whether the parties were married. This was clearly incompetent. In the sixth the witness was asked whether he and his wife had recognized Jackson and the plaintiff's mother as husband and wife. Family repute and general reputation are evidence; but the individual opinions and recognition of two persons are not admissible. They were not even connected with the family. In the seventh exception a witness for de fendants testified that she lived in a house about three yards distant from the one occupied by Jackson, and the plaintiff's mother, and that "she heard whistling at night about the house, and saw men in the yard about the house at night, and that she would meet them sometimes as she was going to the well for water; that the mother of the plaintiff had told her that she had a child in Phila delphia before she was married, and that she had disposed of it by putting it in the water pipes, and that it came before its time; that she never saw a man go in the house, but that on one occasion at night she saw a man come to the door, and plaintiff's mother met him at the door." She was then asked this question by defendants' counsel: "State under what circumstances and conditions you saw the party whom you speak of go to the door, and state what you saw on that occasion?" The counsel for defendants stated "that they proposed to show the conduct of the plaintiff's mother, and the suspicious character of the inmates of the house, and proposed to follow it up by frequent visits of men to the premises at night, under suspicious circumstances." But, on objection by the plaintiff, the court overruled the question. If the defendants could prove that the house was kept in a disorderly and disreputable manner, it would have a tendency to show that the intercourse between these parties was not of a virtuous kind. Similar testimony was tendered in the eighth exception, and for the same reason it ought to have been admitted. In the ninth exception the defendants offered to prove by a witness that he had never heard Jackson say that he was married, or that he had a child. This witness had already testified that he was very intimate with Jackson, and had talked with him on the subject of marriage. If Jackson had said that he had never been married, it would have been admissible in evidence, but we cannot see how his failure to make any statement on the subject can be evidence. The court ruled against the defendants on all the questions of evidence which we have been considering. There was error in granting the plaintiff's two prayers, and in refusing the defendants' eighth prayer, and in the rulings in the third, seventh, and eighth exceptions to evidence. Rulings reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial. GALLUP v. FOX. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 9, 1894.) RECORD AS EVIDENCE-PROVINCE OF COURT-CONTRACT OF SALE-RATIFICATION-WHAT CONSTITUTES. 1. It is for the court to determine what appears on the face of the record of a court of probate. 2. Whether or not the retention of a note previously given by the vendor in a contract of sale, and returned to him by the vendee as the consideration thereof, is sufficient evidence of a ratification of such sale by the trustee in insolvency of such vendor, is for the jury. Appeal from court of common pleas, New London county; Crump, Judge. Action of trover by Loren A. Gallup, as trustee in insolvency of Almon Bartlett, against Albert N. Fox, to recover the value of a certain horse, wagon, and harness, formerly the property of said Bartlett. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed. ANDREWS, C. J. This was a complaint in the nature of an action of trover, brought to the court of common pleas in New London county by the plaintiff, describing himself to be the trustee in insolvency on the estate of one Almon Bartlett, and claiming to recover the value of a horse, wagon, and harness which had belonged to said Bartlett. There were two defenses,-the general issue, and a denial that the plaintiff was at the time the suit was commenced, or ever since had been, the trustee of the said insolvent estate, and had, as such, no right to bring or maintain this action. The case was tried to the jury, and the defendant had a verdict. To prove his appointment as trustee, the plaintiff laid in the record of the court of probate in the district of Montville, where the said Bartlett resided, and claimed that it appeared thereon that said Bartlett had been by that court decreed to be an insolvent debtor, and that he, the plaintiff, had been appointed the trustee of his estate, and that he had come into said court, accepted the trust, and given bond for the faithful performance of his duty. This record showed that there had been some amendments made in it, and the defendant objected to its admission in evidence, but the court admitted it, and it was read to the jury. Under the general issue the defendant offered evidence, and claimed to have proved, that he purchased said personal property bona fide of the said Bartlett, through one Penharlow, his agent, before the proceedings in the court of probate were commenced upon which the said decree of insolvency was made and the plaintiff appointed trustee, and in payment therefor surrendered a note which he held | far ratified the transfer as to be estopped against the said Bartlett; and also evidence to show that the plaintiff had, subsequent to his said appointment, ratified said sale by Penharlow to him, the defendant. The main fact, and substantially the only one upon which this claim was made, was that the plaintiff had not returned to the defendant the note of said Bartlett. In the instructions to