the Republic of China on Taiwan as we develop a friendship on the mainland. Would you say that is an accurate statement? Mr. GREEN. I think that is a fair statement. How we treat a smaller country is important. We obviously want to have a better relationship with 800 million people on the mainland but we are not going to sacrifice our relationship with the 15 million people on Taiwan. Therefore, I fully agree with the import of your remarks. The way we handle this was not lost on the other countries, most of whom are in the range of 15 million people. I think it is very important that we stand by our friends, and we have done it in a fairly dramatic way in this instance.. I must say I would not have thought a year ago that it was possible to have an improved relationship with the People's Republic of China while at the same time reaffirming our position as we have done now. In my trip through East Asia, there was not one single blast from Peking and I made departure statements at each stop. I didn't make them on arrival because I was on a small plane with no facilities, but everywhere I left I made a departure statement, and none of those was attacked. So they understand our position and, as a matter of fact, when I left China Premier Chou En-lai came down and said, "Goodbye, Mr. Green, you have a tough job ahead of you." He was right. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Secretary Green. Ambassador Reischauer, do you have anything further to add? U.S. GAINS FROM NIXON VISIT Mr. TERRILL. I would just say that China did get certain things from the trip. I think we gained some things, as Secretary Green said. Peking has agreed to start normalizing relations with the United States before the Taiwan question is settled and that is really quite a new thing, as well as the drawing in of Peking to state-to-state diplomacy on a larger scale. Who can know what will be the good effects of that? Mr. Nixon's trip has certainly contributed substantially to it. On North Vietnam, I think it should be underlined that there is nothing in the Shanghai communique that would make one expect that Peking would have any decisive influence over the events of the last month. Nor in the realities of the relation of Hanoi and Peking, which is not as close now as it sometimes has been. It could well be that what Hanoi has done is more related to the impending visit of President Nixon to the Soviet Union than to the past visit of President Nixon to China; after all, the sophisticated weaponry to which you referred earlier, Mr. Chairman, comes not from Peking, which supplies small arms and foods to Hanoi, but from the Russians. Mr. GALLAGHER. Secretary Green. Well, on behalf of the subcommittee, I wish to thank each of you for a very interesting and very educational afternoon. The subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow at 2 p.m. (Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Wednesday, May 3, 1972.) THE NEW CHINA POLICY: ITS IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA II. The New China Policy: Its Impact on the Republic of China WEDNESDAY, MAY 3, 1972 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order. We welcome you gentlemen here this afternoon. Today we continue our inquiry into the impact of the new United States-China policy on our traditional friendships and alliances in Asia. Our focus will be the Republic of China. INTRODUCTION If the Chair may start off on a personal note, I am pleased at the quiet dignity and restraint with which the Republic of China has taken both its unfortunate expulsion from the United Nations and the idle speculation about its future. It is clear to all the world that the Republic of China fully intends to continue its remarkable pattern of economic and social development. In addition, the Chiang Kai-shek government has shown itself to be adept and flexible in its diplomatic initiatives to broaden its range of friends and trading partners, as well as raise the sense of admiration and respect of its friends here in the United States. We are fortunate to have with us today a distinguished panel of China experts-Prof. David Rowe of Yale University; Mr. James Grant, President of the Overseas Development Council, who has appeared before this subcommittee in another capacity and for whom we have high regard; Professor Reisman of the Yale Law School; and Mr. Robert Barnett, who is Vice President of the Asia Society-all with very distinguished careers. I might add that Mr. Grant and Mr. Barnett are appearing in their individual capacities rather than as spokesmen for their organizations. We will hear first from Professor Rowe whose knowledge of developments on Taiwan is exceptional because he has been visiting there at least twice a year for some time. Professor Rowe will be offering to the subcommittee a report of conditions on Taiwan as he found them just prior to the President's trip to Peking, as well as his conclusions about sovereignty over but which they admittedly did not control undertheir rule. However, both the Chinese Government in Peking and the foreign powers were opposed to Japan's actions along this line. As a result of protracted negotiations in Peking, the Japanese withdrew both their forces and their claims against the Chinese system of control and the Chinese system of political culture in Taiwan, and by the early 1870's of the 19th century Taiwan was generally recognized by all powers to belong in toto to the Chinese Empire, of which it was considered an integral part. However, the Chinese never did try to assert their control over aboriginal territory or the people there, in Taiwan, any more than they ever had over similar territories and people on the mainland. This has all been written up by Dr. S. Yen in her book entitled "Taiwan in China's Foreign Relations 1836-74." When the Japanese defeated China in the first Sino-Japanese war, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895, transferred title to Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan as a spoils of war. Japanese title thereafter derived from previous Chinese ownership. The Japanese thereafter tried to extend their rule to the mountainous aboriginal territory of western Taiwan and the people there, but without complete success. In desperation, they finally resorted to sealing off the central part of that area behind, in some areas, an electrified fence, leaving the aborigines there to rule themselves. From that autonomous territory the aborigines often sallied forth in rebellion and war against the Japanese authorities, who were confronted over a 50-year period with an average of one small rebellion every 6 months and a big one every year. Some of these affairs involved the Chinese inhabitants of the islands. Thus the Japanese could do no more in this respect than to adopt for themselves the Chinese position on the aborigines, namely, that lack of effective control overthem and their lands did not vitiate Japanese title to the whole area of Taiwan and the Pescadores. No one outside ever did challenge Japanese title to or sovereignty over these territories during the whole 50 years of Japanese colonial ownership thereof by insisting that such sovereignty depended upon. effective general control in any part of the area which