City of Hartford v. West Middle District.

personal claims, still their liability to other parties continues, and that keeps alive their trusteeship, and their official interest in the policy.

But aside from that I think there is no force in this objection. When the fire occurred the plaintiffs, as trustees, were owing $83,000. This policy then became a claim, and was a part of the assets in their hands to be applied in payment of that indebtedness. A part of that indebtedness was due to themselves personally and a part to other parties. I think they are entitled to collect this policy; and when collected, whether paid to one creditor or to another, to themselves personally or to others, can make no possible difference.

In this opinion GRANGER, J., concurred.

CITY OF HARTFORD vs. WEST MIDDLE DISTRICT.

Under the charter of the city of Hartford all land specially benefited by a city improvement is liable to be assessed for the expense of such improvement. Held that a piece of land owned by a school district, upon which its schoolhouse stood, and which was used solely for school purposes, and of which no other use was contemplated in the future, was not so benefited that it could be assessed for the expense of a street laid out by the city near it.

To render an assessment of benefits legal, it must appear that the benefit is direct and immediate, not contingent and remote.

DEBT, to recover the amount of an assessment for the expense of the laying out of a city street, near to a schoolhouse of the defendants, an incorporated school district of the town of Hartford. The action was brought to the Superior Court in the county of Hartford, and tried to the court before Hovey, J., who made a finding of the facts and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

G. G. Sill, with whom was E. Johnson, for the plaintiffs

in error.

City of Hartford v. West Middle District.

C. R. Chapman, for the defendants in error.

GRANGER, J. The principal question presented by this record is, whether a school district is liable to assessment for benefits to its property by the laying out of a street or highway. If this question is determined, as we think it must be, in favor of the defendants in this case, a consideration of the other questions made becomes unnecessary.

The Superior Court finds that the "assessment was made upon the defendants, because they were the owners of property in said city, which in the opinion of the board of street commissioners was specially benefited by the laying out of said new highway or street. Said property consisted of a lot of land, with a school-house thereon, which land the defendants purchased in 1872, as a site for said school-house, at a cost of $35,000, and took a deed thereof in their corporate name, and in 1873 erected said school-house, at an expense of $118,844. The defendants used the whole of said land for school district purposes, and cannot maintain the public schools, which they are required by law to maintain, and provide them with sufficient and convenient accommodations without it. The said school-house was designed, built and fitted up for school purposes only. For those purposes exclusively it has been used ever since it was completed, and it is adapted to no other purpose or use. Moreover it is centrally located and accommodates all the inhabitants of the district."

This was the condition and character of the property at the time the assessment was made, and at the time the street was laid out. How could the defendants, as a school district, be benefited by the laying out of the street? The assessment was undoubtedly made upon the idea that the intrinsic value of the property was increased, but, if that were so as a matter of fact, does it follow that it was increased in value as school district property, bought and used solely for school purposes, and did the district, or could it from the nature of things, derive any immediate, direct or special benefit from the laying out of the street? We are unable to see how the district as

Stanley Rule & Level Co. v. Bailey.

a corporation could be so benefited, or that their property was rendered any more valuable for the purpose for which they use it, and for which they must continue to use it, if not for all time, at least for a very long period.

To render the assessment of benefits legal and valid, it must appear that the benefit is direct and immediate, and not contingent and remote. City of Bridgeport v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co., 36 Conn., 255; New York & New Haven Railroad Co. v. City of New Haven, 42 Conn., 279. We think there is manifest error in the judgment of the Superior Court, and it must be reversed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred; except CARPENTER, J., who did not sit.

THE STANLEY RULE & LEVEL COMPANY vs. LEONARD BAILEY.

The plaintiffs entered into a contract with the defendant, under which they were to have the exclusive right to manufacture and sell various articles under numerous patents owned by him, the right to continue during the life of the patents and any extension of them, and they to pay him a royalty on all the articles sold, the defendant agreeing to defend them against all parties claiming a right to use the patents. Certain of the patents expired and were not renewed by the defendant, but the plaintiffs not being aware of the fact, but believing them in force, went on paying the royalty upon articles made under them, the defendant receiving the money in the belief that he was entitled to it under the contract. In a suit to recover back the money so paid, it was held

1. That under the contract the defendant was not entitled to a continuance of the royalty until all the patents had expired, but only to receive it on the articles manufactured under the patents that had not expired.

