Prindle v. Holcomb damages alone remains. The court before which the action. is pending must necessarily have the power to determine that question unless there is something in the nature of the case or in the provisions of the statute which confers jurisdiction of that question upon some other tribunal. There is no inherent difficulty in determining it before the, Superior Court, and no special reason why it should be done by the court of probate. The argument of the defendants assumes that testamentary trustees stand upon the same footing with executors and administrators. Executors and administrators are charged with the duty of settling estates, over which courts of probate have sole and exclusive jurisdiction. It is important that the probate records should show all the proceedings relating to such settlements; hence the propriety and necessity of requiring administrators' accounts to be settled in that court. But with testamentary trustees it is different. Ordinarily they take the trust property after the estate is settled and distribution or a partial distribution is made, and hold it for the purposes of the trust. These trusts are created by will, and the relations existing between the trustee and the cestui que trust are not essentially different from those existing in cases of ordinary common law trusts. Over such trusts courts of probate will exercise no jurisdiction except as it is conferred by statute. Cases of testamentary trusts probably were not frequent prior to 1822, as we find no reference to them in the statutes before that year. Such as may have existed were doubtless regulated and controlled by the General Assembly, or by courts of equity after equity powers were conferred upon the courts in 1778. In 1822 a statute was passed providing that, in case of the death or incapacity of a trustee appointed by will, or of his refusal to accept, the court of probate "shall appoint some suitable person or persons to execute said trust according to the will, taking from them good and sufficient bonds with surety conditioned for a faithful performance thereof." Thus the law stood until 1831, when courts of probate were authorized to remove trustees for cause; and in 1832 an act was passed regulating proceedings upon the resignation of trustees and Prindle v. Holcomb. providing for the appointment of others in their stead. The next change made was in 1853, when the act was passed requiring trustees, conservators and guardians to render annual accounts to the court of probate. Under the statutes in force prior to 1853 it will hardly be claimed that a settlement of the trustee's account in the court of probate was essential to the maintenance of an action on his bond. No such settlement was provided for by statute, and probate courts had no such power unless it existed previous to the statutes. That it did not previously exist is apparent when we consider that it is essentially an exercise of chancery powers and glance at the history of courts and equity and probate jurisdiction in this state. The "General Court" had sole jurisdiction of equity causes until 1778, when jurisdiction was conferred upon the county courts in all matters not exceeding £200, and upon the Superior Court in all matters exceeding £200 and not exceeding £800, reserving to the General Court jurisdiction in all matters above the latter sum. Courts of probate, as separate tribunals, were first constituted in the year 1698. In the early history of the colony the ordinary courts of justice-the "Particular Court" or "Court of Magistrates," as it was sometimes called, entertained jurisdiction of "Wills and Inventories." In 1666 counties were organized and probate jurisdiction was conferred upon the county courts. Col. Records, Vol. 2, pages 34-39. In 1698 the judge of the county court, with two justices of the quorum, were constituted a "court for the probate of wills, granting administration, and appointing and allowing of guardians, with full power to act in all matters proper for a prerogative court." Col. Records, Vol. 4, page 268. In 1699 (same volume, p. 307,) courts of probate were authorized to call administrators to account "for and touching the goods and estate of such deceased person." In 1784 that provision was extended to executors, and has remained a part of the statute laws of this state until this day. Revision of 1875, p. 393, sec. 32. As thus constituted courts of probate were courts of special and limited powers, and had such jurisdiction only as was Prindle v. Holcomb. expressly conferred by statute. If an express statute was required to authorize them to call executors and administrators to account, it will not be presumed that they had powers to call testamentary trustees to account in the absence of any such statute. If equity jurisdiction was so sparingly conferred, and to a limited extent only, upon the higher courts, it affords strong reasons for presuming that courts of probate did not exercise such jurisdiction without express authority. It follows that the court of probate had not jurisdiction of the settlement of Holcomb's account as trustee unless such jurisdiction was conferred by the act of 1853. That act requires all guardians, trustees and conservators annually to render an account for the year next preceding, embracing therein an inventory or schedule of the estate held by them, the estimated value of the same, the amount of income, interest, issues and profits thereof during the year, and the amount paid or proposed to be paid for the support of, or as dividends to, or for the person or persons for whose benefit the estate is held. Such accounts are to be sworn to, and a neglect or refusal to render the same is to be deemed a refusal to perform the duties of the trust. It will be noticed that the language of this act refers to an annual account to be made to the court of probate, and not to a final settlement with the person or persons ultimately entitled to the trust fund or the income therefrom. There is no provision for notice to other parties interested, none for enforcing any order or decree, and indeed none for compelling any account to be rendered. It is apparent therefore from what the act says and from what it omits to say, that the legislature did not contemplate by the account required a final and conclusive determination of the rights of the parties. Suppose the trustee had rendered his account and had omitted from the inventory or schedule some item of the trust property, or had neglected to charge himself with some portion of the income received; the acceptance of his account by the court would be no defense to an action on his bond to recover the value of the property so omitted. That was held in the case of an executor even after there had been a final Prindle v. Holcomb. Moore v. Holmes, settlement of his administration account. 32 Conn., 553. Suppose he had credited himself with a sum of money paid to the person entitled to the income which in fact was never paid. For the same reason and upon the same principle he would still be liable therefor on his bond. Suppose further that he should refuse to render any account; what power has the court of probate except to declare the trusteeship vacant and appoint another in his place? In that event what remedy has the cestui que trust, if the theory of the defendants is correct, that his account can only be settled in the court of probate? These reasons seem to us sufficient to justify the conclusion that the accounts required by the act of 1853 do not conclude the parties, and that there is little or no room for inferring that the court of probate has power to settle the final accounts, and determine conclusively the rights of trustees and parties interested in the trust estate. The Circuit Court of the United States, in this district, took the same view of the statute under consideration. Parsons v. Lyman, 32 Conn., 566. It is competent therefore for the Superior Court to determine the question of damages in this action. We see no reason for sanctioning the claim of the plaintiff that he is entitled to recover the interest accruing since the commencement of this suit, as this is not a final settlement of all matters between the parties. We advise the Superior Court to render judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of interest due at the time this suit was commenced. In this opinion the other judges concurred. PARK, C. J., CARPENTER, PARDEE AND GRANGER, Js. JONATHAN W. POND vs. WATTS COOKE AND ANOTHER. Where property has once vested in an assignee or receiver by the law of the state where the property is situated the law of another state will not divest him of his right to it, if he should take it into such state in the performance of his duty. A receiver of an insolvent manufacturing corporation appointed by a court in New Jersey where it was located, took possession of its assets, and for the purpose of completing a bridge which it had contracted to build in this state, purchased iron with the funds of the estate, and sent it to this state. Held— that the iron was not open to attachment in this state by a creditor residing here. And held that a party giving a receipt for the property to the officer who attached it, and taking it into his possession, was not liable to nominal damages in a suit brought upon the receipt after a demand and refusal. A receiver appointed by a court in such a case stands in the same position as an assignee or trustee in insolvency. ASSUMPSIT on a receipt given by the defendants to the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff of the county of New Haven, for certain property attached by him in a suit against the Watson Manufacturing Company; brought to the Superior Court. The following facts were agreed upon. The Blake Crusher Company, a corporation located in New Haven, brought a suit to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County, at its October term, 1876, against the Watson Manufacturing Company, a corporation located in Paterson, in the state of New Jersey, and William G. Watson, of said Paterson, and recovered judgment against the defendants in |