otherwise would not be Japanese. Today, any challenge to sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores based upon the previous (to 1895) lack of effective Chinese governmental control in or over any part of those islands would necessarily take the form of asserting that the people the Chinese displaced there and from whom they took almost all the territory were in fact the proper owners of the whole of the territory, namely the aboriginal inhabitants who were more or less all over the islands several hundred years ago. No such assertion is responsibly advanced in any quarter, any more than is the assertion that North America should properly revert to the American Indians from whom it was for the most part forcibly taken by migrants from other and remote regions during the past several hundred years. As far as can be known, there is now no material dissidence amongthe aboriginal elements in Taiwan, who are now much better off under The Taiwan question, as it is usually misnamed, has since World War II contained a component question relative to the ownership of, and/or sovereignty over, the island of Taiwan and adjacent islands. Í want to put this question into a perspective of history, law, and other facts. MAINLAND CONTROL OF TAIWAN Historically, Taiwan has been progressively taken over by Chinese immigration from the mainland, from native aborigines of Malaysian ethnic and cultural affiliation. This Chinese takeover began several hundred years ago, and was an extension into Taiwan and adjacent islands of the age-old Chinese processes of expansion and territorial acquisition, written up authoritatively by Prof. H. Wiens in his book "China's March Toward the Tropics," where the processes involved have been carefully analyzed and set forth. In the Chinese system, good agricultural lands in the possession of non-Chinese peoples were invaded and taken over, the original inhabitants being driven off into the mountainous neighboring terrain which was of little or no interest to Chinese agriculturalists. There they were allowed to remain, mostly unaffected in anyway by Chinese culture, including Chinese Government. The Chinese attitude was that these barbarians were almost totally unredeemable from a Chinese point of view, that they could hardly be sinified with any chance of success, and that therefore they would be left alone as long as they did not try to regain their lost lands. In modern times there have been in Mainland China as many as 20 million or more of these non-Chinese people, living mostly under their own tribal culture, with distinct languages and material civilization, for the most part autonomous politically. During the entire period of contact in modern times, the Western Powers accepted this Chinese order of things and, with very few exceptions, never challenged the Chinese claim to sovereignty over these peoples or their territory. JAPANESE TITLE TO TAIWAN The exception to this general rule, of concern here, is the attempt by the Japanese during the middle part of the 19th century to challenge Chinese total sovereignty over Taiwan on the basis that the Chinese Government there could not and did not claim to control aboriginal areas in Taiwan or the aboriginal people there, whose actions against Japanese shipwrecked mariners on Taiwan's coasts were often aggressively hostile. This involved not only shipwrecked Japanese, but nationals of other countries in the same unfortunate situation. The Japanese, quoting Western principles of international law, which they had learned from the West, asserted that if the Chinese authorities could not control the whole territory of Taiwan and all the people there, they-the Japanese-would assert their own claim to jurisdiction. They actually did send military forces to eastern Taiwan and engaged in punitive action against the aboriginal hostiles there, with an asserted claim that they could take possession and assume ownership of the territories there which the Chinese authorities claimed sovereignty over but which they admittedly did not control undertheir rule. However, both the Chinese Government in Peking and the foreign powers were opposed to Japan's actions along this line. As a result of protracted negotiations in Peking, the Japanese withdrew both their forces and their claims against the Chinese system of control and the Chinese system of political culture in Taiwan, and by the early 1870's of the 19th century Taiwan was generally recognized by all powers to belong in toto to the Chinese Empire, of which it was considered an integral part. However, the Chinese never did try to assert their control over aboriginal territory or the people there, in Taiwan, any more than they ever had over similar territories and people on the mainland. This has all been written up by Dr. S. Yen in her book entitled "Taiwan in China's Foreign Relations 1836-74." When the Japanese defeated China in the first Sino-Japanese war, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895, transferred title to Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan as a spoils of war. Japanese title thereafter derived from previous Chinese ownership. The Japanese thereafter tried to extend their rule to the mountainous aboriginal territory of western Taiwan and the people there, but without complete success. In desperation, they finally resorted to sealing off the central part of that area behind, in some areas, an electrified fence, leaving the aborigines there to rule themselves. From that autonomous territory the aborigines often sallied forth in rebellion and war against the Japanese authorities, who were confronted over a 50-year period with an average of one small rebellion every 6 months and a big one every year. Some of these affairs involved the Chinese inhabitants of the islands. Thus the Japanese could do no more in this respect than to adopt for themselves the Chineseposition on the aborigines, namely, that lack of effective control over them and their lands did not vitiate Japanese title to the whole area of Taiwan and the Pescadores. No one outside ever did challenge Japanese title to or sovereignty over these territories during the whole 50 years of Japanese colonial ownership thereof by insisting that such sovereignty depended upon effective general control in any part of the area which otherwise would not be Japanese. Today, any challenge to sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores based upon the previous (to 1895) lack of effective Chinese governmental control in or over any part of those islands would necessarily take the form of asserting that the people the Chinese displaced there and from whom they took almost all the territory were in fact the proper owners of the whole of the territory, namely the aboriginal inhabitants who were more or less all over the islands several hundred years ago. No such assertion is responsibly advanced in any quarter, any more than is the assertion that North America should properly revert to the American Indians from whom it was for the most part forcibly taken by migrants from other and remote regions during the past several hundred years. As far as can be known, there is now no material dissidence among the aboriginal elements in Taiwan, who are now much better off under |