One reason we have failed to recognize the future importance of Japan in international politics is that the Japanese most Americans now encounter appear as narrowly focused economic men. It is their misfortune that they often seem to caricature the notorious American qualities of thinking in short time spans and carrying pragmatism altogether too far.

Yet in regarding the Japanese too narrowly in economic terms we Americans disclose an ideological bias that has frequently led us astray-our tendency to swallow the Marxist myth that all nations (except, of course, the United States) shape their foreign policy in slavish conformity to their presumed economic advantage, despite the fact that history is filled with situations where the opposite occurred. Thus we are tempted to take it for granted that because the United States is currently the most important single outlet for Japanese goods, we can behave pretty much as we wish toward Tokyo "because the Japanese have nowhere else to go."

But pride, nationalism and often downright irrationality are more likely to shape Japan's political relations than any informed calculation of economic interest. In spite of the current vogue for "linkage," we will never persuade Japan to adopt a political course at odds with her popular consensus, whether by threats of protectionism or commercial policy concessions. Let us not forget that when we sought to discourage Japan's expansionism in 1940 by cutting off her petroleum supplies, we did not stop her from going to war; we merely speeded her timing.

Nor should we draw false conclusions from a mistaken conception of her economy. Japan is not a Hong Kong that lives by importing raw materials, transforming them and selling them on the markets of the world: She is first and foremost a vast and burgeoning internal market. In contrast to a nation such as West Germany, whose exports total almost a fourth of her gross national product, Japan's exports and imports each constitute not much more than 10 percent-or considerably less than 1 year's annual growth. Certainly Japan is dependent on imported raw materials, but most of these are obtainable from the so-called Third World, including China, and if Japan should find herself increasingly excluded from Western markets—or if she should find her major political interests jeopardized or disregarded by the West-she is far more likely to seek a privileged position with such developing countries than to bend her political policies to appease or mollify the United States or Western Europe.

This by no means suggests that the problem posed by aggressive Japanese competition is unimportant or that it does not demand intense and careful attention. Within the past few years, as our own external trade balance has deteriorated, many Americans in both business and government have felt angered and frustrated by Japan's behavior in international trade, and though they sometimes overstate the problem, they unquestionably have a legitimate complaint. Unhappily our reaction has been uninformed by a coherent policy. Under pressure of the individual complaints of particular industries, we have resorted to restrictionist improvisations worked out through bilateral discussions. We have ignored the point that Japanese industry has its own special history, structure, institutions and relationships; to bring it into a trading system constructed largely in response to Western institutions and habits of thought is an intricate task that cannot be accomplished by America alone, but only by a common effort of all the industrial trading nations.

But if preoccupation with Japan as an industrial competitor has led us to overlook her political significance, that only partially explains our aberrant actions during the past year. Fully as important as our preoccupation with Japan as an industrial competitor has been the lack of professionalism that has increasingly marred the execution of policy ever since the White House opted to become its own foreign office or, more accurately, sought to get along without

one.

Troublesome as this problem has been for our relations with other parts of the world, in regard to Japan it has got completely out of hand. It is significant that there is no Japanese expert among the 165 members of Mr. Kissinger's White House staff; and, since the State Department's own experts are no longer consulted, it is easy to understand why we have disastrously underestimated Japan's capacities for good or evil.

Still, it would be oversimplifying the problem to attribute Japan's threatened estrangement merely to the obtuseness of a White House too egocentric to delegate, for it has also reflected a self-conscious decision by the administration to regard the reactions of Japan as of only secondary interest.

And this brings us back to the President's image of five balancing powers, which deserves a closer second look. In terms of present-day realities it would be fanciful to speak of "an even balance" among entities of such disparate size and weight as the United States, Western Europe, Russia, China, and Japan. Two have massive nuclear arsenals, two have relatively puny nuclear capabilities, and one has no nuclear weapons at all; two have world-circling political interests and activities while the political interests and activities of the other three are merely regional in scope; four are major industrial powers while one is a vast underdeveloped country.