the jury upon each of these points we think the trial court erred. In respect to the record of the court of probate the jury was instructed as follows: "In the case at bar, Justice Gallup testifies that the amendments to the record were made in accordance with the facts actually found. So if you shall find that upon the records of July 30th and March 17th, amended as they are, it appears that Almon F. Bartlett was decreed to be an insolvent, and that Loren A. Gallup was appointed trustee of his insolvent estate; and further, by the records of said court in said case, that he gave bonds; and duly qualified as trustee,-you have nothing further to consider about the legality of his appointment. If these records disclose that he was appointed such trustee, he was entitled to the custody of Bartlett's estate for the purpose of distributing it among his creditors in ac cordance with the intention of the statutes, and so far qualified to maintain this suit." The record of the Montville court of probate is set out at length in the record before us, and it appears therefrom by an inspection that the plaintiff had been appointed trustee on the insolvent estate of said Bartlett. It is true that the record of a court of probate or of any other inferior court is only prima facie evidence of jurisdictional facts; but of any material facts upon which it adjudicates its judgment imports absolute verity, as fully as does the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction. Bell v. Raymond, 18 Conn. 100; Holcomb' v. Cornish, 8 Conn. 375. The material fact adjudicated by the court of probate, as shown by its record, was that the plaintiff had been appointed the trustee on the insolvent estate of said Bartlett. That fact appeared on the face of the record, and the court of common pleas should have told the jury that they must take that fact as proved. Commercial Nat. Bank's Appeal, 59 Conn. 25, 21 Atl. 1021. It is not within the province of a jury "to find" what appears on the record, or what a record discloses. When a record is offered in evidence, and admitted, and laid before the jury, it is the duty of the court to state to them what it proves, and their duty in respect to the facts so proved. On the claim of ratification the judge said to the jury: "It is evident, I think, that the plaintiff could not both retain the note and sue for the recovery of the value of the property. He must make his election, or at least must tender back the note before he begins suit. If he chose to retain the note, and not to offer to return it to the defendant, he so from denying its validity now. So that, if you should find that the note which Bartlett gave to the defendant as evidence of his indebtedness, and which he claims to have given to Penharlow in consideration for the transfer of the property in question, was given as such consideration, and came into the hands of the plaintiff as trustee of Bartlett's estate, and was not offered to be surrendered to the defendant before this suit was begun, then you should render your verdict for the defendant." After considering the case for a short time, the jury returned into court, and asked for further instructions on this part of the case, as it was not clear to them; and the judge further instructed them in this way: "As to the question of ratification and the offer to return the note, my charge to you was that, if the plaintiff retained the consideration for this alleged contract,-in other words, if he kept the note, and made no offer to return it whatever before this suit was brought, and then went on to bring the suit,-that, as a matter of law, would so far operate as an estoppel as to prevent him from maintaining the suit. I may say this to you, however: that if there is any evidence (and you will remember the conversation testified to by Mr. Perkins as to the demand for the return of the property, and also Mr. Gallup's conversation with the plaintiff about the return of the property) by which it appears to your minds that there was any offer to return this note at the same time that the property was demanded (the horse, wagon, and harness), and there was a refusal on the part of the defendant to give up the property, then you should bring in a verdict for the plaintiff. That, of course, gentlemen, is a fact for you to find from the evidence before you,-whether there was any such ratification or not. If, however, it appears to your minds that there was no offer to return the note,-that the demand for the property was not accompanied by an offer to return the note,then, as a matter of law, I charge you that the trustee had so far ratified the transfer as to be unable in law to maintain the suit." This, we think, was error, because it took from the jury a question which clearly it was for them to decide. It is a very serious question whether a trustee in insolvency, acting not in his own right, but in behalf of the creditors of the estate, has power to ratify a contract made by the insolvent, in such a way that the creditors will be bound. But, assuming that the plaintiff in this case had the fullest power to ratify, the retention of the note was not, as a matter of law, a ratification of the sale for which the note was given up. Ordinarily, ratification, like a contract, includes within it an intention. An indispensable element of a contract is a meeting of the minds upon the subject of the contract. A ratification is the adoption of a previously formed contract. Stanton v. Railway Co., 59 Conn. 284, 22 Atl. 300. The retention of the note, unexplained, might be evidence from which the jury would be justified in finding the intent to ratify. But it would be no more than evidence. It would not, of itself, be a ratification. It would be open to explanation. In this case there were circumstances of explanation. The plaintiff claimed that, instead of ratifying the sale, he had expressly repudiated it. The jury should have been told to consider the fact of the retention of the note in connection with the other circumstances of the case, and from all the facts taken together to find whether or not the plaintiff had ratified the sale. There is error, and a new trial must be granted. The other judges concurred. CAIN v. BRACKEN. