I think we all welcome the recent relaxation of tensions between this country and the People's Republic of China.

GAINS FROM NIXON TRIP TO PEKING

It is desirable that we should be moving away from the military containment of China as the core element in our relationships with East Asia.

The People's Republic has not shown a desire nor made preparations for military aggression beyond the frontiers it recognizes and the policy of containment has left us in much too inflexible a position toward China and toward its neighbors.

Still more important is the start of a dialogue between ourselves and the Chinese, because they do constitute something like a quarter of the population of the whole globe, and it is vastly important that a real meaningful dialogue should be developed between our one-third of the world's wealth and the Chinese one-quarter of the world's population if we as a human race are going to be able to address ourselves to the great global problems that are pressing down on us very rapidly.

STYLE OF NIXON TRIP UNFORTUNATE

I heartily endorse the President's initiatives in this direction. I think at long last we are going in the right direction, but I am disturbed by some of the false expectations that have been aroused both in this country and abroad by the histrionics that accompanied this desirable shift in policy and I am appalled by the possible cost to this country and to the world of the apparently thoughtless, one might even say reckless, style in which the policy change was effectuated.

This style was not necessary, because the results could all have been achieved by a much more sober, more low profile, and more traditional form of diplomacy.

Now, some people might argue that the style is a matter over the dam and we should not concern ourselves with it; however, it seems to me symptomatic of the administration's continued thinking. The administration, I think, is in some sense a victim itself of the false hopes and unrealistic expectations that it has raised, and the blind spots that permitted it to do so much damage through the style of its diplomacy still remain to limit its vision.

LIMITATIONS OF NIXON TRIP

Let me first say something about the limitations of what has been achieved by the President's visit to China.

It leaves most of the immediately pressing problems in East Asia virtually unchanged. We can't expect any helpful influence by Peking on Hanoi. If Peking were to try to make a deal with us about Vietnam, that would expose its ideological flank to attack by the Soviet Union. Beyond that, I do not think that the Vietnamese are going to be any more willing to let Chinese or Russians determine their fate as they would be to let Americans attempt to do that.

MAINTAIN CLOSE U.S. RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

The problem of Taiwan has obviously entered a new phase but, again, it is no nearer solution. American statements that we have no vital national interest in a separate Taiwan or a permanent American military presence there may be reassuring to Peking but merely make explicit what should always have been obvious, and they leave the real Taiwan problem unchanged.

The real Taiwan problem is not American ambitions or Japanese ambitions or even the ambitions of Chiang Kai-shek-it is the hopes, it is the feelings, it is the aspirations of the 14 million people who live in Taiwan, and they, for the most part, have lived separated politically and economically from China for 73 of the past 77 years and have developed a very different style of life, and it would seem they do not wish to be absorbed into China at least under present conditions. This problem will continue.

While I believe that we should recognize the fact that Taipei is not the Government of China, still I think we must maintain our close and friendly relations with the people of Taiwan and the government that rules over them.

To take positive steps to undermine the right of self-determination of the 14 million people on Taiwan, who constitute a larger grouping than the populations of three-quarters of the countries in the United Nations and who have maintained a clearly separate and very successful economic and political unit for more than two decades, would be heartless intervention against basic human rights and would undermine the principles on which we hope a truly peaceful world can be built. This being so, our close relations with Taiwan will probably continue, and that means that the rapprochement with China is not likely to develop into full diplomatic relations in the near future.

U.S. ECONOMIC LINKS TO PRC LIMITED

I think trade and cultural relations, too, will remain fairly small between ourselves and China during the foreseeable future.

A realistic estimate is that our trade with China might rise to 1 or 2 percent of our trade with Japan. This illustrates how small it will be. When you look at the precedents of our relationship with the Soviet Union, which is really a much less self-contained, much less isolated society than is China, we can't have great hopes for very large or meaningful cultural and intellectual relations developing in the near future with China.

FOUR POWER BALANCE DISCOUNTED

Some people have felt that the President's visit to China has achieved a new balance of power in the world, but this, I think, is extremely doubtful. Some people even think that we and the Chinese can somehow settle the problems of that part of the world, but this is mere fantasy.

The President's visit did no more than symbolize a relaxation of tensions between the United States and China-a relaxation which

had already occurred and which had grown, I think, primarily out of what we had learned from our Vietnamese fiasco, when we had seen that a half million American troops could not determine the future of Vietnam. Obviously, something new has developed in the world. Outside military power cannot control less developed countries that have been aroused by nationalism to seek to control their own fate.

Now, if this applies to us, it also applies to the Chinese and the Soviet Union. We have suddenly realized that the less developed world is not a vacuum that needs our defending because it can defend itself from external control. So we have shifted away from this view of the world and that has made it possible for us to move away from the concept of containment of China as our basic objective and to look for more positive, more flexible relations with China.

Such changed attitudes made possible the President's visit to Peking, but they did not change the balance of power in the world. Between the great nations the nuclear balance has been there for a long time. War is so suicidal that the balance is relatively firm. We are also finding out that the less developed world is not an area over which great powers can contend in a successful way.

Efforts at intervention are sure to be a losing game. Thus, the great powers will come into conflict over less developed areas much less than before. Thus we are not achieving a new four-power balance in the world, or a five-power balance. The less developed nations are going to achieve their own balance, and this is not going to be achieved for them from the outside.

MYTH OF UNITED STATES "SPECIAL RELATION" WITH CHINA

So much for the limitations of what has been achieved. Let me say something about the problems and dangers of the new policy. It has dissolved some myths in our Asian relations, but I am afraid it runs a danger of creating new ones. It is reviving the old myths of the vast Chinese market once called the 400 million customers and now the 800 million customers. This is something that has always been a myth. The new policy also seems to be reviving the myth of the very great and very special relationship between the United States and China which has been much touted by American missionaries and Chinese politicians in the past. But that again is something that has been basically a myth throughout.