Even if Europe someday achieves real political unity and Japan becomes a world political force, the conditions would not exist for a static equipoise of five equidistant powers. Something of that kind was possible among the Italian city-states of the 15th century and later among the sovereigns of Europe; in those cases the political units shared a common intellectual and social heritage. But historical, social, ideological and economic differences could not be more profound than among the five powers the President says he would like to see in even balance. Thus the conditions clearly do not exist for a static equipoise, nor can one envisage a balance of power in the 19th-century pattern, with alliances reversing and coalitions shifting to prevent any one nation from gaining a position of hegemony over the others.

For one thing, there is no pivotal power to "hold" the balance-a role that Great Britain played by throwing its weight with whichever seemed the weaker side. And given the fundamental ideological cleavages both between the Communist powers and in the rest of the world, it is bizarre to think of the United States combining with China against Japan or Western Europe, just as it is difficult to believe that Japan might combine either with the Soviet Union or China against Western Europe or the United States. Thus the Japanese and informed Europeans interpret the President's concept of five balancing powers to mean only that the United States has abandoned a strategy based on alliances in favor of a strategy of maneuver and independent action.

Certainly that is the game the White House seems to be playing today, dealing bilaterally with Moscow and Peking, trying to play one off against the other, while we let our allies-particularly Japan-shift for themselves. In the case of Europe this may do little harm, provided it does not inspire a flurry of bilateral diplomacy with each small European state trying to make its own separate deal with the Russians and thus producing a weak and fragmented West. An optimist might even hope, on the contrary, that a lone-wolf American policy could speed Europe toward unity-which would clearly be a good thing. With a shared heritage of institutions and ideas and a settled habit of talking easily with one another, the Atlantic nations are quite unlikely to work at crosspurposes, whether or not our alliance relations are institutionalized.

But Japan is a different matter. Ties across the Pacific are of brief duration and dangerously fragile, and we face enormous problems in trying to understand one another. Nor could a Japan alienated from America and left to her own devices avail herself of anything resembling the kind of constructive alternative that the Europeans can find by unifying; her only realistic alternative would be nationalism.

That is why many of us have contended for many years that America should take the lead in building a coalition of major non-Communist industrialized nations by first turning the United States-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty into a mature coalition, then progressively integrating that relationship into an expanded Atlantic partnership that would include in its purview the Far East as well as the West.

The assumption underlying this proposal was that over the years ahead, Europe would slowly expand its political horizons to resume an interest in Far Eastern affairs, while Japan would, along with its global industrial role, extend its political interests on a worldwide basis. Thus, by bringing Japan into existing Atlantic economic institutions and developing political institutions to include the Far East, we might in the long run be able to build a broad and solid base from which a reconciliation could gradually be worked out with the Soviet Union and China.

It was a bright vision but it is rapidly fading, and if we persist in our present course of action, it will fade irrevocably. Perhaps it has already during this past traumatic year.

APPENDIX 11

PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO MAINLAND CHINA: ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND AFTERMATH

(By Stephen Pan, Ph. D., former president, East Asian Research Institute, and Rev. Raymond J. De Jaegher, general representative for Far East Area, Free Pacific Association, August 1972)

1. HOW COMMUNIST CHINA CAME INTO EXISTENCE

The Chinese Communists succeeded in conquering mainland China in 1949 due to several important factors. Among the most obviously important factors were the weaknesses and faults of the Chinese National Government, the Chinese Communist strategic and tactical policy of deliberate deceit, subversion, and revolution together with full Soviet support, and the lukewarm assistance rendered by the United States to its wartime ally, the Chinese National Government and the Nationalist Party.

From the time the Chinese Communists established their government in Peking in October 1949, up to 1971 and extending to January 1972, the American Government, through the Democratic and Republican administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, had adhered to their well-known "nonrecognition policy" toward the Peking regime. In 1915, when Japan presented her 21 Demands to China, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan invoked the "nonrecognition policy." (U.S. Foreign Relations, Washington, 1915, p. 146.) During the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Secretary of State Henry Stimson invoked the policy of nonrecognition. (Department of State, Press Releases, January 9, 1932, vol. 6, pp. 41-2.)

Regarding the creation of "Manchukuo" by Japan, Secretary of State Cordell Hull also repeatedly reiterated U.S. nonrecognition toward the puppet state.

