CHAP. III. the non execution of the treaty of peace, events 1789. were continually supplying this temper with fresh

aliment. The disinclination which the cabinet of London had discovered to a commercial treaty with the United States was not attributed exclusively to the cause which had been assigned for it. It was in part ascribed to that jealousy with which Britain was supposed to view the growing trade of America.

The general restrictions on commerce by which every maritime power sought to promote its own navigation, and that part of the European system in particular, by which each aimed at a monopoly of the trade of its colonies, were felt with peculiar keenness when practised by England. To the British regulations on this subject, the people of America were perhaps the more sensible, because, having composed a part of that empire, they had grown up in the habit of a free admission into all its ports; and, without accurately appreciating the cause to which a change of this usage was to be ascribed, they were disposed to attribute it to a jealousy of their prosperity, and to an inclination to diminish the value of their independence. In this suspicious temper, almost every unfavourable event which occurred was traced up to British hostility.

That an attempt to form a commercial treaty with Portugal had failed, was attributed to the influence of the cabinet of London; and to the machinations of the same power were also ascribed the danger from the corsairs of Barbary, and the bloody incursions of the Indians. The resentments

excited by these various causes was felt in a CHAP. III. greater or less degree by a large proportion of the 1789. American people; and the expression of it was common and public. That correspondent dispositions existed in England is by no means improbable, and the necessary effect of this temper was to increase the difficulty of adjusting amicably the real differences between the two nations. The American plenipotentiaries had laboured, without success, to introduce into the definitive treaty of peace some articles for regulating the future intercourse between the two countries; and the temper discovered on both sides while those negotiations were pending, was such that, added to the disposition of other powers to obstruct a cordial reconciliation, it suggested to one of the ministers of the United States the idea, that a renewal of the war, at no very distant period, was far from being improbable.

With France, the most perfect harmony subsisted; and those attachments which originated in the signal services received from his most christian majesty during the war of the revolution, had sustained no diminution. Yet, from causes which it was found difficult to counteract, the commercial intercourse between the two nations was not so extensive as had been expected. It was the interest, and of consequence the policy of France, to avail herself of the misunderstandings between the United States and Great Britain, in order to obtain such regulations as might gradually divert the increasing trade of the American continent from those channels in which it had Bb

VOL. V.

CHAP. III. been accustomed to flow. Neither her general 1789 restraints on commerce, nor her observance of the colonial system, excited the indignation which was occasioned by similar measures on the part of that power with which the United States had most intercourse; and a disposition was extensively felt to co-operate with her, in enabling her merchants, by legislative encouragements, to rival those of Britain in the American market.

A great revolution had commenced in that country, the first stage of which was completed by limiting the powers of the monarch, and by the establishment of a popular assembly. In no part of the globe was this revolution contemplated with more interest than in America. The influence it would have on the affairs of the world was not then distinctly foreseen: and the philanthropist, without becoming a political partisan, rejoiced in the event. On this subject therefore, there existed in the public mind but one sentiment.

The relations of the United States with the other powers of Europe, did not require particular attention. Their dispositions were rather friendly than otherwise; and an inclination was generally manifested to participate in the advantages which the erection of an independent empire on the western shores of the Atlantic seemed to offer to the commercial world.

By the diplomatic characters in America, it would readily be supposed, that the first steps taken by the new government would not only be indicative of its present system; but would probably affect permanently its foreign relations, and that

1789.

the influence of the president, should he be inclined CHAP. III, to exercise his constitutional right of recommendation, would be felt in the legislature. Scarcely was the exercise of his executive functions commenced, when the president received an application from the count de Moustiers, the minister of France, requesting a private conference. On being told that the department of foreign affairs was the channel through which all official business should pass, the count replied that the interview he requested was not for the purpose of actual business, but rather as preparatory to its future transactions.

The next day, at one in the afternoon, was named for the interview. The count commenced the conversation with declarations of his personal regard for America, the manifestations of which, he said, had been early and uniform. His nation too was well disposed to be upon terms of amity with the United States: but at his public reception, there were occurrences which he thought indicative of coolness in the secretary of foreign affairs, who had, he feared, while in Europe, imbibed prejudices not only against Spain, but against France also. If this conjecture should be right, the present head of that department could not be an agreeable organ of intercourse with the president. He then took a view of the modern usages of European courts, which, he said, favoured the practice he recommended of permitting foreign ministers to make their communications directly to the chief of the executive. "He then presented a letter," says the president

CHAP. HI. in his private journal," which he termed confiden1789. tial, and to be considered as addressed to me in my

private character, which was too strongly marked with an intention, as well as a wish to have no person between the minister and president in the transaction of business between the two nations,"

In reply to these observations, the president gave the most explicit assurances that, judging from his own feelings, and from the public sentiment, there existed in America a reciprocal disposition to be on the best terms with France. That whatever former difficulties might have occurred, he was persuaded the secretary of foreign affairs had offered no intentional disrespect, either to the minister, or to his nation. Without undertaking to know the private opinions of Mr. Jay, he would declare that he had never heard that officer express, directly or indirectly, any sentiment unfavourable to either.

Reason and usage, he added, must direct the mode of treating national and official business. If rules had been established, they must be conformed to. If they were yet to be framed, it was hoped that they would be convenient and proper. So far as ease could be made to comport with regularity, and with necessary forms, it ought to be `consulted; but custom, and the dignity of office, were not to be disregarded. The conversation continued upwards of an hour, but no change was made in the resolution of the president.

When the first legislature assembled under the new government, the subjects which pressed for