CHAP. III. the person charged with the affairs of the United 1789. States at that court, had made some favourable

impressions which the conduct of the American government ought not to efface.

With great earnestness it was urged, that from artificial or adventitious causes, the commerce between the United States and Great Britain had exceeded its natural boundary. It was wise to give such political advantages to other nations as would enable them to acquire their due share of the direct trade. It was also wise to impart some benefits to nations that had formed commercial treaties with the United States, and thereby to impress on those powers which had hitherto neglected to form such treaties, the idea that some advantages were to be gained by a reciprocity of friendship.

That France had claims on the gratitude of the American people which ought not to be overlooked, was an additional argument in favour of the principle for which they contended.

The discrimination was opposed by Mr. Benson, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Shermen.

They did not admit that the public sentiment had been unequivocally expressed; nor did they admit that such benefits had flowed from commercial treaties as to justify a sacrifice of interest to obtain them. There was a commercial treaty with France; but neither that treaty, nor the favours shown to that nation, had produced any correspondent advantages. The license to sell ships could not be of this description, since it was well known that the merchants of the United

States did not own vessels enough for the transportation of the produce of the country, and only two, as was believed, had been sold since the license had been granted. The trade with Great Britain, viewed in all its parts, was upon a footing as beneficial to the United States as that with France.

That the latter power had claims upon the gratitude of America was admitted, but that these claims would justify premiums for the encouragement of French commerce and navigation, to be drawn from the pockets of the American people, was not conceded. The state of the revenue, it was said, would not admit of these experiments.

The observation founded on the extensiveness of the trade between the United States and Great Britain was answered by saying that this was not a subject proper for legislative interposition. It was one of which the merchants were the best judges. They would consult their interest as individuals; and this was a case in which the interest of the nation and of individuals was the same.

In explanation of this fact, Mr. Fitzsimmons stated that the war of the revolution had deprived the American merchants of their ships, and of the means of acquiring others. On the return of peace the British re-established their commercial houses; and it was by these men and by their capital in many of the states, that vessels were furnished for the transportation of their produce, and that the greater part of their trade was carried on.

CHAP. III.

1789.

CHAP. II. At length, the bills passed the house of repre1789. sentatives, and were carried to the senate, where

they were amended by expunging the discrimination made in favour of the tonnage and distilled spirits of those nations which had formed commercial treaties with the United States.

These amendments were disagreed to; and each house insisting on its opinion, a conference took place, after which the point was reluctantly yieldea by the house of representatives. The proceedings of the senate being at that time conducted with closed doors, the course of reasoning on which an important principle was rejected, to which the other branch of the legislature, and the community at large appeared to be strongly attached, cannot be stated. In that body, there were certainly persons by whom the commercial interests of America were well understood, and dispassionately considered: but from some expressions used in debate by a member of the house of representatives who had advocated the discrimination with great earnestness, it would seem that the point had been yielded under the impression that the subject would be resumed in a distinct form, so as not to embarrass the passage of bills on which the revenue depended.

This debate on the impost and tonnage bills was succeeded by one on a subject which was believed to involve principles of still greater interest.

In organizing the departments of the executive, the question in what manner the high officers who filled them should be removeable, came on to be discussed. Believing that the decision of this

On the pre

power of

question would materially influence the character CHAP. III. of the new government, the members supported 1789. their respective opinions with a degree of earnestness proportioned to the importance they attributed to the measure. In a committee of the whole house on the bill " to establish an executive department to be denominated the* department of foreign affairs," Mr. White moved to strike out sident's the clause which declared the secretary to be removal from removeable by the president. president. The power of removal, where no express provision existed, was, he said, in the nature of things, incidental to that of appointment. And as the senate was by the constitution associated with the president in making appointments, that body must in the same degree, participate in the power of removing from office.

Mr. White was supported by Mr. Smith of South Carolina, Mr. Page, Mr. Stone, and Mr. Jackson.

Those gentlemen contended that the clause was either unnecessary or improper. If the constitution gave the power to the president, a repetition of the grant in an act of congress was nugatory: if the constitution did not give it, the attempt to confer it by law was improper. If it belonged conjointly to the president and senate, the house of representatives should not attempt to abridge the constitutional prerogative of the other branch of the legislature. However this might be, they were clearly of opinion that it was not placed in the president alone. In the power over all the executive officers

This has since been denominated the department of state.

office.

CHAP. III. which the bill proposed to confer upon the pre 1789. sident, the most alarming dangers to liberty were

perceived. It was in the nature of monarchical prerogative, and would convert them into the mere tools and creatures of his will. A dependence so servile on one individual, would deter men of high and honourable minds from engaging in the public service; and if contrary to expectation such men should be brought into office, they would be reduced to the necessity of sacrificing every principle of independence to the will of the chief magistrate, or of exposing themselves to the disgrace of being removed from office, and that too at a time when it might be no longer in their power to engage in other pursuits.

Gentlemen they feared were too much dazzled with the splendor of the virtues which adorned the actual president, to be able to look into futurity. But the framers of the constitution had not confined their views to the person who would most probably first fill the presidential chair. The house of representatives ought to follow their example, and to contemplate this power in the hands of an ambitious man, who might apply it to dangerous purposes; who might from caprice remove the most worthy men from office.

By the friends of the original bill, the amendment was opposed with arguments of great force drawn from the constitution and from general convenience. On several parts of the constitution, and especially on that which vests the executive power in the president, they relied confidently to