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. May 18, 1894.) Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; George W. Wheeler, Judge. Action for assault and battery by Charles A. Cain against John Bracken. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. William C. Case and William H. Ely, for appellant. Charles S. Hamilton, for appellee. PER CURIAM. New trial denied. All concur. No opinion filed. STATE ex rel. PINKERMAN v. RUSLING et al., Police Commissioners. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 9, 1894.) CITY CHARTER OF BRIDGEPORT-BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS-POWER OF REMOVAL. Under section 58 of the city charter of Bridgeport, by which the board of police commissioners is given the sole power of appointment and removal of officers and members of the police force, and by which it is made their duty to suspend, remove, or expel any officer or member whenever, in their judgment, it shall be for the city's interest, providing that the members shall remain in office until removed by the board for cause, of which they shall be the sole judges, it is within the authority of that board to remove a captain for disobedience of orders, after a trial has been accorded him. Appeal from superior court, Fairfield county; Thayer, Judge. Application by John P. Pinkerman for a writ of mandamus to issue requiring John A. Rusling and others, as the board of police commissioners for the city of Bridgeport, to restore relator to the office of police captain in said city, from which, as he alleged, respondents had wrongfully dismissed him. From an order granting a motion to quash the writ, relator appeals. Affirmed. Goodwin Stoddard and Jacob B. Klein, for appellant. Howard H. Knapp, for appellees. ANDREWS. C. J. This was an application to the superior court in Fairfield county, praying that a writ of peremptory mandamus be issued commanding the defendants, the board of police commissioners for the city of Bridgeport. to restore the relator to the office of captain of police in the said city. The application was by the consent of all parties, treated as the alternative writ. Service was made, the parties appeared in court, and the defendants moved that the writ be quashed. That motion was granted, and the relator appealed. The facts are these: Prior to the 25th day of June, 1892, the relator was captain of police in the said city. On that day he was removed from that office by the defendant board, after due hearing with witnesses and counsel, by a notice in writing to the city clerk of said city, the record of which is as follows: "Whereas, John P. Pinkerman, captain of the police force of the city of Bridgeport, did on the 12th day of June, 1891, neglect and refuse to obey orders of his superior officer, John Rylands, chief of police, by assigning Officer John Murphy to duty as a policeman, contrary to the explicit orders of said Rylands; and whereas, said Pinkerman, captain of the police force of the city of Bridgeport, since the 6th day of April, 1892, has continued to keep alive the litigation in the courts against the chief of police, and is now maintaining and urging said litigation, and threatens to continue said litigation in the future, in spite of decisions of the superior court adverse to his claim; and whereas, the conduct of the said Pinkerman in waging legal warfare with his superior officer has stirred up strife and contention, and interfered with the harmonious working of the police force; and whereas, it is necessary and desirable that the entire force should act in unison for the best interests of the city: Now, therefore, resolved, that inasmuch as the conduct of the said Pinkerman has been prejudicial to the best interests of the city, and the cause of much strife and contention among the force, it is unwise and inexpedient that he should be retained in his present office. Resolved, that the said John P. Pinkerman be and he is hereby dismissed from the police force of the city of Bridgeport. Attest: Charles C. Wilson, Clerk of the Board of Police Commissioners." The charter of the city of Bridgeport contains the following section: "Sec. 58. The police commissioners of said city of Bridgeport shall have the sole power of appointment and removal of officers and members of the police department of said city of Bridgeport; and it shall be the duty of the said board of police commissioners to appoint suitable persons to fill the offices of said police department, and other suitable persons as members of said police department, and to suspend, remove, or expel any officer or memoer from office or membership in said department whenever, in the judgment of said commissioners, such suspension, removal, or expulsion shall be for the best interests of the city; and whenever any person shall be appointed an officer or member of said police department, or whenever any officer or member of said police department shall be suspended, removed, or expelled from his office or membership in said department, it shall be the duty of the said board of police commissioners to give a written notice, within