general decisions on deployments will be made.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, the President said in a television interview the beginning of January that he would bring up the question of American prisoners of war in Vietnam when he came to China. Can you tell us if it came up and what the reaction was?

Dr. KISSINGER. Obviously, as the communique makes clear, the issue of Vietnam was discussed, and it is also clear that we would not discuss it without mentioning our concern with respect to the prisoners. The position of the People's Republic is as stated in the communique that it supports the sevenpoint proposal made by the Provisional government-by the People's Government, and I think it is a fair characterization of the basic positions.

Question. Dr. Kissinger, there is a paragraph that says “International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force." Since the People's Republic says the difficulty with us on Taiwan is an international issue, does this mean that they have agreed not to use force or the threat of force in settling or solving that?

Dr. KISSINGER. The formal position of the People's Republic of China with respect to Taiwan is a matter, of course, of extreme delicacy for us to discuss here at all. Clearly, they do not, as they have stated in their part of the section on Taiwan, consider it an international problem in any normal sense. Clearly, the formal statements with respect to this issue have to be drafted with the various perspectives in mind.

REPORTER. Thank you, gentlemen.