LOUIS HOFFMAN, Respondent, v. THE METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY Co., Appellant. APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court, seventh district, borough of Manhattan, entered in favor of the plaintiff. Henry A. Robinson, for appellant. Joseph I. Green, for respondent. Per Curiam. The Appellate Division of this department having declared the act creating the Municipal Court of the City of New York constitutional (Irwin v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 38 App. Div. 253), the judgment must be affirmed, with costs. Present: FREEDMAN, P. J., and MACLEAN, J. JOHN F. PORTER, Respondent, v. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY Co., Appellant. APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court, tenth district, borough of Manhattan, entered in favor of plaintiff upon the verdict of a jury. Henry A. Robinson, for appellant. Hart & Hopkins, for respondent. Per Curiam. The Appellate Division of this department hav ing declared the act creating the Municipal Court of the City of New York constitutional (Irwin v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 38 App. Div. 253), the judgment must be affirmed, with costs. Present: FREEDMAN, P. J., and MacLean, J. LEVENTRITT, J., taking no part. Judgment affirmed, with costs. SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, MAY, 1899. GEORGE W. GIBBONS, as Trustee, etc., Appellant, v. ANTHONY E. HELLWIG, Respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Municipal Court, eighth district, borough of Manhattan, rendered in favor of the defendant, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff. D. T. Kimball, for appellant. George W. Galinger, for respondent. FREEDMAN, P. J. The plaintiff brought this action to recover the rent for certain premises upon which he claimed there was a balance of $5 due for the month of January, 1898, and $65 per month for each of the months of February, March and April, 1898. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant made a motion to dismiss the complaint, which motion was granted. In such a case the facts most favorable to the plaintiff must be regarded as established. The plaintiff is designated in the summons herein "as trustee." and in the stenographer's minutes "as assignee." In whatsoever capacity he may have brought this action, the proof entirely fails to show that he had any right or authority to do so, or any cause of action against the defendant. The only witnesses sworn on the trial, on the part of the plaintiff, were one Thomas M. Roach, and the defendant himself. From their testimony, it appears that one J. A. Demarest was the owner of the premises; that prior to January, 1897, one Hepner was the lessee under Demarest, and that Hellwig, the defendant, was a tenant leasing that portion of the premises occupied by him from Hepner. It further appears, that in January, 1897, Roach leased the property from Demarest for five years; that Hepner was dispossessed, and that Roach thereupon took possession of the premises. There is no testimony in the case showing any connection between Roach and the plaintiff. Upon the trial, a certain paper shown to have been signed by Roach was offered in evidence, and excluded under objection made thereto by defendant's counsel. What the contents of that paper were do not appear. There is nothing in the testimony tending to show that the paper contained any authority, or conferred any For power upon the plaintiff to bring this action, and the record is silent as to the reason why the paper was offered in evidence. all that appears, the paper may have been excluded because it was immaterial, and we, therefore, cannot say that it was error to exclude it. The paper or a copy of it should have been annexed to the return. The plaintiff is not shown to have any interest in the cause of action whatever, and the judgment of the trial court in dismissing the complaint was, therefore, correct, and should be affirmed. MACLEAN and LEVENTRITT, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent. MAURICE HARTMAN, Respondent, v. RALPH MICHEL and JENNIE MICHEL, Whose Christian Names are Unknown to Plaintiff, the First Names Being Fictitious, Appellants. APPEAL by defendants from a judgment of the Municipal Court, third district, borough of Manhattan, rendered in favor of the plaintiff. M. Hallheimer, for appellants. Townsend, Dyett & Levy, for respondent. FREEDMAN, P. J. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover the sum of $50, claimed by him to have been paid to defendants on November 11, 1898, towards the rent of certain premises, such payment being made, however, upon the condition that the defendants, who, it appears upon the trial, were neither the owners, nor lessees of the premises, should on the day following such payment, go to the office of the plaintiff's attorneys, and there produce their authority to let the premises, and then execute a lease to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further claimed that the defendants refused to comply with these conditions, and that he rented other premises. On the part of the defendants it was claimed that the sum of $50 was paid as a part payment upon the rental price agreed upon for the premises referred to, and that plaintiff failed to pay the balance through no fault of the defendants. There was a direct conflict of testimony upon these questions, and the trial judge de cided in favor of the plaintiff, and no sufficient reason appears why such judgment should be disturbed. firmed, with costs. The judgment should be af MACLEAN and LEVENTRITT, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed, with costs to respondent. GEORGE S. DE HIERAPOLIS, Appellant, v. WILLIAM G. WEBBER, Respondent. APPEAL by the plaintiff from a judgment rendered in the Municipal Court, eleventh district, borough of Manhattan. Denis A. Spellissy, for appellant. Edward J. Krug, Jr., for respondent. FREEDMAN, P. J. This action was brought to recover the sum of $99.75, alleged to be a balance due the plaintiff under the terms of a contract to furnish brass railings for buildings erected by the defendant. The facts, so far as they are uncontradicted, are substantially as follows: In August, 1898, one James C. Levy made a contract with the defendant, under which a quantity of railings were put upon buildings then in course of erection by the defendant. On November 12, 1898, the defendant paid Levy $50 to apply in payment for the railings so furnished. On November 19, 1898, the defendant, who up to that time supposed that Levy had contracted on his individual account, was informed that Levy and the plaintiff were partners, doing business under the name of the Metropolitan Brass Foundry Co. The defendant, on that day, made his check payable to the order of the Metropolitan Brass Foundry Co., for the sum of $350, and delivered it to Levy to apply in payment of the contract price of the railings. This check, it appears, was subsequently indorsed and cashed by Levy, and at least the sum of $300 thereof paid to plaintiff. Subsequently, the defendant paid to the plaintiff an amount, which, including the $50 payment made to Levy on November 12th, and the $350 check of November 19, 1898, and a small discount allowed by the plaintiff, equalled the amount due under the contract. The plaintiff claiming that he never received the payment of November 12, 1898, and only $300 of the check of November 19, 1898, brought this action. There was conflict of testimony as to whether Levy was in partnership with plaintiff, and as whether, if not a partner, he was authorized to represent the plaintiff in matters pertaining to the Metropolitan Brass Foundry Co., and to receive payments for and on behalf of the plaintiff, and upon these questions the trial judge found in favor of the defendant. It does not appear that such finding was against the weight of evidence, or that injustice has been done. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed. MACLEAN and LEVENTRITT, JJ., concur. ISAAC KAPLAN, Respondent, v. JOSEPH WEIN, Appellant. APPEAL from a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the Municipal Court, fourth district, borough of Manhattan. Rudolph Marks, for appellant. N. S. Levy, for respondent. FREEDMAN, P. J. This was an action for an alleged conversion of personal property. There was a conflict of evidence upon the trial as to whether the goods claimed by the plaintiff to have been converted by defendant were returned or not, and the trial judge gave judgment for the plaintiff. The testimony on the part of the plaintiff shows that the defendant was a traveling salesman in the employ of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had delivered to the defendant a quantity of wrappers and dressing sacques, to be used in obtaining orders for their sales, that these were the property of the plaintiff, and when the employment of the defendant was ended, were to be returned to the plaintiff, that the employment of the defendant ceased in September, 1898, and that although requested several times to return the samples, he had not done so. The value of the goods was shown without objection to be $41.05, for which amount the plaintiff had a judgment. Several objections were |