2. That if the money was paid in ignorance of the fact that the patents had expired, the plaintiffs were entitled to a repayment of it.

3. That the fact that the plaintiffs had the means of informing themselves by enquiry of the defendant, was not sufficient to charge them with knowledge; it being a case where they might reasonably expect the defendant to inform

them.

4. That the payment after they had knowledge, of the royalty on articles manufactured under the unexpired patents, did not constitute a waiver of their right to demand back the money paid as royalty on articles manufactured under the patents that had expired.

Stanley Rule & Level Co. v. Bailey.

ASSUMPSIT, to recover back money claimed to have been paid under a mistake of facts; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County. The facts were found by a committee, and on the facts the court (McManus, J.,) rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendant brought the record before this court by a motion in error. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

G. G. Sill, for the plaintiff in error.

C. E. Mitchell, for the defendants in error.

PARK, C. J. We think the finding of the court below, that the money sought to be recovered in this suit was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant through misapprehension of the facts with regard to their obligation to pay it, is decisive of the case. It is conceded that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover a part of the amount, and we think it is equally clear they ought to recover the whole. That part of it which is in dispute was paid to the defendant as a royalty for the privilege of manufacturing and selling certain articles, under certain patents, of which the defendant previous to this time was the owner. The money was paid according to the terms of a certain contract between the parties, wherein the defendant, for the consideration of a certain royalty to be paid on all the articles, covered by the patents, which should be manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs, granted them the privilege of manufacturing and selling them during the continuance of the patents and any extension of them. The plaintiffs manufactured and sold the articles, and paid the royalty according to the terms of the contract. In the meantime some of the defendant's patents expired and were not extended, but the plaintiffs being ignorant of the fact continued to pay the royalty as they had done before, and paid the sum which they now seek to recover on patents which had thus expired. The defendant knew that the patents had expired and had not been renewed at the time he received the money; but believing that he had the right to receive it under the contract, did not state the fact to the plaintiffs.

VOL. XLV.-59

Stanley Rule & Level Co. v. Bailey.

It further appears that the plaintiffs paid the money believ ing that the patents were in force, and that they would not have paid it had they known the facts. But it is said that they had the means of knowledge, and that this is equivalent to knowledge itself. There may be such full and complete means of knowledge as to be equivalent to knowledge itself, but we think this is not such a case. The defendant owned the patents. He was in the employ of the plaintiffs. The patents were on a large number of articles; and some of them were covered by two or more patents of different dates. The case was a complicated one, and required thorough examination to determine the exact fact. It would naturally be expected that the defendant would keep himself informed on the matter, and being in the employment of the plaintiffs would inform them when the patents expired. This would reasonably be expected by the plaintiffs where they had no reason to suspect dishonesty in the defendant; and we think they had a right to rely on what would ordinarily be expected under the circumstances.

It is further said that the defendant had a right to the royalty under the contract; that a true construction of it entitles him to the royalty on all the articles, so long as any of the patents are in force on any of the articles. This claim is manifestly erroneous. The right conveyed by the contract is an "exclusive right to make and vend" the articles, and it is "to continue during the life of the patents, or any exten sion of them." Besides which it is provided in the contract that the payment of the royalty shall be co-extensive only with the exclusive right conveyed; also that the defendant shall warrant and defend the exclusive right conveyed. When a patent expires the right to manufacture and sell the article patented ceases to be an exclusive right and becomes a general one. Now the defendant's royalty is confined to articles which the plaintiffs have an exclusive right to manufacture and sell. As that right by the expiration of one patent after another becomes general, so the royalty becomes reduced, and the obligation to warrant and defend is likewise reduced in the same proportion. These three provisions are co-extensive.