peace, health, or safety. So far, all are agreed. But the vital question is, What tribunal is to determine whether a law does or does not fall under this classification? Are the judgment and findings of the legislative assembly conclusive, or are they subject to review by the courts? The inquiry is much simplified by bearing in mind that the exception in the constitutional amendment is not confined to such laws as the legislative assembly may legally enact by virtue of the police powers of the State, or to those alone that may affect the public peace, health, or safety. The police power is limited to the imposition of restraints and burdens on persons and property, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State: Tiedeman, Lim. Pol. Power, Sec. 1. But the language of the constitutional amendment is broader, and includes all laws, of whatsoever kind, necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, whether they impose restraints on persons and property, or come strictly within the police powers, or not. The laws excepted from the operation of the amendment do not depend alone upon their character, but upon the necessity for their enactment in order to accomplish certain purposes. As to such laws, the initiative and referendum amendment does not in any way abridge or restrict the power of the legislature, which, by the insertion of a proper emergency clause, may unquestionably cause them to go into effect upon approval by the Governor. As the legislature may exercise this power when a measure is in fact necessary for the purposes stated, and as the amendment does not declare what shall be deemed laws of the character indicated, who is to decide whether a specific act may or may not be necessary for the purpose? The amendment excepts such laws as may be necessary for a certain purpose. The existence of such necessity is therefore a question of fact, and the authority to determine such fact must rest somewhere. The Constitution does not confer it upon any tribunal. It must there

fore necessarily reside with that department of the government which is called upon to exercise the power. It is a question of which the legislature alone must be the judge, and when it decides the fact to exist, its action is final. The initiative and referendum makes its own exceptions, and, if those conflict with Section 28 of Article IV, supra, they will constitute a limitation upon it to that extent. The legislature has the exclusive power to declare that its enactments are necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, and that hence an emergency exists on account of which an act shall take effect when the legislative process, as applied to the act in question, is fully completed.3

Title of Measure. In laws proposed by initiative petitions pursuant to an amendment of the Constitution, it would seem that the method frequently adopted by members of the legislature of securing votes for the passage of a bill by promises of reciprocal support of other measures could not be pursued, and hence one of the reasons assigned for requiring every bill introduced in the legislative assembly to comply with the requirement of Section 20, Article IV, of the organic law of the State,1 so that it may stand on its own merits, the purpose of which, to be valid, mut be fairly disclosed in the title, would have no application to the consideration of an act which resulted from a vote of the people. The validity of laws adopted at the polls must be determined like enactments by the legislative assembly,

1 Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118.

2 Sears v. Multnomah County, 49 Or. 42.

3 Bennett Trust Co. v. Sengstacken, 58 Or. 333.

4 Sec. 20, Art. IV, Const. Or., is as follows: "Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title."'

by the test of the Constitution as modified by the amendment thereto. Though the argument that a proposed measure must depend upon its own merits may not apply to acts initiated by petitions, a valid reason for requiring that the subject matter of laws to be adopted or rejected at the polls should be stated in the title nevertheless exists. The majority of qualified electors are so much interested in managing their own affairs that they have no time carefully to consider measures affecting the general public. A great number of voters undoubtedly have a superficial knowledge of proposed laws to be voted upon, which is derived from newspaper comments or from conversation with their associates. The assertion may safely be ventured that it is only the few persons who earnestly favor or zealously oppose the passage of a proposed law initiated by petition who have attentively studied its contents and know how it will probably affect their private interests. The greater number of voters do not possess this information and usually derive their knowledge of the contents of a proposed law from an inspection of the title thereof, which is sometimes secured only from the very meager details afforded by a ballot which is examined in an election booth preparatory to exercising the right of suffrage. It is important, therefore, that the title to laws proposed in the manner indicated should strictly comply with the constitutional requirement.1

Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, supra, was intended to apply to acts introduced before the legislative assembly. To that extent it is still in force, and is unaffected by the initiative and referendum amendment, but under no rule of construction can it be held applicable to laws enacted directly by the people, except to the extent that it may not be inconsistent

1 State ex rel. v. Richardson, 48 Or. 309.

with the general object and purpose of the initiative and referendum amendment.1

Meaning of Words.-The qualifying words "local" and "special" as used in Section 1a, Article IV, Constitution, are synonymous, and, in the sense in which they are used, mean any enactment that is plainly intended to affect a particular person or thing or to be in effect in some specified locality only.2 The words "municipality" and "district" as used in the same clause of the amendment adverted to are evidently expressions of equivalent import, for a district legally created from a designated part of the State and organized to promote the convenience of the public at large, is a municipal corporation.3 The term "district," however, has a broader signification than "county," and may designate a territory comprising more than a county, or containing less area.4

Section 2, Article XI, as first adopted, so far as applicable to the subject under consideration, reads: "Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special laws, except for municipal purposes." This provision was amended June 4, 1906, to read as follows: "Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by the legislative assembly by special laws "It is apparent from the language used in the section as first in force, when viewed in the light of the reference to "other municipal corporations" in Section 9 of the same article that the word "corporations' was employed in its broadest sense, including therein public, municipal, and private corporations.5

1 State v. Langworthy, 55 Or. 303.

2 Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria, 49 Or. 520.

Schubel v. Olcott, 60 Or. 503.

State ex rel. v. Port of Tillamook, 62 Or. 332.

3 Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria, supra.

4 Schubel v. Olcott, supra.

5 Straw v. Harris, 54 Or. 424.

Self-Executing.-In construing a provision of a written constitution, the primary inquiry is to ascertain the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted the clause under consideration, to determine which, effect should be given to all the words used, disregarding technical rules and adopting a mean between a strict and a liberal construction. A section of the fundamental law is self-executing when it prescribes a rule, the application of which puts into operation the constitutional provision. Viewed in this light, that portion of Section 1a, Article IV of the Constitution expressly authorizing cities and towns to provide for the manner of exercising the initiative and referendum powers as to their municipal legislation is self-executing;1 the remainder of the amendment is not self-executing for the reason that it only declares or reserves the right, without laying down rules by means of which this right may be given the force of law.2

It is plainly expressed in Section 1, Article IV of the Constitution that its reserved rights are to be independent of the legislature, and is sufficiently specific that it may be carried out without legislative aid; and in the last clause it provides that the Secretary of State, in submitting to the people the matter referred, shall be governed by the general laws until further provision is made by the legislature, thus not only contemplating that such legislation is not necessary as to procuring and presenting the petition, but also forestalling any possibility of defeat, by inaction of the legislature in regard to the manner of its submission to the people. If it were not self-executing, though it were mandatory upon the legislature to make pro

1 Acme Dairy Co. v. Astoria, 49 Or. 520.

McBee v. Town of Springfield, 58 Or. 459.

2 Long v. City of Portland, 53 Or. 92.

State ex rel. v. Portland Ry. L. & P. Co., 56 Or. 32.