U.S. nonrecognition of the Communist regime in Peking through four and onehalf succeeding administrations had been reiterated forcefully time after time, and concurrently the American Government continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and its temporary Government seat in Taipei, Taiwan. Furthermore, the United States signed a mutual security treaty with the Republic of China in 1954, and this treaty is still in force. (Even subsequent to President Nixon's trip to mainland China, the administration official spokesmen have continued to state that the United States would continue to uphold her treaty obligations with the Republic of China.)

Incidentally, the nonrecognition policy has not been confined to the 20th century. For instance, it was nearly 70 years after the Declaration of Independence by the Netherlands that it was recognized by Spain in the Treaty of Munster in 1648. The new dynasty of Braganza was established in Portugal by a revolt against Spain in 1644, but was not acknowledged or recognized by Spain until the Treaty of Lisbon in 1688 was signed, i.e., about 44 years later.

As to an early U.S. experience, in the case of Texas, Congress in the summer of 1836 adopted a resolution urging the recognition of the independence of Texas. But in December of the same year, President Andrew Jackson sent a special message to Congress suggesting delay in recognition. He reminded the Members of Congress that his predecessors had cautiously tried to abstain from making hasty decisions about recognition, and unless they had "clearest evidence" they would not make a decision to recognize an independent state or a new government.

In addition to the practice of nonrecognition, especially during the Eisenhower administration in 1954, Washington had adopted a policy of "containment with isolation" toward Communist China. This policy had been continuously and rigidly adhered to by the succeeding administrations. However, shortly after

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Richard Nixon became President, he suggested and adopted a policy of "negotiation instead of confrontation," and gradually worked out a policy of accommodating Communist China.

3. NIXON'S UNPRECEDENTED DIPLOMATIC ATTEMPTS

It is unprecedented for a President of the United States to pay a visit to a Government or a state which the United States does not recognize or with which Washington has no formal diplomatic relations. Nor can it be found in American diplomatic history that a President while in office has visited China. Moreover, during the Nixon administration, especially in 1971, most of the Chiefs of State whose governments had diplomatic relations with Washington had either to come to U.S. shores or the territories of a third nation in order to meet President Nixon. But President Nixon made a special self-invited trip to mainland China. (See President Nixon's own statement on July 15, 1971.)

4. SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO MAINLAND CHINA When President Nixon was about to depart from Shanghai on February 27, 1972, in his toast at a dinner given by the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, he said: "This was the week that changed the world." In his concluding remark, he rather boastfully stated: "Mr. Prime Minister, our two peoples tonight hold the future of the world in our hands." Such a remark is certainly at odds with President Nixon's statement prior to his trip that his journey would not touch or affect any third nation. Of course, President Nixon at first wanted to ease the minds of statesmen and politicians of other nations by implying that his meetings with Chou En-lai would not sacrifice the rights and interests of other nations, with which the United States has treaty obligations. But at the end of his visit of mainland China, especially after he was charmed by the tongue and tactics of the infinitely cunning and versatile Chou En-lai and after he had completed his visits to the Great Wall and the magnificent palaces in Peking, it might be possible that President Nixon was euphoric and that he forgot that his statement would be carefully analyzed by the statesmen and politicians all over the world. No doubt, such a Nixon statement cannot avoid having wide repercussions. Similarly, President Nixon's own announcement of going to mainland China by itself could have made many nations greatly concerned. Among those nations mostly disturbed were the Soviet Union, Japan. the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

In fact shortly after President Nixon announced on July 15, 1971, his plan of visiting mainland China, several important events occurred as reactions to such a visit. Japan, as a growing economic power, greatly resented the American arbitrary decision to flirt with Communist China without any prior consultation with Tokyo. The Republic of Korea was greatly concerned about President Nixon's effort to appease Peking, which might afford an opportunity for North Korea to launch a new military campaign against South Korea. Thus Seoul declared martial law as an alert against possible North Korean invasion. The Republic of Korea was the first victim of the announced Nixon trip to mainland China when Henry Kissinger was a second time in Peking in October 1971, during the United Nations Assembly discussion on China representation. The Republic of China, a founding member of the United Nations, was summarily expelled from the world organization,

