and its effects on other nations and individuals, as well as on the nations and individuals more immediately involved, are so direful and calamitous, that it can not be justified except as a last resort.

ers.

§ 6. When a formal and solemn declaration of war has been made by Congress, peace can be secured only through the negotiations of ambassadors or ministers representing the contending powAfter the ministerial or ambassadorial conference has agreed on the terms of peace, the power to accept or reject those terms on the part of the United States belongs to the President and Senate. As we have seen in considering the Senate-powers, it requires a majority of two-thirds of the members present to ratify any treaty, including a treaty of peace.

§ 7. The power to declare war doubtless implies the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal. Letters of this kind are sometimes issued by the government to prevent the necessity of a resort to war, though they are incident to the war-making power. They are frequently issued before a declaration of war. They are grantable by the law of nations, says Blackstone, whenever the subjects of one State are oppressed or injured by those of another, and justice is denied by that State to which the oppressor belongs.

§ 8. Marque signifies, as here used, a license from the government to pass beyond the limits or jurisdiction of one's own country; and reprisal signifies a taking in return. Letters of marque and reprisal are a commission from the government authorizing the bearer to pass beyond the boundaries of his own country for the purpose of capturing prizes of the enemy, consisting of their persons or goods. Whatever is so captured is held under certain regulations until satisfaction shall be made to the government or individuals injured.

§ 9. This commission saves the bearer of it, and his crew, from the liability, if captured themselves, of being tried, convicted, and punished as pirates. In case it so happens in their conflicts that they are taken prisoners, they have the protection of their government that they shall be treated as prisoners of war; and, in case

they should be treated otherwise, their own government would retaliate.

3. CAPTURES.

§ 10. But it is necessary that rules should be adopted concerning captures made, whether on land or water. Congress is authorized by the Constitution to make these rules, which, when made, become laws the same as any other laws; and, for the purpose of enforcing them, courts of admiralty have been established, whose business it is to inquire into the legality of the course pursued in taking these prizes. Persons might go out in pursuit of prizes, having no authority, or, having authority, might capture from the ships of neutrals; or an illegal course might be pursued after capture, though the capture itself were legal.

§ 11. "The cognizance of all captures or prizes," says Blackstone," and their incidents, belong exclusively to the courts of the country to which the captors belong, and from whom they derive their authority to make their captures. The remedy for illegal acts of capture is by the institution of proper prize-proceedings in the prizecourts of the captors."

4. THE ARMY.

§ 12. The other war-powers vested in Congress would be utterly useless without the power to raise and support armies. Probably no power of Congress mentioned in the Constitution met with so strong opposition before the people as this one to raise and support armies. It was urged with great force and vehemence, that, being unlimited, it would be dangerous to the liberties of the people, and would finally result in the establishment of a military despotism.

§ 13. This clause refers to the regular or standing army. Con gress had no such power under the Confederation. All they could do was 'to agree on the number of land-forces, and to make requisition on each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State." True, these requisitions were to be binding on the States; but the government must wait their convenience and disposition.

§ 14. The army is created by enlistments under the acts of ConThe enlistment is for five years in the regular army. In

gress.

October, 1880, this branch of the military service numbered a little over twenty-six thousand men.

5. THE NAVY.

§ 15. The Articles of Confederation gave to Congress the power "to build and equip a navy." But, in the Constitutional Convention, the words "to provide and maintain a navy" were accepted, as having greater breadth and appropriateness of meaning.

§ 16. The navy consists of the entire number of ships of war belonging to a nation or people considered collectively. A navy is necessary for the protection of our fisheries, commerce, and navigation. We need it not only on the ocean, but on our lakes, and on several of our rivers, and this even in time of peace.

§ 17. But, in time of war, a navy becomes indispensable to a people whose geographical position is like ours. We have a long line of seaboard, through which we are exposed to the depredations of hostile fleets and invading armies. Located on that seaboard are some of our most important, flourishing, and populous cities. The possession of the chief commercial cities in any country by an enemy in time of war gives him a great advantage in the contest. He can exact contributions of the inhabitants for the support of his army.