Whatever the importance of our relationship with China over the long run-and I think over the long run of several decades it is extremely important other relationships in East Asia will probably prove much more critical for us and the world during the decade ahead.

UNPREDICTABLE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC STYLE

It was, therefore, unfortunate that, in redirecting our China policy toward new and better goals, the President chose to do this in such a flamboyant style that it seriously damaged some of these other relationships.

Let me explain that point. The United States is by far the richest and strongest country in the world. Most other nations are forced to set their course to some degree in conformity with what they believe to be the path our great ship of state will take. When we shift course,

we must do so clearly, firmly, and with unmistakable signals as to our intentions. Otherwise, we will cause great confusion, even consternation, among all those who have set their course by ours. If we appear to be acting in a capricious, unpredictable manner, the confusion will be even greater. But this is exactly what we have seemed to do, twirling the wheel back and forth in bewildering fashion and proclaiming loudly that a Presidential visit to China has somehow changed the world.

The dramatic announcement of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking and the planned Presidential visit to a country with which we did not even have diplomatic relations, much less contacts of trust and amity, while a refreshing surprise to the American public after a couple of decades of Dulles-style inflexibility, seemed to others so entirely unpredictable as to be quixotic and possibly a sign of emotional instability on our part. The high drama and fanfare of the actual visit suggested that there must be more to it than the bland communique and social niceties that appeared on the surface-perhaps some Machiavellian big-power deal to "sell the slaves down the river." And, if not that, did not such diplomatic high jinks show that the United States was still, after all, an immature and somewhat flighty Nation. Most of the countries of the world have probably been made a little uneasy by the flamboyant style of our new China policy, but it has been most disturbing for the countries of East and Southeast Asia.

KOREAN CONCERN ABOUT U.S. STYLE

As an example, let me cite Korea, about which I know something. I understand the Koreans have been entirely mystified by American intentions, deeply apprehensive about the situation, and frustrated by their inability to develop a real exchange of views with the United States about the new developments. Similar feelings, I believe, exist in Thailand, the Philippines, and probably in other countries in Southeast Asia and even further afield. In Asia unpredictability is considered a serious fault in a person or in a country. To the extent that the style of our new China policy has weakened the confidence of other Asian countries in our predictability, reliability, and emotional stability, we have weakened rather than strengthened the chances for stability in Asia.

DAMAGE TO U.S. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

The most serious damage done by the style of the new policy has been in our relations with Japan. There is no time to analyze in detail all that is involved in our relationship with Japan, but I would like to suggest briefly some of the vital matters that seem to be at stake. Our relations with Japan are undergoing a major change in tone and style, if not necessarily in content. Japan has become the third largest economic unit in the world and is still rising faster than any other major nation. Under these circumstances the old relationship of Japan with the United States, which grew out of the postwar American occupation of Japan, is no longer psychologically acceptable to the Japanese public because they perceive it as one of subservience on their part, not only in defense matters but also in foreign policy. The relationship must now be restructured so that both sides see it as one

of full equality. Otherwise, Japan will inevitably drift away from its present position of close cooperation with the United States and interdependence in defense and other matters.

PROBLEMS IN JAPANESE ECONOMIC SUCCESS

Japan's great economic success has also posed difficult problems of adjustment in its economic relations with the outside world. While the Japanese continue to perceive themselves as relatively poor in terms of their domestic living conditions, as compared with the countries of the West, and therefore justified in continuing to protect their economy from foreign competition and in concentrating narrowly on their own economic growth, the rest of the world now sees Japan as rich in terms of GNP and, therefore, obliged to treat the less developed countries more generously, and to deal with the other industrialized nations on terms of greater reciprocity. This divergence of views has resulted in great economic frictions in recent years.

The decision of the Japanese on these matters in the early years of the 1970's could have a decisive effect on the future course of the world as a whole, in a way Sino-American relations in the 1970's could not. If the American-Japanese defense relationship were to erode seriously, the Japanese would begin to feel militarily isolated and would in all probability decide to put a little more emphasis on their own defense forces than they have in the past. Such a trend would greatly increase the anxieties over a resurgent Japan that the Chinese and the other East Asian peoples already have, for they remember Japan was the great military aggressor in their part of the world only a generation ago. The result would probably be growing, rather than lessening, tensions in East Asia, and this then might heighten Japanese feelings of insecurity and thus set up a drift toward rearmament in Japan that could conceivably carry it in time all the way to nuclear weapons.

At the same time, Japan might drift toward a more independent economic position and this might contribute, then, to the breakup of what has been the real world trading community, consisting basically of Western Europe, North America, and Japan. If a trend toward economic regionalism developed, that would be a very dangerous swing back toward the conditions of the 1920's and 1930's, which, I think, under present conditions in the world would lead us all to disaster.

U.S. RELIABILITY AS DEFENSE PARTNER

The Japanese, in seeking to adjust to the necessary change in feel of their defense relationship with us, ask themselves first whether this relationship is really something they can put their trust in. They find many reasons for anxieties here. The strength of popular sentiment in the United States against the war in Vietnam, which has resulted from the slowness and ambiguities of our policy of withdrawal, make them wonder if the United States might not be swinging back toward isolationism, at least in its relations with Asia.

The ambiguities of the Nixon doctrine, which seems to be phrased in geographic terms may conceivably have behind them cultural or even national connotations that put Japan possibly into an Asian category and, therefore, mark our relation with it as different from our relations with Western Europe or Australia. Such ambiguities cause