a reasonable time, to the city clerk of said city of Bridgeport of such appointment, suspension, removal, or expulsion. The present police force of said city of Bridgeport shall hold their respective offices, unless previously suspended, removed, or expelled, until others are appointed in their stead; and every officer or member of said police department shall hold his office and membership in said department until removed or expelled by said board of police commissioners tor cause, of which said board of police commissioners shall be the sole judges. Nothing contained in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the common council of said city of Bridgeport from increasing or reducing the members of the police force of said city, or creating new offices in said police department; and in case the common council of said city shall vote to reduce the police force of said city, the board of police commissioners shall remove a sufficient number of the officers and members of said police force to conform to the vote of said common council." Laws 1887, p. 535. Several reasons are assigned by the defendants why their motion to quash the writ should be granted, the third of which is this: "Third. Because it appears from the allegations of said application and by the charter of said city of Bridgeport, to which reference is therein made, that these respondents, police commissioners of said city of Bridgeport, are vested with the sole power of appointment and removal of officers and members of the police department of said city, and that it is their duty, whenever, in their judgment, it shall be for the best interests of said city that any officer or member of said police department shall be removed, to remove him, and that said police commissioners shall be the sole judges of the cause for which any officer or member of said department may be removed; and it appears from the allegations of said application that these respondents, police commissioners, as aforesaid, in the exercise of the judgment and discretion thus vested in them, have, after hearing said relator, together with his witnesses and counsel, removed this relator from the office of captain of police of said city, which discretion, so vested in these respondents, this relator seeks to control by said alternative writ of mandamus." The defendants insist that the board of police commissioners of the city of Bridgeport, of which they are the members, is vested with a supreme and uncontrolled discretion in the matter of removals from the police force of that city. The relator concedes that if they have such supreme discretion their action cannot be controlled by a writ of mandamus. That such is the law would seem to be beyond controversy. It is so stated by the text writers and in the decisions of courts, so far as we are informed, with entire uniformity. Security Co. v. Fyler, 60 Conn. 448, 22 Atl. 494; State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 567, 23 Atl. 924; Freeman v. Selectmen, etc., of New Haven, 34 Conn. 406. But the relator claims that the defendant board does not possess such supreme and uncontrolled discretion in the matter of removals. He claims that the board can remove only for "cause," and that "cause" means "sufficient cause"; and that, to warrant his removal, the cause must be something personal to himself which renders him an unsuitable person to retain the position. We cannot agree with the relator in his argument. The cases. cited by his counsel, and the only ones on which they seem to rely, do not support his claim. These cases are People v. Board of Fire Com'rs, 72 N. Y. 445, and State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496. These cases were on charters containing quite different provisions from the charter of Bridgeport. In the first case the relator, Joseph H. Munday, was a regular clerk in the fire department in the city of New York, and had been removed from that position by the fire commissioners, without giving him any notice of the cause of his removal. The charter of that city gave the general power of removal of clerks and employés of the fire department to the board of fire commissioners. But that power was limited by declaring that it "cannot be exercised in respect to any regular clerk *** until he has been informed of the cause of the proposed removal, and has had an opportunity of making an explanation"; and it was held that the board of fire commissioners had exceeded their authority. The case 'from Wisconsin was this: The law of that state empowered the board of supervisors of a county to remove certain officers for "incompetency, improper conduct, or other cause satisfactory to the board." All that was decided was that "other cause" must be "other kindred cause." Ex parte Ramshay, 18 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 175, is not applicable, because in this case the defendants did give the relator notice and an opportunity to be heard, with witnesses and by counsel. Besides, we are clearly of the opinion that the legislature has given to this board of police commissioners the supreme and absolute power of removals from, as well as appointments to, the police force of the city of Bridgeport, as fully as language can be used to confer such power, and to be used at discretion. In the first place, in the section of the charter above recited, this board is given the sole power of appointment and removal of officers and members of the police force of that city; then, it is made the duty of the defendant board to supend, remove, or expel any officer or member of the police whenever, in the judgment of said commissioners, such suspension, removal, or