§ 18. In the earlier years of our history, our navy found but little favor in the popular estimation. Judge Story says, "It was not until during the late war with Great Britain (1812), when our little navy, by a gallantry and brilliancy of achievement almost without a parallel, had literally fought itself into favor, that the nation at large began to awake from its lethargy on this subject, and to insist upon a policy which should at once make us respected and formidable abroad, and secure protection and honor at home."

§ 19. According to the report of the Secretary of the Navy, dated Nov. 29th, 1875, the total number of vessels in that department of the public service at that time was one hundred and forty-seven. Of these, there were in commission and on active duty one hundred and fifteen vessels, carrying one thousand and twenty-nine guns.

6.- RULES FOR ARMY AND NAVY.

§ 20. Nothing need be said to vindicate the policy and necessity of vesting in Congress the power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. It naturally follows the power to raise and support armies, and to provide and maintain This clause was not in the first draught of the Constitution, as appears from the Madison Papers; but it was afterwards inserted as an amendment, without opposition.

a navy.

7. THE MILITIA.

§ 21. The next power of Congress to be considered is that of "providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia." The country could not safely rely solely on its standing army for any and every emergency that might arise. The Constitution, therefore, gives Congress jurisdiction over the militia of the several States, and this power of providing for organizing, arming, and disciplining them, as incidental to that jurisdiction. The States have the appointment of the officers over, and the training of, the militia, as we shall see when we come to treat of the rights of States; but this must be done as directed by Congress.

§ 22. Congress is authorized also to make provision for governing such part of the militia as may be employed in the service of the United States. Rigid discipline and government have always been found necessary in the army, whether constituted of regulars or militia. This government must be uniform to be salutary. To be uniform, it must emanate from a single source. It would not do, therefore, to leave the government of the militia in the employ of the nation in the hands of the several States in which they might enlist.

§ 23. There are three purposes for which Congress may provide for calling forth the militia of the several States :

First, To execute the laws of the Union;

Second, To suppress insurrections;

Third, To repel invasions.

The organization of the militia is maintained at an expense com paratively trifling when the advantages to the country are considered.

It saves the immense cost of a large standing army in time of peace. The nation must have the means at its command for carrying on a foreign war, as well as for maintaining its authority at home; and the following reasons favor the militia system:

1st. Recent experience has demonstrated that but a few months of discipline are necessary to insure bravery, courage, and fortitude, in the field of conflict, on the part of the militia. They have crowned themselves with immortal honor, and have added unfading luster to the national reputation.

2d. An agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial community like ours will be unlikely to become involved in long and expensive wars at home or abroad. But few instances in our history have occurred when it has been necessary to call forth the militia of the several States in any considerable numbers and for any great length of time. Our history, thus far, has proved that it is more economical to keep up an extensive militia organization of the States than to keep a large standing army in the field.

3d. The President of the United States is commander-in-chief of the army and navy at all times, and of the militia of the several States when called into actual service of the government. He can not call forth the militia except under provisions made by Congress. Various acts of Congress have been passed, at different times, defining the emergencies under which the President may call forth. the militia. He is to be sole judge of the necessity to call them forth. At the close of the late Civil War, 1865, over one million of the militia were mustered out of service within a few months, and returned to the industrial pursuits of the country.

§ 24. It is believed that the standing armies of the world are now larger than they have been at any time since the great wars of the first Napoleon. The army of the United States now num bers about twenty-five thousand men. The annual cost of ou. army at present is a little less than forty million dollars.

The army of France has been fixed at seven hundred and fifty thousand men in the "active" army, and five hundred and fifty thousand in the "passive;" the latter being called "the National Guard Mobile." Total, thirteen hundred thousand men available