1791.

more or less numerous representation in the pop- CHAP. v. ular branch of the legislature, there was one of a local nature, whose operation, though secret, was extensive, which gave to this question a peculiar interest. To whatever number of persons a representative might be allotted, there would still remain a fraction, which would be greater or less in each state according to the ratio which congress should adopt between representation and population. The relative power of states in one branch of the legislature would consequently be affected by this ratio; and to questions of that description few members can permit themselves to be inattentive.

This bill as originally introduced into the house of representatives, gave to each state one member for every thirty thousand persons. On a motion to strike out the number thirty thousand, the debate turned chiefly on the policy and advantage of a more or less numerous house of representatives; but with the general arguments suggested by the subject, were interspersed strong and pointed allusions to the measures of the preceding congress, which indicated much more serious hostility to the administration than had hitherto been expressed. Speaking of the corruption which he supposed to exist in the British house of commons, Mr. Giles said that causes essentially different from their numbers had produced this effect. " Among these were the frequent mortgages of the funds, and the immense appropriations at the disposal of the executive."

CHAP. V.

1791.

"An inequality of circumstances" he observed, "produces revolutions in governments, from democracy to aristocracy and monarchy. Great wealth produces a desire of distinctions, rank, and titles. The revolutions of property in this country have created a prodigious inequality of circumstances. Government has contributed to this inequality. The bank of the United States is a most important machine in promoting the objects of this monied interest. This bank will be the most powerful engine to corrupt this house. Some of the members are directors of this institution; and it will only be by increasing the representation that an adequate barrier can be opposed to this monied interest." He next adverted to certain ideas which, he said, had been disseminated through the United States. "The legislature," he took occasion to observe, "ought to express some disapprobation of these opinions. The strong executive of this government," he added, "ought to be balanced by a full representation in this house."

Similar sentiments were advanced by Mr. Findley.

After a long and animated discussion, the amendment was lost; as were also other amendments which were severally proposed, for inserting between the words "thirty," and "thousand,” the words five, four, and three; and the bill passed in its original form.

In the senate, it was amended by changing the ratio so as to give one representative for every thirty three thousand persons in each state; but this amendment was disagreed to by the house of

representatives; and each house adhering to its CHAP. V. opinion, the bill fell.

The argument which operated in the senate is understood to have been, the great amount, and the inequality of unrepresented fractions, which were the result of the ratio originally proposed; a circumstance which pressed with peculiar weight on the small states, where the fraction could not be distributed among several members.

A bill was again introduced into the house of representatives under a different title and in a new form, but without any change in its substantial provisions. After a debate in which the inequality and injustice the fractions produced by the ratio it adopted was strongly insisted on, it passed that house. In the senate, it was again amended, not by reducing, but by enlarging the number of representatives.

The constitution of the United States declares that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union according to their respective numbers ;" and that "the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative." Construing the constitution to authorize a process by which the whole number of representatives should be ascertained on the whole population of the United States, and afterwards "apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers," the senate applied the number thirty thousand as a divisor to the total population, and taking the quotient which was

1791.

CHAP. V. one hundred and twenty, as the number of repre. 1791. sentatives given by the ratio which had been

adopted in the house where the bill had originated, they apportioned that number among the several states by that ratio, until as many representatives as it would give were allotted to each. The residuary members were then distributed among the states having the highest fractions. Without professing the principle on which this apportionment was made, the amendment of the senate merely allotted to the states respectively, the number of members which the process just mentioned would give. The result was a more equitable apportionment of representatives to population, and a still more exact accordance, than was found in the original bill, with the prevailing sentiment, which, both within and without doors, seemed to require that the popular branch of the legislature should consist of as many members as the fundamental laws of the government would admit. If the rule of construing that instrument was correct, the amendment removed objections which were certainly well founded, and was not easily assailable by the advocates for a numerous representative body. But the rule was novel, and overturned opinions which had been generally assumed, and were supposed to be settled. In one branch of the legislature it had already been rejected; and in the other, the majority in its favour was only

one.

In the house of representatives, the amendment was supported with considerable ingenuity.

After an earnest debate, however, it was disa greed to, and a conference took place without

producing an accommodation among the members CHAP. V. composing the committee. But finally, the house 1791 of representatives receded from their disagreement; and, by a majority of two voices, the bill passed as amended in the senate.

On the president now devolved, once more, the solemn duty of deciding, by affixing or refusing his signature, whether an act of the legislature consisted with the constitution. If constitutional, it was unexceptionable; and of consequence his assent to it depended entirely on that question.

In his cabinet also, a difference of opinion is understood to have existed: the secretary of state and the attorney general being of opinion that the act was at variance with the constitution; the secretary at war rather undecided; and the secretary of the treasury thinking that from the vagueness of expression in the clause relating to the subject, neither construction could be absolutely rejected; and that therefore it would be proper to accede to the interpretation given by the legisla

ture.

After weighing the arguments which were urged on each side of the question, the president was confirmed in the opinion that the population of each state, and not the total population of the United States, must give the numbers to which alone could be applied the process by which the number of representatives was to be ascertained. Having formed this opinion, to a correct and ndependent mind the course to be pursued was a plain one. Duty required the exercise of a power which a president of the United States will always