expulsion shall be for the best interests of the city; and, finally, that the members of the police force shall remain in office until removed or expelled by the defendant board for cause, of which cause the said board shall be the sole judges. State v. Asylum St. Bridge Commission, 63 Conn. 91, 26 Atl. 580. But the case does not require the application of any extreme or rigorous rule. It comes fairly within the very rule invoked by the relator. The statement shows that the defendant board did give notice to the relator of the charges against him, and appointed a time for him to appear and be heard. He appeared, and was heard with his witnesses and by counsel. The board after that hearing found him guilty of disobedience to his superior officer, and of such conduct as caused strife and a want of harmony among the police force, and that it was for the best interest of the city that he be removed from the office which he held. Then they did remove him. It seems to the court that they acted, not only within their authority, but with a due regard to the rights of the relator. There is no error. The other judges concurred. TOWN OF ANSONIA v. COOPER et al. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 9, 1894.) SALE OF REAL PROPERTY-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT -RATIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT WHAT CONSTITUTES. The owner of a life interest in certain realty conveyed the fee thereof to another for a certain sum, a part of which sum the remainder-men agreed to accept for their interest in the property; and, without further consideration, all but one of them deeded their interests to the grantee in such sale. This one knew, when he accepted his share of the proceeds, of the sale, and that this was the consideration therefor. Proceedings having been established to condemn the land for school purposes, he assigned to another his share in any award that should be made. Held that, having ratified the sale, his assignee acquired no interest in the award. Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Prentice, Judge. Condemnation proceedings by the town of Ansonia to acquire title to certain property for school purposes. The report of the committee appointed for that purpose was accepted, the money paid into court, and defendants Alfred Cooper, Henry G. Alling, and Elizabeth Downs were cited to interplead, to determine their respective rights thereto. Defendant Cooper disclaimed any, but, from an order sustaining a demurrer by defendant Downs to his answer and claim, defendant Alling appeals. Reversed. V. Munger, for appellant. Allan W. Paige and George P. Carroll, for appellee Elizabeth Downs. ANDREWS, C. J. In September, 1891, the town of Ansonia preferred its application to the superior court, in New Haven county, for the appointment of a committee to appraise certain lands in that town, taken for the site of a schoolhouse. The application was duly served, and returned to that court. A committee was appointed, who appraised the said land at the value of $625, and made report of their doings to the court. The report was accepted, and the money paid into court, and is now in the hands of the clerk of the court. Since the commencement of the proceedings, other parties have been cited in, viz. Henry G. Alling and Lewis E. Cooper, of Ansonia, and Elizabeth Downs, of Huntington, each of whom claimed or appeared to have some interest in the said sum of money. The court, in its order accepting the report of the appraisers, decreed that the said Henry G. Alling, Louis E. Cooper, and Elizabeth Downs interplead with each other as to which of them is legally or equitably entitled to said sum of money. The only controversy in respect to the money is now between Elizabeth Downs, on the one side, and Henry G. Alling, on the other. Pursuant to the order of the court requiring the parties to interplead, the said Elizabeth Downs set forth her claims at large; and the said Henry G. Alling made answer thereto, and set forth his claims, and later an amended and substituted answer and claims, to which said Downs demurred. The court sustained that demurrer, and Alling has appealed. The facts, somewhat condensed, from the record, are as follows: Charles Cooper, the elder, was in his lifetime, and at his death, the owner in fee and in possession of the land described in the said application, and of other adjacent land, all of the value of $2,500. He was also the possessor of personal property to the value of $10,000. By his will he devised the residue of his estate, real and personal, to his wife, Elizabeth Cooper, for her life, and the remainder to his four sons, Alfred Cooper, Charles Cooper, William Cooper, and Henry Cooper, to be theirs absolutely, in equal shares. The land in question came to said Elizabeth Cooper by virtue of said will. The said Charles Cooper died about March 20, 1876. On the 31st day of July, 1880, the said Elizabeth Cooper conveyed all said lands, by a warranty deed, to Henry and Augusta Rolf, and received therefor the sum of $2,500, which was its full value, including the fee as well as the life estate. That deed was immediately put on record. The grantees entered into possession, and they and their grantees have ever since kept the possession thereof, to the time the condemnation proceedings were completed. By sundry conveyances, the title and interest conveyed by the said deed of Mrs. Elizabeth Cooper has come to, and is now vested in, Henry G. Alling, who purchased in 1886, subsequent to the agreement between the four sons of Mrs. Cooper, below stated. Mrs. Cooper died in 1885, leaving no property of her own, of any kind. Of the $2,500 which |