At the same time, Communist China was invited to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, even when the United Nations had not removed from its book its condemnation of Communist China as an aggressor in the Korean war. Such an illegal act has made a mockery of the world organization, which is supposed to be against aggression and for world peace and justice. Moreover, Thailand was concerned of possible incursion of the Indochinese Communists, together with the native Thai Communist force, into the northeastern parts of Thailand. Thus, not long after President Nixon's announcement of going to mainland China, Bangkok put aside its constitutional government and formed a military government to encounter a possible emergency. As a countermeasure to the possible Peking-Washington détente, Moscow and New Delhi launched a war against Pakistan, resulting in the creation of Bangladesh. Similarly, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia worked together and decided to adopt a collective policy toward Communist China with watchful waiting. In

other words, these Southeastern nations realizing that they could not altogether depend on American pledges or support, decided they should work together and adopt a common policy toward Peking.

5. WHY COMMUNIST CHINA HAS ADOPTED FLEXIBLE POLICY TOWARDS UNITED STATES

The principal aim of communism is to overthrow world capitalism. The United States, as the strongest capitalist nation, has been the major target of both Soviet Russia and Communist China. In the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party of 1969, it is solemnly declared by Peking that it would try every means to destroy American imperialism. The training of all the youth in mainland China since 1949 to the present has been to hate and to destroy U.S. imperialism. Why did Chou En-lai, as a Communist leader, suddenly adopt a more flexible policy toward the United States? It is evident that Communist China considered that it was to her advantage to be less hostile, at least for the time being, toward the United States. The main reasons for this may be briefly enumerated as follows:

(a) Peking's Internal Struggles

Since the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, there have been many splits and struggles, both ideological and power-based. During the Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–69), many veteran party leaders and cadres were eliminated and purged, which caused the party to be somewhat paralyzed and the military, under the leadership of Lin Piao, controlled or at least dominated the party. Even in the state council under Chou En-lai, the various ministries were gradually infiltrated by military leaders as deputy ministers up to September 1971. Such a phenomenon threatened the very existence of Chou En-lai and possibly the power of Mao Tse-tung. Thus, at the height of the controversy between Lin Piao and Chou En-lai, the former was finally purged or liquidated by the Mao-Chou faction. There are different versions of the death or elimination of Lin Piao. But, in short, Lin Piao is now either physically or politically dead, or both.

Dr. Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Peking in the early part of July of last year, together with President Nixon's announcement about his trip to mainland China certainly strengthened the hands of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung. However, despite the purge of Lin Piao and hundreds of party and government leaders of Lin's group, many military officers and party cadres still continue to occupy key power positions in many provinces and special districts or regions.

It should be remembered that during the Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-69) the antiforeign activities of the Red Guards, as instigated by the Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao faction of the Chinese Communist Party, alienated the friendship and good will of many nations (including some Communist nations) which had diplomatic relations with Peking. For instance, the Red Guards launched demonstrations and acts of violence in Macao and Hong Kong. They even started demonstrations in Soviet Russia, Bulgaria, East Germany, Outer Mongolia, Italy, Japan, and France. British, French, Soviet, and Indian diplomats and consuls were insulted and humiliated. During this period, Peking recalled all its high ranking diplomats residing abroad except Huang Hua, Peking's ambassador in Cairo. Thus, Communist China practically isolated herself from the rest of the world from 1966 to 1969 and even in the early part of 1971, Peking had not recovered from this position. In order to regain its position in the world, Peking thought that courting the United States would be helpful to accomplish this end, facilitate the implementation of the Nixon doctrine, and the gradual withdrawal of American involvements in Asia, especially in Indochina, China, Japan, Korea, and other areas in that region.

(b) Deteriorated Relations Between Moscow and Peking

Various conflicting problems confronted Moscow and Peking from 1957 to 1959. By 1960, relations between these two nations worsened. In 1968, during the Czechoslovakian crisis, Moscow announced the Brezhnev doctrine, which stated that Soviet Russia, as the leader of world communism, was justified in intervening in the internal affairs of other socialist states. Peking certainly became worried about the possibility that Moscow might interfere in the internal politics of Communist China. The 1969 border clashes between Communist China and Soviet Russia almost developed into a large-scale war. The off-and-on negotiations between the diplomats of these two Communist nations have not yet come to a satisfactory settlement. There was some talk of "preventive war," to be started by Moscow to destroy nuclear and other important military objectives in mainland